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Marvin, Stephen Dale

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A COMPARATIVE EXAMINATION OF THE DEVELOPMENT,  
ORGANIZATION, AND CONDUCT OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL  
OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION

STEPHEN DALE MARVIN

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ORGANIZATION, AND CONDUCT OF THE  
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS OF THE  
UNITED STATES AND  
THE SOVIET UNION

by

Stephen Dale Marvin  
//

Submitted to the  
Faculty of the School of International Service  
of The American University  
in Partial Fulfillment of  
the Requirements for the Degree  
of  
MASTER OF ARTS



AN ABSTRACT

of

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January 1965

The American University  
Washington, D. C.





## ABSTRACT

Psychological operations encompass all courses of action which are planned and conducted to create emotions, attitudes, or behavior favorable to the achievement of national policies and objectives. These operations support, in the realm of ideas, national, political, economic, and military policies from the nature and character of which the psychological operations draw their strength.

Russian heritage provides a national value system which predisposes the Soviet Union to the employment of psychological operations in the conduct of a completely integrated foreign policy. No policy action is taken without consideration of its psychological impact.

Almost the reverse of this situation is encountered in American experience, attitude, and employment of psychological operations. The history of this instrument in American foreign policy has been one of rejection or reluctant use.

Before the United States can employ the psychological instrument effectively, it must develop an integrated planning process for the achievement of its foreign policy goals. To coordinate and to conciliate a total program from the individual programs of member activities has been the American pattern. A solution will evolve only after the



government agencies are no longer permitted to decide whether or not they will carry out the letter and spirit of the Chief Executive's policies. Effective organization and positive leadership will provide this.



TO

MY FATHER

Who Exemplifies Those  
Qualities Which Made Our  
Country Great





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## TO THE SOLDIER WHO MARCHES WEST<sup>1</sup>

You are still alive. It is wonderful. Everything that lives is wonderful, even the green grass and the birds.

The dead and the rocks and the soil and the dung—they are nothing, for they have no life.

We who have life have everything; we possess fabulous wealth.

The rocks, the dead and the soil have nothing, are nothing.

Where will your road lead you, soldier? Are you going West? Are you going to Paris?

Do you know what is in the West, soldier? I shall tell you, soldier; listen.

In front of you are the English, you know that. The French and the Americans are behind them. You also know how they fire into the lines of your comrades. Perhaps they will retreat and new regiments will march ahead. Then they will fire again. Then the Allies retreat again.

But the firing never ceases . . . .

There is something else in the West. I shall tell you what this "something" is. Nobody can tell you exactly where it is, but it surely is in the West.

Your grave lies in the West.

If you march West, you can't help finding it. Possibly it is far ahead of you, behind the mountains. But possibly it is very near you, perhaps you can see it. Today or tomorrow--nobody knows. But surely, the grave lies there, as surely as does the sunset.

Do you march West, soldier? Then we say good-by to you. All of us who live say good-by.

There are only two things on earth, the living and the dead. The difference between these two things is greater than that between friend and foe, greater than that between man and animal. It is the greatest difference in this world. With the dead one you cannot marry, to the dead one you cannot be a friend, you can't talk with him, you don't touch him. If you march West, soldier we say good-by, we who are alive.

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<sup>1</sup>British Combat Propaganda Leaflet, World War I. Cited by Hans Speir, "Morale and Propaganda," Propaganda in War and Crisis, ed. Daniel Lerner (New York: George W. Stewart, 1951), p. 3.



Men and women, dogs and birds and insects--they  
shall not be with you any more . . . .

Soldier, farewell.

Today, you are one of us; you are one with men and  
women and everything that lives. You are master of  
the rocks and the woods and all inanimate things.

Tomorrow you march West.

Soldier, farewell.

Do you hear our voice?

Farewell.





## CHAPTER I

### PSYCHOLOGICAL WAR AND OPERATIONS

Psychological operations encompass those political, military, economic, and ideological courses of action which are planned and conducted to create in enemy, hostile, neutral, or friendly groups emotions, attitudes, or behavior favorable to the achievement of national policies and objectives. These operations are included within and implement psychological warfare and psychological activities. At one time, it was fashionable to differentiate between these two forms of psychological action on the basis of the existence or non-existence of a state of war or declared emergency or on the basis of the existence or non-existence of active military operations in a military theater of war.

#### I. INTRODUCTION

Today, we live in a twilight world of half-war and no peace. We have been involved in this twilight conflict since the conclusion of the Second World War. The future promises no foreseeable conclusion. At stake are the national survival, the continuation of respective political systems, and the pursuit of state goals of the United States and the Soviet Union. Such a contest is a war, irrespective of terminology or of the methods employed in its prosecution.





It seems, therefore, fallacious to approach the conduct of this war in terms other than those of stark reality. The psychological operations involved are the strategies and tactics of psychological war, nothing less. We are involved in a war, not merely in an activity; and there are no theaters where active operations are not in existence.

Modern, total warfare has three major divisions: military, politico-economic, and psychological. Psychological warfare serves as a framework or weapons-mount which provides an interchangeability within and between these three major divisions and which gives their integrated employment the widest conceivable effectiveness. Hence, psychological warfare emerges as a tool of national security policy which

injects into the "unpsychological" wars of the machine age the recollection and rediscovery of man as the agent of aggression, the object of suffering, and the human element in bureaucratized strategy and industrialized battles.<sup>1</sup>

## II. DEFINITIONS AND EARLY USAGE

Psychological warfare has been defined as warfare psychologically waged;<sup>2</sup> that is, operations carried out with

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<sup>1</sup>Hans Speir, "Psychological Warfare Reconsidered," Propaganda In War and Crisis, ed. Daniel Lerner (New York: George W. Stewart, Inc., 1951), p. 464.

<sup>2</sup>War Department General Staff, Propaganda Branch, Intelligence Division, A Syllabus of Psychological Warfare (The Pentagon, Washington, 1946), pp. 2-3.





close and studied reference to the politics, opinion, and morale of the enemy. In the broad sense, psychological warfare is the application of portions of the science of psychology to further the efforts of political, economic, or military actions. Its principal vehicle, propaganda, is the use of any form of communication to disseminate material designed to affect the minds and actions of a given group for a specific public purpose, whether military, economic, or political. In American usage, psychological warfare connotes propaganda designed to achieve national policy goals in the world political arena. This American concept of psychological warfare is somewhat less comprehensive than other terms with which it is closely linked. The more inclusive concept is that of "political warfare"--the term used by the British--which encompasses more than the means of mass communication or the handling of weapons to achieve maximum impact on the will to resist. Political warfare contributes the important concept that all instruments of policy need to be correlated properly in the conduct of war.<sup>3</sup> Effective national psychological warfare demands the inclusion of this concept of political warfare within its purview.

Psychological warfare is the recent name for an idea

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<sup>3</sup>Harold D. Lasswell, "Political and Psychological Warfare," Propaganda In War and Crisis, ed. Daniel Lerner (New York: George W. Stewart, Inc., 1951), pp. 264-265.



as old and as widespread as mankind. The idea of using psychology as an adjunct to military action is expounded in the earliest known manuals on strategy and tactics. In the fifth century B.C., Sun Tzu wrote in his Book of War on the importance of destroying the enemy's will to fight by such means as surprise, show, and noise. Essentially the same principles are set forth in the military literature and prevailing maxims of the ancient empires of India and the Middle East. The East Indian political classic, Kantilya's Arthasastra, contains advice on how to destroy enemy morale and build up one's own.<sup>4</sup> In these works, emphasis is placed on what is now called "propaganda of the deed"; that is, the assassination of important officials, the show of force, the achievement of surprise, and the taking of emotionally significant cities.

One of the earliest recorded applications was by Gideon in his great battle with the Midianites (by traditional reckoning, 1245 B.C.). Another Old Testament story relates how Joshua circled Jericho for seven times on seven days, sounding the trumpet, "and the walls came tumbling down."

The Greeks employed the "Trojan Horse" to infiltrate and undermine a mighty fortress-city that they could not

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<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 261.



*Journal of Interpersonal Violence* 28(10) 1976-1993  
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we have to use either "unavailable" or the word "not."

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reduce by siege. Herodotus tells how Themistocles subverted the Ionians, who were satellites of the Persians. Messages were engraved on stones near their watering holes to remind them of their common Greek heritage, and with the added line that, if they could not defect, they should behave badly in battle.<sup>5</sup> This was also a source of excellent propaganda intended to make the Persians think that any Ionian less than perfect was a secret Athenian sympathizer. This appeal was sound by all modern standards.<sup>6</sup>

The Romans employed a ritual of "evocatio," which can be traced back to the Hittites, by which the Romans implored the protective gods of the enemy city to pass over to the Roman camp. Some versions tried to bribe the enemy gods with promises of more sumptuous temples. Machiavelli, in his fascination with the problems of besieged cities, came to the conclusion that the Roman method of psychological operations was probably more effective than the measures used against them by their enemies.<sup>7</sup> An early example of correct target selection occurred in the First Punic War, when the Romans, having fled in panic on their first

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<sup>5</sup>Paul M. A. Linebarger, Psychological Warfare (second edition; New York: Duell Sloane, and Pearce, 1960), p. 7.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid.

<sup>7</sup>Niccolo Machiavelli, The Discourses (New York: Columbia University Press, 1940), p. 371.





encounter with the Carthaginian war elephants, retaliated by driving pigs in front of them to stampede the elephants.

The Mongol conquests were accomplished through the use of highly mobile forces, the exploitation of intelligence, the coordination of strategy, and the application of propaganda in all its forms. The Mongols deliberately used rumor to exaggerate accounts of their numbers and ferocity; they even used enemy spies to promote these rumors by boasting and by staging demonstrations to impress known spies and enemy emissaries in their midst. Although the Mongols carried out superb strategic and tactical propaganda operations, they never solved the problem of consolidation and failed to win the loyalty of the conquered peoples.

No examination of early psychological operations would be complete without noting that Cortez used horses to spread terror among the Aztecs and also exploited legends of the Fair God; that the Inquisition was a psychological warfare instrument of the Spanish rulers, Ferdinand and Isabella; that the European feudal classes identified the peasants with filth, anarchy, murder, and cruelty; that the Manchus, with odds of four hundred to one against them, used terror to nullify Chinese superiority; that the Tokugawa Shoguns used preventive psychological warfare, after 1636, to enmesh the minds of the Japanese people; that the British East India Company used propaganda in conquering India



against overwhelming numerical superiority; and that both before and during the French Revolution, revolutionary propaganda was rife.

In America, Whig propaganda was energetic in leading to colonial defiance of England. At Bunker Hill, the Colonists used one of the very earliest versions of front-line combat propaganda, a desertion leaflet for British soldiers. Paine's Common Sense and Washington's just and moderate political and military measures provided a base for patriot propaganda operations. During the Mexican War, both sides employed propaganda, but which was the more successful is difficult to determine. The Mexican effort was certainly not without effect, for the guns defending Mexico City were manned by traitor American artillerymen.<sup>8</sup> Historians in both countries gloss over the treason and subversion which occurred on each side. In the Civil War, psychological operations were carried out by both sides, both against the other and to influence opinion in England and on the continent. Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation ranks as one of the great strokes of psychological warfare.

### III. THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY

An examination of the conduct of the various

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<sup>8</sup>Linebarger, op. cit., p. 23.



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ramifications of international relations since 1914 reveals an ever-increasing emphasis on ideology, or political faith, as a driving force. An ideology is a system of deep-rooted beliefs about fundamental questions in human life and affairs.<sup>9</sup> Ideology, therefore, plays an important part in psychological warfare.

The earliest form of ideology was apparently religion.<sup>10</sup> It was the first group of ideas which decisively influenced the mentality and behavior of primitive man and primitive society. The social ideologies developed later and were, at first, intimately fused with the all-dominating religious conception of the universe. In the later evolutionary phase, the social and political ideologies separated from the religions which, more and more, lost their domination over individuals and societies. The latest step in this evolutionary process is the non-religious but totalitarian ideology which appears in recent history in a more and more vigorous and sharply-defined shape.

Ideologies pass, at times, through inactive periods, sometimes centuries in duration. There are also phases of ideological expansion. These are the phases of conquest,

---

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., pp. 30-32.

<sup>10</sup>Bela Szunyogh, Psychological Warfare (New York: The William-Frederick Press, 1955), p. 46.





the stage for the most active propaganda, for the blindest fanaticism, and for merciless intolerance. These phases represent a very important form of psychological warfare; they are Wars of Faith.

The expansion of the Muslim Creed and Empire provides a great deal of information which should not be neglected in the twentieth century. The emirs of the Arab conquests demonstrated two principles of long-range, psychological warfare which are still valid.

A people could be converted from one faith to the other if given the choice between conversion and extermination, stubborn individuals being rooted out. To effect the initial conversion, participation in the public ceremonies and formal language of the new faith were required. Sustained counter intelligence remained on the alert against back sliders. Formal acceptance would eventually become genuine acceptance by denying public media of expression to the vanquished faith.

If immediate, wholesale conversion required too extensive or severe operations, the same result could be achieved by toleration of the objectionable faith, combined with the issuance of genuine privileges to the new, preferred faith. The conquered people were left in the private, humble enjoyment of their old beliefs and folkways. However, all participation in public life, be it political, cultural,



or economic, was conditioned upon acceptance of the new faith. In this manner, all up-rising members of the society would move in a few generations over to the new faith in the process of becoming rich, powerful, or learned; what was left of the old belief became a gutter superstition, possessing neither power nor majesty.<sup>11</sup>

These two rules worked admirably in the Muslim conquests. The Germans employed them in World War II; the Soviets have employed them continuously since 1917. The first method is difficult and bloody, providing quick results. The second rule is slow but as irresistible and as sure as the movement of an ice age glacier. Whether the process is termed the "capture of the rising elite" or the "utilization of potential leadership cadres from historically superseded classes," the effect is the same. If men are placed in a position of underprivilege and shame because of their beliefs and if a way is provided for voluntary conversion to the winning side, the winning side will, sooner or later, convert almost everyone who is capable of making trouble.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>11</sup>Linebarger, op. cit., pp. 8-14 ff.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., p. 13.





## IV. THE ROLE OF PROPAGANDA

Psychological warfare is waged before, during, and after wars--it is everlasting and no one, anywhere, ever escapes its tentacles. It has become a constant part of international relations. Its principal vehicle is propaganda. Propaganda is by no means something new in the struggle of mankind; but its conscious and scientific application by means of modern, high-speed methods of mass communications has lent it an importance infinitely greater than it enjoyed in by-gone days. Because it has the means of reaching mass audiences, psychological warfare is, therefore, a potentially deadly weapon.

The word "propaganda" was originally applied to an activity which was inspired by very laudable motives. In the Roman Catholic Church, the College of Propaganda was a committee of cardinals whose task it was to adapt the teachings of Christianity to the practices and customs of people in widely different parts of the world.<sup>13</sup> Every doctrine or ideology, no matter how noble, is likely to encounter difficulties in getting itself properly understood. A good propagandist is merely one who knows how to present his ideas effectively, and the arts of propaganda are merely the

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<sup>13</sup>Carroll C. Pratt, Psychology: The Third Dimension of War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1942), p. 18.





means by which a point of view can best be made acceptable. Propaganda, however, is successful only when there is a positive policy to be sold, imaginative and creative spokesmen to sell it, and detailed knowledge about the audience and its aspirations.

## V. ELEMENTS OF PROPAGANDA

In the field of propaganda, there are five general areas or elements into which it may be broken and examined: source, time, audience, subject, and mission. These analysis factors are useful in portraying the spectrum across which propaganda is employed.

Source is the most important element. An overt and acknowledged source implies that the government issuing the message is placing it before the world. This requires dignity and an eye to the future and is most effectively accomplished through responsible public officials, preferably with international reputations, who will realize the best effect from the use of the name and facilities of the government. If the source is faked, it is very important for the government to ensure that the propaganda cannot be traced back readily. Covert sources require persons adept at illicit imaginativeness and with a strong sense of discipline and security.



In American practice, source is generally considered as falling into three categories:<sup>14</sup>

1. White propaganda issued by an acknowledged source, usually a government or an agency of the government.
2. Grey propaganda issued by an ill-defined source.
3. Black propaganda purportedly issued by a source other than the true one.

In terms of the time-span of the propaganda, a subdivision into the categories of strategic and tactical can be made.

Strategic propaganda is directed at enemy forces, areas, people, or nations in their entirety and, in coordination with strategic planning, is designed to achieve results planned and sought over a period of psychological changes that may extend over long periods.

Tactical propaganda is directed at specific audiences, usually named, and is prepared and executed in support of localized, ad hoc operations. It is employed to achieve an immediate, short-range purpose and normally does not cover a long time interval.

Propaganda is so intimately keyed to the news and opinion situation that it does not usually bear elaborate pre-operational analysis. However, on a national policy

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<sup>14</sup>Linebarger, op. cit., pp. 44-45.



The following is a list of the names of the persons who have been

admitted to the office of the Secretary of the State of New York.

1. John A. B. Smith, Secretary of the State of New York, in 1880.

2. John A. B. Smith, Secretary of the State of New York, in 1881.

3. John A. B. Smith, Secretary of the State of New York, in 1882.

4. John A. B. Smith, Secretary of the State of New York, in 1883.

5. John A. B. Smith, Secretary of the State of New York, in 1884.

6. John A. B. Smith, Secretary of the State of New York, in 1885.

7. John A. B. Smith, Secretary of the State of New York, in 1886.

8. John A. B. Smith, Secretary of the State of New York, in 1887.

9. John A. B. Smith, Secretary of the State of New York, in 1888.

10. John A. B. Smith, Secretary of the State of New York, in 1889.

11. John A. B. Smith, Secretary of the State of New York, in 1890.

12. John A. B. Smith, Secretary of the State of New York, in 1891.

13. John A. B. Smith, Secretary of the State of New York, in 1892.

14. John A. B. Smith, Secretary of the State of New York, in 1893.

15. John A. B. Smith, Secretary of the State of New York, in 1894.

16. John A. B. Smith, Secretary of the State of New York, in 1895.

17. John A. B. Smith, Secretary of the State of New York, in 1896.

18. John A. B. Smith, Secretary of the State of New York, in 1897.

19. John A. B. Smith, Secretary of the State of New York, in 1898.

20. John A. B. Smith, Secretary of the State of New York, in 1899.

21. John A. B. Smith, Secretary of the State of New York, in 1900.

level, propaganda can be categorized as offensive or defensive in nature with regard to the audience envisioned.

Defensive propaganda is designed to maintain an accepted and operating form of social or other public action in the face of a simultaneously hostile propaganda operation.

Offensive propaganda is designed to interrupt a social action not desired by the propagandist or to predispose to a social action which he desires, either through revolutionary means (within the same society) or international means, diplomatic or belligerent (between different societies).

Among the infinite number of propaganda purposes which a psychological warfare group may have in mind for the audience are several broad categories of mission:

Conversionary propaganda is designed to change the emotional or practical allegiance of individuals from one group to another.

Divisive propaganda is designed to split apart the component sub-groups of the enemy and thereby reduce the effectiveness of the enemy group, considered as a single unit.

Consolidation propaganda is directed toward civil populations in areas occupied by a military force and is designed to insure compliance with the commands or policies promulgated by the commander of the occupation forces.





Counter propaganda is designed to refute a specific point or theme of enemy propaganda.

Most of these distinctions are in reality theoretic terms and rarely find expression as a single, pure, operational entity. The basic distinctions are determined by the task involved and not by the propaganda content.<sup>15</sup>

The voice of propaganda must be self confident and convincing at all times. The propagandist must take the imperturbable stand that he can prove anything. He is never wrong, and he must never show any resignation or depression. He can prove any statement, even if it appears absurd at first view. Even if a part of the audience ridicules the speaker, others will give him credit. No failure can be allowed to weaken the speaker's confident words. When all people despair, he cannot despair; for when the propaganda fails, the fall of the movement is inevitable.

Propaganda is made up of words which are adjustable to every situation. It is of minor importance what the subject of the discussion is; what matters is the way it is spoken. Proper words may conceal any fact or may glorify unimportant details to an extreme. The importance of vocabulary is easily recognized by reading the following collection of words and expressions taken from communist writings:

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<sup>15</sup>Ibid., pp. 43-48 ff.

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. . . aggression, flunky, warmonger, enemy of the people, exploitation, mass-demonstration, hostility toward the workers, world peace organization, heroic laborer, reactionary, fighting group, landrobber, stooges, imperialists, the great patriotic war.

The mere collection of these words evokes a certain feeling. They are heavy with emotion, power and intolerance; and they are without mercy. The success of communist propaganda is to be attributed, in part, to such powerful and very dynamic language which strikes the opponent with an annihilating verve and passion.

## VI. POLICY GOALS AND PROPAGANDA

Propaganda is the tool, not the master, of policy, although effective propaganda always has some policy. The policy probably will not have been made by propagandists, and it most certainly will not remain forever the same. If the propaganda is consistent with what is known, or believed, of the policy, then it can be effective, otherwise it cannot.

Long-range goals are statements of ultimate and mid-course purposes of life in the body politic. The task of policy is to re-examine and redefine the operational connotations of these long-range goals in the light of current events, needs, and demands, so as to insure that these parameters continue to define the type of future sought by the state and its people. Since policy is the sequence of governing decisions in any body politic, it inevitably

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fluctuates as changing conditions alter issues and modify alternatives. Although its guiding policy may shift, the purpose of propaganda remains constant: to serve policy with maximum effectiveness. However, without clear policy goals firmly in control of utterances, propaganda may move its audience--but in no direction or in the wrong direction.

In world politics, policy employs four instruments to achieve its goals: propaganda (persuasion), diplomacy (negotiation), economics (bargaining), and war (coercion). Their respective vehicles are symbols, contracts, commodities, and violence.<sup>16</sup> War, economics, and even diplomacy operate upon the material environment. The propaganda function is to advance policy goals by manipulating the symbolic environment. What people believe about the future shapes their responses to present events. It is these beliefs about the future--the structure of expectations--which propaganda attempts to modify on behalf of policy goals.

The manipulation of expectations is an instrument with powerful uses but also with definite limits. The fundamental limitation is inherent in the instrument: its strategy is persuasion and its vehicle is the symbol. Propaganda does not change conditions but only beliefs about

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<sup>16</sup>Daniel Lerner, "Effective Propaganda: Conditions and Evaluation," Propaganda In War and Crisis, ed. Daniel Lerner (New York: George W. Stewart, Inc., 1951), pp. 344-346.





conditions; it cannot force people to change their beliefs but can only persuade them to do so.

Propaganda is effective when it achieves a modification of audience behavior which alters the distribution of power in ways advantageous to the policy of the propagandist.<sup>17</sup> Policy goals thus define one set of limits for propaganda activity--by postulating what is desirable. A second set of limits is defined by audience predispositions--which determine what is possible. Propaganda strategy operates within the terrain bounded by these policy and audience considerations.

It is important to recognize that the behavioral consequences of modified expectations need not appear immediately. In fact, some of the most important consequences of any attitude alterations appear only in the long-range future. Propaganda attempts to adjust the timing of the behavioral consequences it seeks to the short-range or long-range aims of its policy goals.

One requirement of sound policy is the classification of goals; a second is their instrumentation. Psychological warfare in support of policy must, first, clearly define its objectives and the methods through which it proposes to attain them. Second, it must determine with regard to

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<sup>17</sup>Ibid., pp. 348-354.



For more information, contact the author at [john.davis@unh.edu](mailto:john.davis@unh.edu).

—Tous les jours, il y a des gens qui se font tuer.

• **Alumni:** beyond the book endowments, willing to exchange

objectives and methods, the popular aspirations of those to whom the psychological appeal is addressed. Third, it must determine to what extent psychological warfare is capable of supporting political policy.

## VII. INTELLIGENCE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Assuming that clear goals and firm policy are available for the conduct of psychological operations, to move towards instrumentation of these goals demands adequate intelligence of conditions. The crucial service rendered to policymaking by the intelligence function is perhaps the most serious area of ignorance in our present understanding of the political process. The instruments of policy activate policy decisions by continuously modifying present conditions toward future goals. Policy specifies the desired ends; intelligence appraises the available means. Each of the policy instruments (propaganda, diplomacy, economics, and war) has its destructive techniques, but all are to be appraised by the criterion of effectiveness.<sup>18</sup> Intelligence is, therefore, indispensable to both policy and psychological operations.

Each sphere of policy is to some extent an end and to some extent a means. Thus, for example, every proposed

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<sup>18</sup>Lerner, Propaganda in War and Crisis, op. cit., XIV-XV.





military policy must be evaluated with reference to other objectives in that sphere and to the goals in the spheres of diplomacy, economics, and psychology. Intelligence can clarify goals and alternatives and provide needed knowledge. The types of knowledge needed for psychological policy may be classified: (1) distribution of attitudes, (2) trend of attitudes, and (3) comparison of available alternatives with past situations and with scientific findings. Attitudes, in turn, can be inferred from many kinds of data such as: (1) what people say and do, (2) what is said to people, and (3) what is done to people.<sup>19</sup>

The organization of the intelligence function calls for the proper articulation of many specialists with the policy makers. Psychological operations and propaganda are not the same as advertising. Psychological warfare is a task of extraordinary complexity, requiring intellectuals, scholars, journalists, political philosophers, and specialists with creative imaginations in the fields of political sociology, social psychology, history, cultural anthropology, and communications. Psychological warfare must understand and reach the people for whom it is intended. This is not a job for stodgy, conformist bureaucrats.

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<sup>19</sup>Harold D. Lasswell, "Policy and the Intelligence Function," Propaganda In War and Crisis, Daniel Lerner (ed.) (New York: George W. Stewart, Inc., 1951), pp. 55-58 f, 61 f.

... military policy must be consistent with resistance to change  
 objectives in that sphere and in the field of the subject of  
 economy, technology, and psychology. Intelligence and  
 security goals and objectives and their related knowledge,  
 the types of knowledge needed for psychological policy may  
 be classified: (1) distribution of resources, (2) level of  
 activity, and (3) complexity of weapons development with  
 past situations and with scientific knowledge. However, it  
 must be recognized that many kinds of data may not (1)  
 have people say and do, (2) that it may be possible, and (3)  
 that it may be possible.

The relationship of the intelligence function exists  
 for the proper utilization of such resources and the  
 policy making psychological research and proposals and  
 not for them as a discipline. Psychological research is a  
 form of systematically (scientific) knowledge (intelligence),  
 whereas, intelligence, political intelligence, and political  
 intelligence research is the field of political  
 science, social psychology, history, and social anthropology,  
 and communication. Psychological research and intelligence  
 and teach the people the way it is important. There is not a  
 job for people, intelligence research.

<sup>1</sup>Charles A. Lindholm, "Vitality and the Intelligence  
 Function," *Proceedings of the Intelligence Research Society* (1961),  
 New York: American Psychological Association, 1961, pp. 25-28, p. 27.



### VIII. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND POLICY FORMULATION

The relationships between those who formulate authoritative declarations of policy and those who perform the intelligence function require constant refinement and redefinition. Psychological material is less definitive than technical reports, and its adequate presentation demands a close personal relationship amongst planning personnel. If psychological operations are to be correctly related to policy, psychological planners must occupy a prominent position in all circles and levels of policy councils. Only through constant emphasis can policy makers come to recognize and sense the full degree of their reliance upon certain facts for basic clarification of their task.

Policy makers often leave goals phrased in ambiguous language that is open to misinterpretation, and it is one of the functions of the intelligence branch to point out any ambiguity and to seek out an authoritative declaration. Psychological operators continually ask for new specifications of objectives. Many times the goals enunciated by the makers of policy are inconsistent or even contradictory. On other occasions, authoritative statements are entirely missing in reference to many zones of action. In this process of clarification of goals, the psychological operator



rapidly discovers that there can be no clarification unless the need for integrated policy is widely felt. It is at this point where the nicest balance must be observed. To attempt to force a rigorous proclamation of purpose may not only fail to carry the policy group along but may lead to the rejection of disciplined fact gathering.<sup>20</sup> Yet, failure to keep the need of clarity at the focus of policy-making attention may result in a critical delay in adjustment to reality.

#### IX. IMPONDERABLES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

In physical warfare, the inherent instability in every situation, including such variables as weather, is partly compensated for by the ponderable factors. In psychological warfare, there is virtually nothing that can be calculated. The target--the enemy mind in its entirety--is a factor beyond the absolute, finite understanding of man. The propagandist can define: (1) the specific kinds of demoralization or discord he wishes to create, (2) the particular enemy audiences in which he wishes to create them, (3) the types of arguments he proposes to use, and (4) the media through which he will project his propaganda; but very

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<sup>20</sup> Ibid., pp. 66-67.







little more.<sup>21</sup> The honest psychological operator will admit that he does not know where he is at any given moment, how far he is from his starting point, or how near he is to his goal. The propagandist can never say, "this consideration is now finished; let us proceed to the next phase."

Psychological warfare is far more complex than a single propaganda campaign, and the key to its effective use lies in an appreciation of its possibilities and its limitations. Psychological warfare officers and researchers must develop a realistic, specific, and mature approach to the problems that actually arise. They must realize that the basic principles of war apply also in psychological warfare. Further, psychological factors must be taken into account in making command decisions. This involves the gathering of psychological warfare intelligence, including information on the political and psychological effects of tactics and weapons systems.

At present, it is a rare American political or military leader who consciously considers psychological implications when making command decisions. Possibly this failing is due to the fact that it is a rare intelligence officer (civil or military) who looks for or adequately reports intelligence of the type needed in psychological warfare

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<sup>21</sup>Linebarger, op. cit., p. 150 f.



operations. It is certainly due, in part, to a national indisposition towards psychological operations. Irrespective of the reason, the need for more and better psychological warfare intelligence is great. To be effective, psychological warfare demands valid measurements of the motivational forces affecting groups whose behavior and thinking it is wished to influence. Accurate data must be available on current attitudes, interests, and beliefs of target populations. It is imperative to know what information and misinformation they possess, the source of information they trust, the concepts they hold, and the values they seek to realize.

#### X. MORAL AND TRADITIONAL OBJECTIONS

The world is governed in accordance with political customs, ideas, and structures that developed long ago. Psychological warfare is in one sense reactionary, because it goes behind the target state and appeals to the individual as a member of the human community. The greater the success of psychological warfare in inducing treason, the more humane it is as a weapon. Nevertheless, there are unpleasant and immoral overtones in the use of psychological warfare. In the hands of the wrong persons, it is capable of being converted into a drastic instrument of domestic confusion. On a broader, international scale, "warfare psychologically waged" by a total state against a free one can be a vile and







effective instrument, achieving victories by exploiting the peacefulness, indecision, and disunity of its victim. The most powerful countermeasure to hostile, prebelligerent attack is high national morale, which, in turn, depends upon the mental, emotional, and physical health of the people.

Apart from the opinion that propaganda is a form of deceit, and thus immoral, specialists often regard other instruments of policy--diplomacy, armaments, economic measures--as both more respectable and more effective. By tradition and experience, Foreign Service officials are inclined to observe the time-honored ways of communicating with their peers in other capitals and to view communications to people at large as either wasteful or dangerous. Indeed, no degree of righteousness and veracity in mass propaganda can alter the fact that propagandist aims are often subversive.

## XI. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICY

Psychological warfare is only an instrument of policy, not a policy itself. There are certain things it can do, others it cannot do. It cannot, in the long run, perpetuate falsehoods. It cannot impose an alien system of values on one that already exists. It cannot satisfy physical needs or permanently substitute words for deeds. Where used in



connection with a political or military policy, it can give life and impetus to political goals, it can encourage friends and discourage enemies; militarily, it can confuse and undermine the enemy, damage his morale, and put him on the defensive. It can do much to dishearten the enemy's allies and to win over neutrals. Properly used, and always in coordination with a policy of action, it can neutralize the potentially hostile or wavering. The policies and particularly the acts of a government are the most potent ammunition of psychological warfare; not only is the nature of these acts significant, but, equally significant are the wording of their announcement and the time of its release.

Psychological warfare is but the impact, in the realm of ideas, of the political, economic, and military policies it seeks to support. It is the ideological expression and projection of the objectives and methods of these policies. From the nature and character of these policies, it draws its strength. With them, it triumphs or fails. If it is to be effective, it must be coupled with political and military policies that have the makings of victory. Deeds speak much louder than words.<sup>22</sup>

In the sphere of political action, there is no such

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<sup>22</sup>Hans J. Morgenthau, In Defense of the National Interest (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), pp. 214, 216, and 219-220.



competition with a political or military policy, it can give  
 law and justice to political goals. It can encourage freedom  
 and democracy without necessarily, in the process, and even  
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thing as one and the same truth for everyone. Different people will each consider the same news item, the same idea, from their own particular philosophic, moral, and political perspective. Each will see the idea in a different color and interpret it differently.

Propaganda cannot assume that the sender has the whole truth and the only truth and disregard the basic interests and outlook of the foreign audience. Ignoring the audience's expectations may lead to propaganda boomerangs. Even the most truthful statement can return "home to roost" if it is not attuned to the range of the audience's beliefs and experiences.

## XII. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AND DEMOCRACY

Psychological warfare subordinated to satisfying the home public is not psychological warfare. One of the greatest difficulties encountered in establishing a psychological warfare program is the failure, at all levels, by officials to recognize the totality of effort required. Every act of a nation has either good or bad psychological implications. For all representatives to have the desired unity of purpose, every agency of the government, every newspaper and magazine must be oriented to give the same view. This requires an indoctrination of officials, a degree of policy guidance,

the interest in the

It is not difficult to see why the company's policy  
toward the world market is to expand and to grow.  
The company's expansion in 1941 is a significant example.  
The company has a policy of expansion and growth.  
The company has a policy of expansion and growth.  
The company has a policy of expansion and growth.

1. The first step in the process of developing a policy is to identify the problem or issue that needs to be addressed. This involves gathering information about the problem and its causes, and determining the scope of the problem. Once the problem has been identified, the next step is to develop a clear statement of the problem, which will serve as the basis for the policy.

and a level of internal control which is generally unavailable in a democratic nation.

The character of psychological warfare as a policy instrument derives from the social structure of the nation whose policies it serves. The conditions of its communications industry will determine the number and kinds of channels available for propaganda. The national educational system will determine the personnel available--their number and quality. The values, goals, and aspirations of the nation will condition the policies that psychological warfare will be designed to serve.<sup>23</sup>

Psychological warfare is an instrument of foreign policy: it always has been; for psychology and propaganda are necessary in peace and in war in the pursuit of national goals. Some critics claim that propaganda, psychological operations, and psychological war are antithetical to a democratic way of life. So is war; yet democracy has waged just and honorable wars, and democracy has repeatedly used psychological warfare and propaganda in the conduct of its wars and foreign affairs. To deny the state an effective tool in the international field on the grounds that it is not correct practice in "peacetime" to influence a nation's own people, its friends, the neutrals, the enslaved, and the

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<sup>23</sup>Daniel Lerner, Sykewar (Cornwall, New York: Cornwall Press, Inc., 1949), p. 9.



and a level of technical control which is essentially unaltered.

The second level of control is the level of the individual worker.

The worker is responsible for his own work and for the work of others.

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conquerors through psychological operations is a moralistic bit of nonsense left over from the era of the Light Brigade. Within those limits imposed by national values, the rules of the Marquis of Queensberry must be laid gently, but firmly, to rest.



## CHAPTER II

### THE FACTORS OF HERITAGE AND IDEOLOGY

#### I. THE SOVIET UNION

The roots of Russian civilization go deep into the ancient Indo-European background which is common to all European nations. Like all modern peoples, the Russians have acquired a certain admixture of alien blood through the centuries. The Varangians (Norsemen) swept through the land in the eighth and ninth centuries A.D.; and both before and after this period, the eastern Slavs mixed freely with peoples of the Ural-Altaic family--Mongols, Turks, and Finns. Yet, the Russians remained essentially a Slavonic people and did not differ appreciably from such other Indo-European peoples outside of the Mediterranean area as the Germans and the Balts.<sup>1</sup>

The ancient Russian civilization profited greatly from intercourse with the Iranians--also an Indo-European strain--who, in those early days, were firmly established on the south Russian steppes. Slavic mythology, folklore, and heroic songs show wide and unmistakable evidence of this

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<sup>1</sup>George Vernadsky, A History of Russia (fifth revised edition; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), pp. 1-19.

## CHAPTER 12

## THE FACTORY OF THE FUTURE

## THE FACTORY OF THE FUTURE

The factory of the future is a place where the worker is no longer a machine, but a man.

It is a place where the worker is no longer a machine, but a man.

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It is a place where the worker is no longer a machine, but a man.



influence. Thus, a combination of original Slavic and related Iranian elements underlies Russian civilization.

### The Effect of Byzantine Christianity

In the course of the ninth and tenth centuries A.D., Russia was officially converted to Christianity in its Byzantine form. This conversion was of tremendous importance for the whole subsequent course of Russian intellectual and cultural history. Although this conversion laid the basis for a closer relation between Europe and Eurasia, the potential unifying force was greatly inhibited by the eleventh-century breach between the Roman and Byzantine churches. This tended to turn the Russian people inward and laid an early basis of separation between Russia and the West. The constant military pressure exerted by the Poles, Germans, and Swedes against Russia's borders further widened the separation.

### The Impact of the Mongols

Across the great sweep of Eurasia, from time immemorial, had surged waves of conquering nomads, each tribe forcing its predecessor onward as inexorably as the pressure of the next outpouring mounted against it in turn. Scythians, Sarmatians, Huns, Avars, and Khazars followed in historic procession, leaving an indelible heritage of fear, conquest, and oppression. Yet, during this long, continuing

information. There is a considerable amount of original data and the  
 data is being analyzed and interpreted.

### The Effect of the Data

On the basis of the data and the results of the

analysis and statistical analysis of the data, it is

concluded that the data is being analyzed and interpreted.

For the whole statistical analysis of the data, the

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assault, the Russian principalities grew, developing a political organization which combined elements of monarchical, aristocratic, and democratic forms of government.<sup>2</sup> These three elements of power appeared in varying degrees of importance from place to place. Even the Suzdalian monarchy--the nucleus of the future tsardom of Moscow--where the monarchical element had particularly developed was a constitutional monarchy and not absolute. As late as the thirteenth century, Russian political institutions were based upon a free society. The knell to this evolutionary process was struck in the year 1223 A.D. when the Mongols first emerged from the wastes of Northern Persia and Transcaucasia and penetrated the south Russian steppes.

Historically speaking, the Mongol invasion was the last great drive of the Eurasian nomads to the West. The Mongol's intention was "to establish a world empire under which international peace, the pax mongolica, would be achieved."<sup>3</sup> The full fury of their assault was not exerted for another fourteen years; but when it finally struck in December of 1237, it carried all before it. By 1241, Russia had been overrun and for the next two hundred and forty years, she lay under the Mongol yoke.

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<sup>2</sup>Ibid., pp. 47-56.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 58.



... result, the Russian political system, according to  
 political organization which combined elements of monarch-  
 cal autocracy, and democratic form of government.<sup>1</sup>  
 These three elements of power appeared in various degrees of  
 importance from time to time. When the Russian monarch-  
 the nucleus of the Russian system of power—where the main  
 political element and particularly developed was a monarch-  
 ical monarchy and not a republic. As late as the Russian  
 century, Russian political institutions were based upon a  
 royal society. The result of this development is well the  
 shown in the year 1917, when the Russian state passed  
 from the basis of monarchism to the basis of democracy and  
 abolished the royal autocratic system.  
 Historically speaking, the Russian monarch was the  
 last great ruler of the Russian people in the past. The  
 Russian revolution was the occasion of a new system under  
 which international power, now democratic, would be  
 achieved.<sup>2</sup> The full story of their struggle was not reached  
 for another thousand years; but when it finally comes in  
 October of 1917, it marked the end of the old system and the  
 beginning of a new one. The new system was based upon the  
 basis, and the new system was based upon the basis.

<sup>1</sup> Ibid., p. 10.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 10.



Mongol rule left many indelible traces in Russian life. City crafts and population declined, while agriculture continued to expand. It was in the Mongol period that Russia became a predominantly agrarian country.<sup>4</sup>

Politically, the decline of the cities meant the weakening and eventual destruction of the democratic element in the old Russian system. While the prince was completely subordinated to the Khan, the Khan's patent now protected him against the political claims of either the townspeople or the boyars. Thus, the very nature of princely authority began to change. As the Khans delegated an increasing number of administrative duties to the princes, particularly the responsibility of collecting taxes, these rulers were able to use, for their own benefit, the administrative and military machine built up in Russia by the Mongols. The Russian princes emerged from the Mongol period much stronger rulers than had been their predecessors before the conquest.

Of great importance was the psychological conditioning process through which the population passed. The people were trained by the Mongols to accept orders unquestioningly, to pay taxes, and to supply manpower without delay. They were subjected to brutal and immediate punishment for any manifest objections. This change in attitude gradually

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<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 78.



resulted in a new concept of state and society. The old, free political institutions were replaced by the authority of the Grand Duke. The free society was gradually transformed into a network of social classes bound to state service.

Another important source of influence on Russian heritage lay in the development of the power of the church. Under the protection of a charter of immunity granted by the Khan, Manger-Temir, the church became less dependent upon princely power than in any other period of Russian history. Furthermore, it was in the Mongol period that the rural population was Christianized.

#### Effects from the Fall of Constantinople, 1453

As a branch of the Byzantine Church, the Russian Church was deeply affected by the grave political and religious crisis which developed in the old Near East between 1350 and 1450. Though Orthodoxy was restored by the Turks in Constantinople following its capture in 1453, the political and psychological conditions inherent in the See of the Patriarch's being in the camp of the infidels forced the Russian Church into self government.<sup>5</sup> It was, thereafter, a natural progression for the Byzantine doctrine of the

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<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 83.



consisted of a number of small and medium-sized firms, the majority of which were engaged in the production of goods for the home market. The firm's output was generally small, and it was a source of local employment. The firm's output was generally small, and it was a source of local employment.

Another important source of information on the firm's output is the firm's output. The firm's output is the firm's output, and it is a source of information on the firm's output. The firm's output is the firm's output, and it is a source of information on the firm's output. The firm's output is the firm's output, and it is a source of information on the firm's output.

### Notes on the Firm's Output

As a source of information on the firm's output, the firm's output is a source of information on the firm's output. The firm's output is the firm's output, and it is a source of information on the firm's output. The firm's output is the firm's output, and it is a source of information on the firm's output. The firm's output is the firm's output, and it is a source of information on the firm's output.



symphony of church and state--the concept of Byzantium as the Second Rome--to be adapted to the Russian milieu. Thus, Moscow became the Third Rome--the last Rome; there would be no other. There was also to develop a near mystic conception of purpose: a deep, emotional sense of defending the faith; and, eventually, the concept of caesero-papism which vested in the Tsar the spiritual as well as temporal leadership of the state.

#### The Effect of Europeanization

The Europeanization of Russia brought with it new political, religious, and social ideas. It also brought profound internal conflict and a crisis of national psychology.<sup>6</sup> The new ideas reached the governing and upper classes and were absorbed by them before they reached the masses. Consequently, a split developed between the top and the bottom of society which was never bridged.

Peter the Great accomplished this political emergence at a great price. In the course of his program of westernizing the state, the people were deprived of political power and local government was abrogated. The Orthodox Church, the chief psychological basis of the old Russian state, was subordinated to the civil power and thereafter continually

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<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 148.



lost influence to such a degree that it faced a threat of disintegration in 1917.

The majority of the people resisted the program of Europeanization, and their inherent suspicion and distrust of the West was further heightened by the forceful imposition of the reforms. Peter's "primary concern was the good, not exactly of the Russian people, but rather of the Russian state."<sup>7</sup> He stopped at nothing in pursuing the interest of the state. His concept of absolutism, as a part of Russian heritage, was to become habitual and traditional.

#### Familiar Traits

The reports of foreign observers on the status of affairs in those early days have a prophetic tinge and, in retrospect, seem to presage the conflict of these times. Traits were then becoming visible that were destined later to play an important part in the psychological composition of Soviet power. There was a tendency to a messianic concept of Russia's role in history; an intolerance of foreign outlooks and values; a pronounced xenophobia on the part of Russian officialdom; an insistence on isolating the Russian people from foreign contact; a secretiveness and deviousness of diplomatic practice; a seeming inability to understand

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<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 151.





anything in the nature of a permanently peaceful and equal relationship between states; a tendency to view every treaty of peace as being in the nature of a provisional armistice; and a tendency to think of conflict as the normal--peace as the provisional and abnormal.

### The Role of Ideology

Prophetic as these historic Russian traits may be, it was the linking, by means of a doctrinaire ideology, of a totalitarian party system and national power aspirations which has effectively produced that mutation known as the "cold war." This ideology is woven through the organization of the Communist Party system and interacts with the power considerations of a large block of nations. Therefore, in examining the predilections of the Soviet Union to the use of psychological warfare and psychological operations, it is necessary to examine this ideology for its contribution.

### The Contribution of Karl Marx

Karl Marx deriving his concepts from Feuerbach and Hegel combined the materialism of the former with the historical concepts of the latter.<sup>8</sup> "Historical materialism"

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<sup>8</sup>Gerhart Niemeyer, "The Ideological Core of Communism," American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, Walter F. Hahn and John C. Neff (eds.) (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1960), p. 56.

anything in the nature of a governmentally sponsored and equal  
 relationship between himself a community on the one hand and  
 of power or being in the nature of a personal relationship  
 and a tendency to think of himself as the master—power is  
 the practical and abstract.

### The Role of Ideology

Proposed as they might be, these ideas may not be  
 the final, by means of a theoretical ideology of a  
 totalitarian party system and national power relations  
 which has effectively rendered that system known as the  
 "cold war". This ideology is often enough an organization  
 of the Communist Party system and relations with the power  
 structure of a large group of nations. Therefore, in  
 extending the boundaries of the world to the new  
 of psychological systems and psychological systems, it is  
 necessary to consider the ideology of the revolution.

### The Organization of the Party

That this ideology has brought about freedom and  
 hope combined the organization of the system with the  
 political concepts of the Party.<sup>2</sup> Theoretical relationships

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<sup>2</sup>These are the "The Ideological Role of Communism"  
 American Studies for the People, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1951  
 John C. Hall, 1951. (London 1951) University and Co., Ltd.  
 1951, p. 22.

was the derivative: the idea that history occurs because of changes in material, economic conditions which, in turn, lead to changes in human existence and which proceed according to an inescapable logic.

From this derivative, it develops that: (1) life is fundamentally a relation between man and matter (out of this relationship issues a communist's certainty that his beliefs are corroborated by scientific proof); (2) the laws of history can be scientifically determined and the Marxist interpretation is the only "scientific" key to the knowledge of history; (3) one can find general truth about human affairs only by participating in historic change--the point of philosophy is not to interpret but actively to change the world. Out of this purpose, revolutionary activity as a way of life becomes apparent.

The core of the communist teaching about society is the doctrine that all societies above the primitive level are split into classes. These classes are locked in an unceasing and irreconcilable struggle. Thus, struggle is not an abnormal condition, but rather the characteristic trait of all historically recorded societies. In modern society, this struggle has narrowed to a conflict between the bourgeoisie, who are those who produce commodities through hired wage-labor, and the proletariat, who are the propertyless wage workers. In this social conflict, power is







interpreted, basically, as the rule of one class over another.

According to communist theory, it is private ownership of the means of production which enables a class to rule. Since the proletariat possesses no means of production, being without property, its victory in the class struggle cannot result in another class rule.

The revolution of the proletariat is, therefore, expected to end all class rule and to inaugurate a new type of society in which there will be no classes, no exploitation, and no need for political power--socialist society.<sup>9</sup>

Communist doctrine holds that all societies pass through successive phases of development--primitive, slaveholding, feudal, bourgeois, and, finally, socialist.<sup>10</sup> In the course of this development, the class struggle has fastened itself upon mankind as a result of the institution of private property, for it is private ownership of the means of production which enables a class to rule and wealth can be generated only at the price of poverty. Classes, then, developed a machinery for oppression--the state. Only when human society is free of class rule, will mankind be relieved of these plagues.

In Karl Marx's view, the capitalists exploit the people for profit and rule all men in bourgeois society.

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<sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. 59.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., pp. 54-60, passim.



This system is inherently evil and must be destroyed in its entirety. It also is shot through with inherent contradictions and thus bears the seeds of its own destruction and overthrow by the proletariat. Thus, Marx left to Lenin a target for hostility, a motive for irreconcilable hatred of the world's society, and the prediction of a catastrophic but hopeful end.

### Lenin's Adaptations

With the legacy of Marx, developed in his Capital, as bedrock, Lenin proceeded to transform these teachings into the basic Bolshevik doctrine of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

To Lenin, capitalism had advanced from the competitive to the monopolistic and imperialistic stage. This was the final stage, and the capitalist nations could now be expected to turn on each other in mutually destructive wars. The world was, therefore, to be the scene of a final, titanic conflict between the industrial nations on one hand and the socialist and anti-imperialist states on the other. The latter group comprised the "overwhelming majority," according to Lenin, and was, thereby, given a kind of democratic justification.

The struggle was now to be a world-wide conflict between two international "camps" and was, in addition to a contest between the revolutionary forces and capitalism,







also a struggle against war. In this manner, world politics and revolutionary cause were to be woven into a single fabric.<sup>11</sup>

Marxism-Leninism thus postulated a struggle of the future against the present--the Socialist Revolution or, simply, "the Revolution." It summoned all "toilers," under the unifying leadership of the Communist Party, to fight the revolutionary struggle to bring about the inevitable end of present day capitalist society. Any method required to bring to pass the catastrophic destruction of this bourgeois society was to be justified in the name of the hoped-for result. Deliberate action and political organization would be necessary to accomplish the deed, and no sacrifices could be deemed excessive in the struggle for victory.

While he borrowed heavily from Marx to formulate his views on "the Revolution," the basic operational doctrine for implementation of the revolution was shaped entirely by Lenin.<sup>12</sup>

We live not only in a state, but in a system of states and the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with the imperialist states for a long time is unthinkable. In the end, either one or the other will conquer. And until that end comes, a series of the most terrible collisions between the Soviet Republic and bourgeois states is inevitable.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>11</sup>Ibid., p. 63.      <sup>12</sup>Ibid., pp. 64-69, passim.

<sup>13</sup>Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, Selected Works (New York: International Publishers, 1935), p. 107.



Hence, the struggle would continue with undiminished fury against external enemies long after the communists had seized power and dealt with their internal foes. Marx's concept of a single upheaval was now transmuted into a "protracted struggle" in which the Communist Party, Communist strategy, the role of the state, and the place of the Soviet Union all had doctrinal functions to perform.

### The Role of the Party

The Party was defined as the "vanguard" of the proletariat, and was entrusted with guarding and developing revolutionary theory. It was, therefore, implicitly the judge of the correctness of all thought. Its members would be comparatively few in number and dedicated to the profession of revolution.

Lenin developed a number of strategic principles most of which proposed methods by which a small, compact organization could use revolutions made by others to control large-scale revolutionary movements and change. The use of alliances, neutralization, legal as well as illegal activities, and bourgeois revolutions which were later to be subverted are all examples of basic tactics.

The road to a society of full freedom when the state has withered away leads through the dictatorship of the proletariat. Therefore, until the long-awaited day when there



... , which, the Executive would consider as  
 they against national independence with the Committee as  
 seized power and their with their national body. But  
 country as a single question and not considered with a  
 foreign affairs in which the Committee Party, however  
 strategy, the fact is not clear, and the fact of the  
 Union all the national movement in history.

### The role of the party

The party was formed in the framework of the  
 national, and was organized with national and international  
 revolutionary spirit. It was, however, initially the  
 judge of the character of all groups. It was not  
 be completely for its own and devoted to the  
 aim of revolution.

Latin America a number of attempts have been made  
 of which various systems in Latin America, which require  
 the social and revolutionary change in Latin America  
 social revolutionary movement and change. The use of all-  
 round, mass-based, legal as well as illegal activities,  
 and complete revolution which was later to be revealed  
 are all examples of social justice.

The case is a matter of all freedom and the state  
 has without any doubt through the development of the  
 industrial, economic, and the industrial and the state



is "nothing any more to suppress," the state is to be used dictatorially, not as an instrument of the common good but for combat operations of the Party as a "rule based upon force and unlimited by law."<sup>14</sup>

### The Role of the Soviet Union

The Soviet Union was assigned the role of the power base for the world revolutions. Here, the Party could consolidate its power; and Soviet Russia, therefore, became a chief instrument of the world revolution, and the Communist International became the tool of Soviet Russia. "Henceforth, the national power, national security, and national expansion of the Soviet Union came to be intertwined with communism as an ideological cause."<sup>15</sup>

Any agreements between the Party and outside groups must be regarded as aiding the future liquidation of these groups and as barriers against the liquidation of the Party by them. Therefore there is no essential difference between coming to an ostensibly amicable agreement with an outside group or using violence against it; they are both tactics in an overall strategy of attack.<sup>16</sup>

### Bolshevik Combat Philosophy and the Place of Psychological Operations

Therefore, there is no place in the Marxist-Leninist

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<sup>14</sup>Cited by Niemeyer, op. cit., p. 67.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., p. 68.

<sup>16</sup>Nathan Leites, The Operational Code of the Politburo (Santa Monica: The Rand Corp., 1950), p. 62.



outlook for genuine compromise or coexistence or for any reconciliation of differences. The struggle against the capitalist enemy is the law of life. To end it, even to interrupt it, would be to die. Once an opportunity arises, action--immediate action--is the only permissible course. "History," said Lenin, "will not forgive revolutionaries for procrastination when they can be victorious today . . . , while they risk losing much, in fact, everything tomorrow."<sup>17</sup>

Struggle, consequently, must remain the key to Soviet tactical and strategic thinking. Relaxation, "normalcy" in the conduct of relations with others, peace, as the West understands the term, are by definition incompatible with what the Soviet leaders avow to be their solemn obligation to history. The contest, they themselves insist, must be to the death.

From its earliest days, communist conflict doctrine has revealed a remarkable affinity to military thought. The pith of communist doctrine is the concept that military and political instruments are interchangeable in the execution of one vast strategic plan.<sup>18</sup> War, be it fought with

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<sup>17</sup> Lenin, op. cit., p. 237.

<sup>18</sup> Alvin J. Cottrell and James E. Doughety, "The Larger Strategic Vision," American Strategy for the Nuclear Age, Walter F. Hahn and John C. Neff (eds.) (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1960), p. 56.







military hardware or through non-violent, political, and psychological operations, is a unity. "Hot" and "cold" are but degrees of intensity in one and the same war.

According to standard communist procedure, the predominant enemy group should not be attacked in a decisive manner before its leaders and cadres have become unsure of their capabilities, intentions, rights, and, above all, of their chances of success. This doctrine firmly establishes the operational requirement for psychological warfare and psychological operations as a tool of Soviet foreign policy. Since foreign policy is conceived within the parameters of a nation's values as they have developed out of heritage and ideology, it follows that the Soviet conduct of psychological operations would be in accordance with Bolshevik conflict doctrine. Since war, politics, diplomacy, law, science, economics, and psychology all form a continuum and are closely integrated in the conduct of Soviet foreign policy, psychological operations can be encountered in every act of the Soviet Union. Soviet National Security policy marinates military, foreign, and domestic policies in a vehicle of psychological operations. No action is taken without consideration of its psychological impact upon the entire spectrum of short and long range objectives.

ability depends on three main factors: (1) the  
 experimental conditions, (2) the subject's  
 and degree of interest, (3) the time of day.

According to the experimental conditions, the

subject's ability may vary from day to day.

When the subject is tired, his ability is

lower than when he is fresh and alert.

When the subject is interested, his ability is

higher than when he is not interested.

When the subject is tired and not interested,

his ability is at its lowest.

When the subject is fresh and interested,

his ability is at its highest.

When the subject is tired and not interested,

his ability is at its lowest.

When the subject is fresh and interested,

his ability is at its highest.

When the subject is tired and not interested,

his ability is at its lowest.

When the subject is fresh and interested,

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When the subject is fresh and interested,

his ability is at its highest.

## II. THE UNITED STATES

Since the remote ages of pre-history, the land had been there, shielded behind the heaving, restless barriers of the North Atlantic and North Pacific oceans and the swirling sea mists. Perhaps as long ago as 50,000 B.C.<sup>19</sup> man had reached its shores. Kin of the same nomads who periodically welled up out of the depths of Eurasia and surged into the European peninsula, Asiatic migrants crossed the land bridge between Siberia and Alaska. Driven by cold, searching for more game, questing for an easier life, these migrants gradually dispersed through the entire landmass from the Bering Strait to Tierra Del Fuego.

These early arrivals from Asia brought with them a primitive Stone Age culture and knowledge of the use of fire. In time, some of them learned how to work metal; others never advanced beyond stone weapons and tools. In the jungles of Central America, the Valley of Mexico, and the Peruvian highlands, great civilizations comparable to those of the Mediterranean and Western Europe flowered.

No such empires were developed in the vast, near empty sweep of land that would, one day, become the United States and Canada. Here, by the end of the fifteenth century,

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<sup>19</sup>Richard B. Morris, The New World (New York: Time Inc., 1963), p. 9.







the Indian population numbered no more than a million. These people were split into a large number of tribes marked by the utmost diversity and fragmentation. They did not look alike, speak alike, live alike, or even pray alike. Their weapons and tools were primitive, and they possessed an ineffective political organization. Psychologically, most of them could not unite, which placed them at a great disadvantage when faced by an organized invader. The geography of their land placed them at an additional disadvantage. The coast line provided innumerable attractive sites for initial settlement, while the network of lakes and rivers provided strategic highways of penetration. Only the North Atlantic Ocean protected the seemingly fixed and unalterable patterns of the Indian's way of life.

The first coming of the European was an historical accident which yielded no enduring results, exerted no influence, and for centuries was all but forgotten.<sup>20</sup> The Norseman, Leif (the Lucky) Ericsson, sailed from Norway in the year 1000 A.D. to bring the Christian faith to his pagan homeland in Greenland. En route, he was struck by a violent North Atlantic gale which set him far to the southward. When he raised the land, it was an unknown shore. This was the New World--Vineland, Leif called it.

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<sup>20</sup>Ibid., p. 11.



Leif sailed away to be followed by one Thorfinn Karlsefnei, a trader, who pursued a colonizing enterprise. The venture was ill-fated and, largely because of the violent contact with a strange and hostile people, he withdrew after three years of terror and combat. For almost another five hundred years the North Atlantic remained unconquered.

### The New World

From first light on the morning of October 12, 1492, dates the impact of the New World on the course of history. The Americas now lay before Europe. Spain, with her armed forces freed for the first time in seven hundred years from conflict with the Moors, immediately poured her captains and adventurers into the Western Hemisphere, bent on conquest and the search for gold. France and Britain joined in the early explorations, but while the Spaniards exploited the Americas for precious metals, the French and English amassed less glamorous wealth and developed thriving fishing and fur industries, thus laying the basis for a commercial colonization.

### The Results of the Defeat of the Spanish Armada

Following the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588, the pace and scope of English expansion into the New World burgeoned. On the eve of that great naval engagement, Philip II of Spain ruled all of the permanent European



This action may be followed by an action  
 against a third party, and against a company  
 The action may also be followed by an action  
 against a third party, and against a company  
 The action may also be followed by an action  
 against a third party, and against a company

### The New World

Two lines of the world are shown in 1900,  
 before the impact of the New World on the world of 1900.  
 The world is now a world of 1900, with two lines  
 before the first line in 1900, before the first  
 conflict with the world, immediately before the first  
 movement into the world, before the first  
 and the world for 1900, before the first  
 early movement, but while the movement is  
 American for previous world, the world and world  
 are almost world and world involving world and  
 industrial, the world and a commercial world  
 time.

### The World of the World of 1900

Following the world of the world of 1900,  
 the world and world of world of 1900 and the world  
 movement. The world of 1900 and the world  
 world is the world of 1900 and the world of 1900



settlements in the New World. A century later, the English were entrenched along the North Atlantic coast from Maine to the Carolinas, as well as in the Caribbean. Much of North America was already lost to Spain.

Had British sea power been defeated in the Channel, the character of North America would have, without doubt, developed along entirely different lines. Its culture would have been Latin, its religion Catholic, its native races would have been exploited rather than ejected or exterminated, and its precepts of government and political stability would have been in the Hispanic-colonial style rather than in the Anglo-American traditions of constitutional rights, representative government, and civil liberties.

#### Emergence of the American

And those who came were resolved to be Englishmen,  
Gone to the World's end, but English every one,  
And they ate the white corn-kernels, parched in the sun,  
And they knew it not, but they'd not be English again.<sup>21</sup>

Many of the emigrants were farmers seeking cheap or free land. There were weavers, tradesmen, laborers. There were vagrants, bound men and women, pickpockets, convicts, paupers, and prostitutes. Some sought to escape the degradation and hopelessness that had been their lot in the father land. Others sought a freedom of worship not granted

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<sup>21</sup>Stephen Vincent Benet, Western Star (New York: Fanar and Rinehart, Inc., 1943), p. 116.

...in the world, a century later, the British  
were ... along the North Atlantic coast from Maine to  
the ... as well as in the ... of ...  
America was already ...

... and ... in the ...  
the ... of ...  
developed along ... lines. The ...  
have been ... the ...  
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needed, and the ... and political ...  
would have been in the ...  
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representative government, and civil liberties.

... of the ...

And ... and ... as ...  
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... and ...

to them in the old country. But no matter their reason for leaving Europe, they all sought a freedom and a liberty that was not available to them in the Old World. Some gave up home; all gave up country; all faced a savage, wild, primeval wilderness. No one can gainsay their collective bravery.

Despite the conditions at home which led the emigrants to sail for the New World, England occupied a position of deep regard in the hearts of the early colonists; and it was natural that they attempted to reproduce, in the wilderness, the institutions of government as they remembered them at home. Yet, the very threat and challenge of the wilderness compounded by the vast problem of communications forced the mutation and evolution of the transplanted political institutions to commence almost as soon as the first crude settlement was laid out. The New World was isolated, and autonomous action was necessary for survival. Any arrangements between the Crown and the Colonies which inhibited the action necessary for the physical, economic, or political survival and well being--as the Colonist saw these factors--would be and was intolerable. The roots of the American tradition of Isolationism can be found in this early demand for freedom of action and the necessity, later grown to a felt preference, to rely chiefly on one's own strength and resources for colonial survival.



to them in the old country. But at present their hands are  
leaving things. They are doing a business and a little more  
was not available to them in the old world. Some gave up  
now, all gave up country; all took a voyage, with their  
all winter. So the new primary social collective system  
people and countries at home which led the way  
grants to call for the new world, England occupied a posi-  
tion of deep respect in the world in the early nineteenth  
and it was natural that they attempted to reproduce it in  
England, the traditions of government as they were  
based from at home. But the new world was different  
the wilderness demanded of the new people a complete  
from toward the nation and evolution of the individual  
political institutions to common which as long as the  
these were established and this was the new world was  
limited, and autonomous policy was necessary for society.  
Any arrangements between the world and the colonies were  
limited the nation necessary for the political system, in  
political survival and well-being—the political system  
therefore—would be and was different. The world of the  
political tradition of civilization was in need of this  
only demand for freedom of action and the necessity, that  
growth to a high civilization, to help society in order to  
strength and resources for political survival.



The Crown ruled the colonies in a paradoxical manner.<sup>22</sup>

While granting home rule to the Colonists, it waged a constant campaign to prevent their ruling. The Empire counted upon the loyalty of the Colonies yet appeared not to trust them to remain loyal. While the Colonists were regarded as English citizens, they were, at the same time, denied many of the basic rights of Englishmen. The colonies were required to assume a share of the burden of empire and simultaneously denied a serious voice in the imperial decision-making process. The fleet effectively protected the Colonies from foreign attack to such an extent that the Empire considered it much less necessary to provide troop protection for the Colonials.

It was difficult to tell at just what point the colonists ceased to be loyal English subjects outraged over taxes and repressive measures imposed from abroad. Perhaps one third remained loyal. But gradually others, at first a few, then in ever-increasing numbers turned to the idea of liberty. King George III's American subjects had ever been quick to defend their ancient English liberties; his English subjects had let theirs erode.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>22</sup>Morris, op. cit., p. 143.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., p. 156.



## The American Revolution

The American Revolution, which developed gradually from a series of political skirmishes for the defense of colonial rights, finally exploded into a full-scale war for political independence, unleashing pent-up demands for political and social reform. The Americans carried into the conflict a deep concern for, and emphatic stress upon, legality. They fought for the rights they believed were guaranteed them as Englishmen under the British constitution and for the rights of man as they understood them to be derived from the "Laws of Nature and of Nature's God." This sense of community, achieved through an explicit commitment to particular concepts of social and political organization, was later to be reenforced by a growing nationalism. The resulting compound defines one of the basic elements of American experience and heritage, and it continues to shape American values.

The Declaration of Independence with its affirmation of the natural rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness would become the conscience of the American people, reminding them of standards by which to judge the conduct of their national life. When Jefferson wrote into the Declaration the natural right of the individual to the pursuit of happiness, he was providing a theoretical base for an experience in the open-class system already a century and a







half old. A man could aspire to heights limited only by his ability, and he could enjoy acceptance by his fellows on the basis of his character and his accomplishments. The idea and reality of the open-class system was one of the most important contributions of the Americans to the social thinking of Western civilization.

The successful conclusion of the Revolution resulted in the throwing off of the English allegiance--the rejection of the only embodied authority which was generally recognized. It was not, at the time, the replacement of one authority by another. The birth of the American Republic was marked by the rejection of authority as such: authority was coercive, arbitrary, despotic, morally wrong.

For eleven years the thirteen independent Colonies pursued widely diverse paths. The almost complete bankruptcy to which this near anarchy brought the Confederation demonstrated that it was impossible for them to survive without some sort of central authority.

### The Advent of the Constitution

All hope for the future of America was centered in the Philadelphia convention which opened in May of 1787. The remarkable document which was produced created a federal structure that endowed the national government with both power and energy. It reflected the American suspicion of authority and the dedication to freedom of action through an



ingenious system of checks and balances and the principle of divided powers. Thus, authority was jealously circumscribed by the erection of insuperable legal barriers to the excessive hegemony of one person or group.

The typical American attitudes toward authority have remained substantially the same as those manifested by the framers of the Constitution. Authority must be as circumscribed, diffused, and limited as legal ingenuity can devise, and the holders of these positions should be under constant scrutiny and should be watched as potential enemies.

#### Washington's Farewell Address

From 1492, American had been involved in the overseas ramifications of every European conflict. Her independence had been gained through the support of France to the extent that Paris assessed the positive net worth of such a military venture in the overall Anglo-French contest. In an attempt to frame American perspective in terms of the Napoleonic Era and the still precarious national position, Washington spoke on a general theme embracing domestic and foreign policy. The shadow of this Farewell Address has lain across the development of American thought ever since. Washington attempted to focus attention on a distinctive course of action for the nation so that its national interest could be related to the world environment in which, perforce, it must exist. He counseled not a hermit land but an American







nation, sufficiently strong militarily, to protect itself from a position of maneuver purposely kept free from formal commitments to any nations involved in the European power struggle of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. This would provide the American people the opportunity to develop their land and destiny free of European destiny. Only in this way could Washington foresee unlimited horizons for the new American commitment to its distinctive set of values in political and social life.

#### The Westward Movement

The Nation accepted this advice and turned itself to the task of building and consolidating its hold upon the land of North America; and it was a marvelous land--its earth rich, its streams filled with fish. The primeval stand of woodlands stretched to the great plains where the immense, waving buffalo grass prairies, undulating in the wind, whispered and heaved like a sea. Only nature, the aboriginal tribes, and its own internal limitations blocked territorial expansion. For another hundred years, the day-by-day life of America would be directly challenged by the undreamed rich potential of this land, and this century-long steepage in such an environment was also to play a large measure in the molding of American experience and basic values.



Without childishly denying the relevance of the past, can we not recognize that the American past does not, like the past of many other peoples, extend downward into the soil on which we at any moment stand. Our past, by and large, extends laterally backward across the mountains or plains, or across the sea, to somewhere else. Our history is the process of westering and the counter process of return . . . . A long, complex, and sometimes rapid sequence of consecutive change. America is not an artifact. It is not a fixed and immutable ideal . . . . America is process, and in so far as we are American, the work of our heads and hands and hearts inevitably reflects that fact.<sup>24</sup>

Their eyes are fixed upon another sight: The American people views its own march across these wilds [and] . . . this magnificent image of themselves does not meet the gaze of the American at intervals only; it may be said to haunt every one of them in his heart as well as his most important actions and to be always flitting before his mind.<sup>25</sup>

The Westward movement further attenuated America's political ties with Europe; the acquisition of the Louisiana territory and conclusion of the War of 1812 accelerated the process. The power of attraction of this westward movement is to be felt even today in the rich American connotations of the word "frontier." As the American center of gravity moved westward, America's national culture became continually more remote from its European origins.

The frontier became the milieu in which a unique

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<sup>24</sup>John Kouwenhoven, "What is American About America," Colorado Quarterly (June 1956), p. 54.

<sup>25</sup>Cited from de Tocqueville by W. W. Rostow, "The National Style," The American Style, Elting E. Morison (ed.) (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958), pp. 251-252.







American national character was shaped. The man who could solve the urgent, material, day-to-day problems, organize and operate profitably a productive enterprise, and deal effectively with the daily local social and political life rose in status and repute. His operational approach to all matters became the American approach. His faculties, attuned to an assessment of concrete problems, an empirical method of resolution, and a pragmatic solution became the national approach to all problems. It followed naturally that this same national approach, preoccupied with ad hoc solutions to arduous, practical tasks and generally unable to take time for reflective thought, generated a proclivity towards the accumulation of a store of general concepts. As can be the case with empiricism, these general concepts were not always demonstrably related to each other or, for that matter, related to the bodies of fact they were supposed to encompass.

### The Religious Input

Religion had ever been present throughout the colonies. Some offered sanctuary to oppressed faiths, some forbade all but their own; generally Protestantism predominated. The Puritans contributed much to the spiritual heritage of the nation. Politically, reaction to Puritanism helped shape early American political parties and contributed

national national character was sought. The aim was to  
 give the system, national, day-to-day problems, national  
 and separate completely a revolutionary character, and deal  
 effectively with the daily local social and political life  
 rose in status and respect. The operational approach to all  
 national problems the national approach, the national, re-  
 turned to an examination of national problems, the national  
 method of examination, and a separate solution under the  
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 through the examination of a more or less national approach. As  
 can be seen with national, these national approaches were  
 not always demonstrably related to each other or, for that  
 matter, related to the nation or they were supposed to  
 encompass.

### The National Approach

National and local problems through the national  
 approach. Some efforts necessary to approach national, some  
 towards all but their own, generally international  
 national. The national approach was to the national  
 nation of the nation. National, national in national  
 national and local political problems and national

to the constitutional separation of church and state. However, the Puritan character, diluted in its westward movement, spread throughout the country and is still reflected in the character of modern America in the sense of the moral content of life and in the mixture of practicality and militant zeal for humanitarian causes. It underlies the sense of mission, first carried westward by the settlers and frontiersman, that the Nation created in 1776 exists as a corporate entity not only to further the peace and security of its citizens but to aid--at home and, by example, abroad--the cause of freedom and humane living.

#### The Nineteenth Century Balance of Power

America was singularly blessed in that fortune granted the young nation, after 1815, a century during which a protracted era of international peace existed. The geographic protection afforded by two large oceans and a British foreign policy, supported by naval power, which found it to be in the Imperial interest to deny the Western Hemisphere to incursions by other European powers, permitted uninterrupted national development. Throughout the greater part of the nineteenth century, therefore, there was no autonomous center of military power, other than the United States, in the Western Hemisphere and, consequently, no immediate threat to its existence. By historical accident, it was to be that







the great theaters of the nineteenth and twentieth century wars would be in Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Far East; for over a hundred years, the European balance of power remained such that no substantial European coalition could likely be brought to bear to threaten the security of the American Republic.

The domestic impact of such fortune seemed to support the Washingtonian policies of non-entanglement in world politics. It would have seemed the height of folly to abandon such a position and willfully become involved in the shifts and realignments of European balance-of-power politics. European disunity and American remoteness, then, acted to protect the United States. Both conditions made alliances superfluous--alliances which would, at best, have reduced America's own security in world politics. Unencumbered, American diplomacy retained a freedom of action within the Western Hemisphere, established a benign reputation among nations and peoples who considered themselves victims of the European balance-of-power system, and permitted a physical and industrial growth to occur which was commonly viewed with indifference rather than with concern by the European powers. Consequently, the continuity of national life seemed to validate the initial cultural, political, and value choices and decisions followed since the time of Washington.

the great diversity of the elements of the political system  
 which would be in Europe, the United States, and the  
 East. For there is a marked trend, the tendency of  
 power remains with the industrial countries which  
 could finally be expected to lead to European and possibly of  
 the American nations.

The domestic issues of each country seem to support  
 the Washington position of non-intervention in world  
 politics. The world has found the need of only to seek  
 out such a position and actively become involved in the  
 affairs and developments of European nations of power. This  
 fact, European affairs, and political movements, which  
 seem to support the United States, such movements are  
 alliances, relations—European—United States, of power, have  
 reduced European and possibly in world politics. European  
 power, American diplomacy, which is a factor in action  
 within the Western Hemisphere, established a world power  
 that stood against and people who considered themselves  
 victims of the European nations of power, which, and the  
 United States physical and material power to control which was  
 commonly viewed with indifference. From this position  
 by the European power. Consequently, the possibility of  
 national life seems to maintain the United States,  
 political, and this position and relations between them  
 the fact of Washington.

### The Immigrants

As the expansion continued, the waves of immigration poured into the Atlantic ports.

Give me your tired, your poor,  
Your huddled masses yearning to be free,  
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore,  
Send these the homeless, tempest-tossed to me.  
I hold the lamp before the golden door.<sup>26</sup>

These new immigrations sustained the widespread belief that America was a refuge from Europe and its discontents. Most of those who came did so voluntarily. Yet, for many of these ethnic groups, particularly the Irish and the East Europeans, cultural assimilation was difficult. In the land of equality, they found themselves considered as social inferiors. Memories of Europe were simultaneously humiliating reminders of their incomplete assimilation into the American culture and society and a source of a comforting ethnic subculture which lessened the loneliness and isolation they felt. The effect of these ethnic tensions was to reenforce the basic concept of neutrality towards the European balance of power.

So long as one's own personal renunciation of Europe coincided with the broader national purposes of America, there was no reason to expect that foreign policy crises would tear apart the seam of American nationalism.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> Emma Lazarus, The New Colossus (inscribed on the pedestal of the Statue of Liberty, Bedloe Island, New York).

<sup>27</sup> Paul Seabury, Power, Freedom and Diplomacy (New York: Random House, 1963), p. 44.







In this manner, the multi-national background of American society served to enhance the country's isolationist impulses.

### Self-Sufficiency

With the opening and exploration of the land, the continent was found to contain most of the natural resources necessary to sustain a constantly enlarging standard of living. The absence of internal tariff barriers and restrictions on interstate commerce opened a gigantic internal market within which industrial and agricultural production could be marketed. Concurrent increase in agricultural productivity rendered the United States virtually self-sufficient in foodstuffs. This set of circumstances was in direct opposition to the European pattern which, in quest of materials, markets, and food, had turned outwards upon the world and thereby increased the relative involvement of these nations in world trade and the international implications of each other's economic policies. In America, the consequences of economic growth were just the opposite and served as yet another source of validation for the chosen national path.

### The Developing Pattern of Organization

The industrial and governmental complex expanded with the growth of the nation, and concurrently the matter of organizational attitudes and structure for the operation of

is also correct. The military and naval forces of America  
society cannot be compared to the military and naval forces  
of other nations.

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[illegible]

these organizations received increasing attention. Throughout the developmental process, American politics and industry "relied on the ability of an individualistic society to throw up a succession of innovating leaders."<sup>28</sup> The operating code of this American organizational pattern became centered about a planning process which projected into the future the pattern of the familiar on-going processes and trends. The emphasis became one of operating a relatively static process efficiently rather than developing solutions to radically new problems.

American heritage developed out of the individualist society of a pioneering people conquering a new, virgin land. There was no feudal heritage or society and no political past, in the European sense, from which the Americans had to free themselves. The natural concepts and conditions which were taken for granted in the young America had to be bought in blood, if ever achieved, in other lands. Consequently, there has been little in the American heritage would could provide an operational source of experience for the empiric American planning cycle to employ in dealing with the political, social, and economic attitudes and problems of the rest of the world.

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<sup>28</sup>Rostow, op. cit., p. 281.



These organizations received increasing attention and support  
 over the developmental process, American politics and business  
 lay outside of the ability of an individualized society to  
 show up a situation of innovative features. The  
 operating code of this business organizational pattern  
 became essential to a planning process which projected  
 into the future the pattern of the earlier working process  
 and the future. The business became one of operating a  
 relatively static process efficiently rather than developing  
 solutions to radically new problems.

Business activities developed out of the individualized  
 society as a functioning people cooperation a new, viable form.  
 There was no total rupture of society and no political  
 break in the business sense. From within the Americans had to  
 live themselves. The natural changed and decisions which  
 were taken for granted in the young America had to be sought  
 in place, it was national, it was local. Consequently,  
 there has been little in the American mind which would  
 provide an operational source of inspiration for the entire  
 American planning cycle as today is dealing with the political,  
 social, and economic activities and problems of the past  
 of the world.



### The Pains of Emergence onto the World Stage

America was able to pursue its internal expansion and national interest, the course and nature of which established its national values and heritage, through an unwitting (and occasionally a witting) exploitation of the balance-of-power struggle between the major European states. By the beginning of the twentieth century, this kind of exploitation was no longer sufficient. No longer did the fragmentation of Europe assure America that no single power or power group would dominate Eurasia and thereby simultaneously threaten the security of the United States. No longer did the determination of European national interests correspond, even approximately, with those which defined the Washington policy. American interests now collided with issues considered to be of primary importance to the European powers; no longer could American policies be predicated upon the benign fall-out from major European power clashes. America, henceforward, would be unable to finesse her international way; willy-nilly, the United States would be required to participate on the international political stage.

It is on this international political stage that the United States has performed since 1900. It is not surprising in the light of her past that the performance has been a reluctant, often grudging, one. Some of the instinctive rejection of the position into which Americans have found

The Future of the United States in the World

...and will be to secure the largest possible and  
national interest, the course and action of which will be  
its national interest and welfare, though in existing law  
occasionally a little adjustment of the balance of  
power might be needed in the major American states. By the  
definition of the American country, that kind of explana-  
tion was no longer sufficient. It is clear that the trans-  
ition of power should be made not on the basis of power  
groups would involve justice and equity simultaneously  
the future of the United States. We know that  
the realization of American national interests depends  
even approximately, with those which affect the American  
policy. American interests are defined with these con-  
siderations in mind of primary importance to the American people  
and foreign policy should be guided by the following  
principles: first, that major interests, power, justice,  
democracy, and the ability to defend our international  
policy, and finally, the ability to defend our  
position on the international political stage.

It is in this international political stage that the  
United States has been active since 1900. It is not surpris-  
ing in the light of the fact that the government has been a  
colossal, often sprawling, one. One of the main reasons  
for the position into which America has come

themselves pushed since the debut was voiced in the late General Patton's order-of-the-day issued to his troops immediately prior to their amphibious assault on Sicily in July, 1943:

When we land, we will meet German and Italian soldiers whom it is our honor and privilege to attack and destroy. Many of you have in your veins German and Italian blood, but remember that these ancestors of yours so loved freedom that they gave up home and country to cross the ocean in search of liberty. The ancestors of the people we shall kill lacked the courage to make such a sacrifice and continued as slaves.<sup>29</sup>

A century and a half of insulation from world politics developed traditional American attitudes that will long continue to influence the development of American policy. The uninterrupted decades of national life which produced a continuous growth of wealth, power, and standard of living seem to be irrefutable proof of the worth of the system. The democratic institutions, the relative absence of class conflicts, and the attainments of its multi-national society all seemed to be highly exportable qualities and lent fervor to the definite messianic traits that existed in the liberal traditions of America.

The conquest of the continent was a straightforward military operation. A good Indian was a dead Indian. His heart and scalp, not his mind or eternal soul, were the

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<sup>29</sup>Cited by Geoffrey Gorer, The American People (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1948), p. 23.



Extensive review of the above information has been completed and the results are being reviewed by the FBI. The FBI is currently reviewing the information and is expected to complete its review by the end of the month. The FBI is currently reviewing the information and is expected to complete its review by the end of the month.

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When we land, we will wear German and Italian uniforms  
that it is our honor and privilege to wear and  
display. Many of you have in your mind German and  
Italian blood, but remember that these soldiers of  
yours who loved freedom and they gave up their own  
country to come and fight in Europe in 1914.  
The members of the people of Italy will honor the  
soldiers to whom a sacrifice has been made in

The democratic idealism, the universal character of class  
conflict, and the significance of the anti-colonial struggle  
All seemed to be highly significant realities and had become  
to the British imperialists that which was to be their  
condition of survival.

It seemed to be highly significant realities and had become  
to the British imperialists that which was to be their  
condition of survival.



targets. There may be considerable validity to the observation that the European settlers of Africa and Central and South America exhibited a fatal lack of foresight, as compared to that of their cousins in the settlements of North America, with respect to the policy applied to the native populations encountered. Be that as it may, the American method was certainly effective. It was in keeping with the pragmatic, total solution sought by the frontiersmen and reflected the American aversion to chronic insecurity and preference for a complete clear-cut victory.

#### Factors Inhibiting Psychological Operations

There was a rough honesty that wove its way through the process of taming the continent. There was little inclination to consider psychological methods, and even less time or material means for affecting such operations. The moralistic foundations of Puritan and evangelical Protestantism that spread over the land lay across any such course of action. The soul and mind were the province of God and to trespass into this domain was not fitting. It smacked of deceit and bordered on immorality. Practically, it was too slow and inconclusive.

Although the developing features of the American conduct of the government process had little if any effect on American attitudes towards psychological factors in politico-military affairs, nevertheless the developing pattern had



definite bearing upon any future, effective use of psychological operations. The empirical approach tended to permit small, long-range problems to be overlooked until they reached major proportions. There was a developing tendency to permit fundamental policy decisions to take the form of compromise solutions, to accord all units in the organization a voice in major decisions. The fundamental American distrust of authority and hegemony lay behind the marked propensity towards multiple, overlapping, and layering agencies, bureaus, and offices working in the same field. The constitutional principle of division of powers, when applied at the working level, produced large-scale units which tended to obscure the field of vision and limit flexibility and rapidity of response.

The American heritage, therefore, does not reflect a basic set of values or operational patterns which predispose the American people to the employment of psychology against the masses of the world. That such is the case is reflected in the reluctance with which the employment of psychological operations is approached. Although there have been noteworthy instances throughout American history when psychological operations have been employed, the overall history of this instrument of foreign policy has been one of rejection or reluctant use inhibited by a moralistic sermonizing which has, to date, prevented the development and employment of an effective American psychological campaign.



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## CHAPTER III

### SOVIET ORGANIZATION AND EMPLOYMENT OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

The Cold War is not novel. It closely resembles the intercivilizational wars of the past in which competing civilizations with divergent moral and political foundations fought one another for final survival. The struggle being waged in mid-twentieth century is similar to the protestant-catholic Thirty Years War of 1618 to 1648. The only parallel in American history is to be found in the frontier Indian Wars, with the exception that the American Indian never posed the threat of sweeping a white and Christian civilization, once it had established a foothold, from the continent.<sup>1</sup>

#### I. THE ROOTS AND NATURE OF SOVIET PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

The Cold War is, therefore, a struggle, which is now being waged between non-communist states and a communist group of nations. The roots of this conflict can be found at any one of several dates (1848, 1917, 1943, and 1946 are a few of those given). However, this East-West relationship

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<sup>1</sup>Paul M. A. Linebarger, Psychological Warfare (second edition; New York: Duell, Sloane, and Pearce, 1960), pp. 244-267.

## CHAPTER III

### THEORY OF MOTIVATION AND DEVELOPMENT

#### OF PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT

The child has a natural tendency to develop in a certain direction.

Interrelationships of the child in social environment

Relationships with different social and physical environments

Learning and growth are closely connected. The child's nature

is not fixed, but develops in response to the environment.

Child's development is not only physical, but also mental and social.

In human history, it is found that the child's nature

is not fixed, but develops in response to the environment.

Child's development is not only physical, but also mental and social.

Child's development is not only physical, but also mental and social.

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Child's development is not only physical, but also mental and social.

is mainly the product of developments of the present century, the two most important of which were:

1. The completion of the expansion of the Russian state to a point where further expansion was practically impossible except at the price of conflict with some other great power. Hand-in-hand with this went the development of Russia into one of the World's major military and industrial powers.
2. The capture of power throughout Russia by a group of men, led by Lenin, and inspired by the Marxist ideology as Lenin had developed it.

With the healing of the ravages of World War I, the Soviet Union began to resume the march of economic and military development which had been in progress before that war. World War II only temporarily halted the physical--though not the planning--progress toward that ultimate realization of the traditional role of Russian rulers--supremacy in the competition for position amid the territorial and military rivalries of the Eastern European and Asiatic areas.

The conduct of this Soviet campaign has been carried out by means of a precisely orchestrated application of all four tools of foreign policy: diplomacy, economics, coercion, and psychology.

In 1940, Molotov told the former Foreign Minister of

is really the product of the present century.

1. The collection of the specimens of the Russian



### Lithuania:

We don't fight America. But when we shall have deprived America of her markets, crisis will come, and that crisis will call forth confusion, and the American Workers will appeal to us to come over and restore order. Presently, the American worker is well off, and, of course, we can't get to him. The Worker will not submit. Consequently, we must cause unemployment in America. After we have taken her markets in Europe, expelled her from Asia and elsewhere, she will have no markets to dump her goods on. She will curtail production and there will be unemployment. We shall then be able to settle our accounts with America.<sup>2</sup>

The chief target, as the foregoing quotation and countless others indicate, has been the United States. The Soviet master plan is global in scope and finds support in a worldwide psychological warfare campaign and propaganda apparatus. The "peaceful coexistence" campaign is one major aspect of these psychological operations. Within the plan, direct Soviet military force is to be withheld. Soviet psychological operations seek to frustrate or nullify the will of individuals or nations, to inhibit action, confuse and instill doubt, promote inertia, and keep its victims on the ideological defensive. Once general moral dislocation has been brought about--total paralysis of Western will and debilitation of Western military, economic, and political power--the optimum time will have arrived for the decisive

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<sup>2</sup>Robert S. Byfield, The Fifth Weapon (New York: n.p., 1954) cited from VOA broadcast by Dr. Vencas Kreve-Mickevicius in 1952, p. 7.

the Soviet light machine gun, and when we shall have the  
 Soviet American of the machine, which will come, and  
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contest. Only at this point, provided the military capability of the USSR to launch an effective surprise attack and subsequent second and third strike blows of exploitation has been brought to the qualitative and quantitative level required, and provided the risks of the contest are considered acceptable, will direct military action be applied.

In examining Soviet psychological operations, it shortly becomes very apparent that the study is not one of some new power of the word, but rather a study of an organizational weapon. The word--propaganda--does not stand alone in Soviet planning. Communist leaders and theorists have ever maintained that words had to merge with deeds and that both of these must submit to organization.<sup>3</sup> Rather than directing their efforts to fighting a battle for all men's minds, Soviet psychological operations seem oriented towards winning the minds of certain key groups in order to seize the material sources of power by which the minds of the masses are supposedly influenced.

## II. SOVIET CONCEPTS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

The Soviet concept of psychological warfare is realistic and unified. As there is no sharp separation

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<sup>3</sup>Wilbur Schramm, "The Soviet Concept of Psychological Warfare," Four Working Papers on Propaganda Theory (University of Illinois: January, 1955), p. 101.







between words and deeds, so also there is no demarcation between political and military warfare. Rather, there is the concept of a Party acting--using words and deeds in such combinations as are needed to further the class struggle. There is no differentiation between war and peace since there can be no peace so long as the class struggle continues. It is the power of a disciplined, ruthless, Combat Party which, in the last analysis, represents the communist "discovery" in the field of psychological operations. To study Soviet psychological warfare it is, therefore, necessary to examine the concept of this Combat Party, its beliefs and goals, its world view, its organization, and its tactical doctrine.

The communist theory of psychological warfare rests upon the importance of clear doctrine. Whereas, the Party leadership need not be concerned with the consistency of statements it makes, it must be sure of the consistency of its position on all issues.

Running through Lenin's writings, and current Soviet ones as well, is the horror . . . lest one small ideological slip lead to a catastrophic political error. Under Bolshevik assumptions ideological error automatically and inevitably leads to political disaster. The consequence has been the development of strict central control over vital questions of doctrine.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>Barrington Moore, Terror and Progress (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 109.

[illegible]

Poor theoretical leadership to the communists, consequently, means poor organizational leadership. "Lack of theory has been primarily responsible for . . . past opportunistic mistakes."<sup>5</sup> ". . . if our party propaganda for some reason goes lame . . . then our entire State and Party work must inevitably perish."<sup>6</sup>

That the Soviet leaders subscribe to the foregoing view of Stalin is unquestionable in the light of the extent and ramifications of the psychological operations of the Soviet Union.

### III. BOLSHEVIK THEORY AND PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

In Bolshevik theory, power is social, resident in people, latent in all social institutions, and generated in the course of all kinds of social actions. To Lenin, the mass represented the greatest reservoir of energy. The availability of this energy increases with the intensity of the class struggle and gain in efficiency as it is organized

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<sup>5</sup> Communist Party in the Philippines, Report on the Political Situation, A Report of the General Secretary of the Communist Party in the Philippines (no publishing data, 1946 or 1947).

<sup>6</sup> Louis Nemzer, "The Kremlin's Professional Staff," American Political Science Quarterly, XLIV (March, 1950), p. 72.



and a number of other physical properties of the  
state is again to be considered in the light of the  
fact that the state is a physical property of the  
state and is not a physical property of the state.

the view already and will be addressed as it is necessary  
the availability of this energy demand with the technology of  
have recognized the present scenario of energy. The  
the course of all kinds of social systems. We believe the  
positive impact on all social institutions, and supported by  
in various forms, power is socially relevant in



and directed.<sup>7</sup>

The proletariat has no other weapon in the fight for power except organization . . . the proletariat can become and will become a dominant force only because its intellectual unity created by the principles of Marxism is fortified by the material unity of organization which welds millions of toilers into an army of the working class.<sup>8</sup>

This power of organization is possessed by the Party which consequently regards itself as the advance guard and leader of the mass. The Party thinks of itself as a sort of general staff which transforms a diffuse population into a mobilizable source of power through the establishment of organs of access and control. It is custodian of basic doctrine, expert in organization, eyes and ears for the mass, and the guide into action.

However, when the mass accepts this guidance, it also accepts strict control. Scholars have observed that the Party operates on the Bonapartist assumption that delegation of authority to leadership places the leadership in unlimited control during its period of office.<sup>9</sup> Consequently, attacks against the leadership are equivalent to treason

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<sup>7</sup>Philip Selznick, The Organizational Weapon: A Study of Bolshevik Strategy and Tactics (New York: McGraw Hill, 1950), p. 254.

<sup>8</sup>Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, Collected Works (New York: International Publishers, 1927), p. 204.

<sup>9</sup>Schramm, op. cit., p. 106.

and directed.

The principal was an active member in the fight for power among organizations. . . . The principal was known and well known a dominant force only because its influence only rested in the principle of action is defined by the natural unity of action which with all the of action is an unity of the natural state.

This power of organization is possessed by the party which consequently regards itself as the advance guard and leader of the mass. The party thinks of itself as a sort of general staff which transforms a diffuse population into a solid body of power through the establishment of organs of action and control. It is controlled of basic doctrine, expert in organization, eyes and ears for the mass, and the guide into action.

However, when the mass accepts this guidance, it also accepts blind control. Leaders have observed that the party operates on the basis of a delegation of authority to leadership placed the leadership in the direct control of the party in action. Consequently, leaders regard the leadership as a division of action.

<sup>1</sup>Philip Seligson, The Organizational Theory: A Study of Leadership Theory and Practice (New York, 1967), p. 114.

<sup>2</sup>Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, Collected Works (New York: International Publishers, 1967), p. 104.

<sup>3</sup>Seliger, op. cit., p. 108.

against the state, and the political apparatus must provide whatever control structure is necessary to mobilize and direct the energy of the mass.

These controls fall into three categories: (1) Party; (2) secret police and armed forces; (3) the Soviet apparatus.<sup>10</sup> The Soviet apparatus is largely a technical means; the police and the army represent the ultimate negative control. Under the Party is found the politically positive function performed by the elaborate propaganda apparatus and by the control and deliberate manipulation of all media of mass communications.

Soviet information policy . . . seeks to deny to men the data and concepts required to formulate an alternative to the system. Police and Party control are designed to prevent men from crystallizing effective action should they formulate an alternative.<sup>11</sup>

Since the 1920's, the role of the mass has become more passive and the role of the Party more important. This does not imply that the power of the mass is not still basic to Bolshevik thinking or that the Party does not still think of itself as a general staff of the mass. Rather, the implication lies in the increased importance attached to the maneuverability of the Combat Party within the Soviet strategy.

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<sup>10</sup>Moore, op. cit., p. 7.

<sup>11</sup>W. W. Rostow, The Dynamics of Soviet Society (New York: The New American Library, 1954), p. 164.



against the state, and the political apparatus must provide  
 whatever control necessary to maintain its control and  
 direct the activity of the state.

These concepts will also have implications: (1) Party  
 (2) Party goals and action program; (3) the Party's  
 role. The Party's action is largely a technical matter,  
 the police and the army represent the technical apparatus  
 itself. Under the Party is found the politically sensitive  
 function performed by the various propaganda agencies and  
 by the control and deliberate manipulation of all media of  
 mass communication.

Lower information policy is a matter to be left to the  
 state and Congress. The Party's role is to  
 active in the system. Police and Party control are  
 designed to prevent any form of political activity  
 action which may constitute an alternative.

Since the 1930's, the role of the state has become  
 more passive and the role of the Party more important. This  
 does not imply that the power of the state is not still basic  
 to political thinking or that the Party does not still think  
 of itself as a central staff of the state. However, the in-  
 creased role in the increased importance attached to the  
 responsibility of the Party with the Party  
 strategy.



As the mass must submit to the dictatorship of the Party, so must the Party submit to the dictatorship of its central bureaucracy and the Party leaders. Here, as everywhere else, appears the Bolshevik faith in organization. Such organization implies a strictly monolithic party. No competing power structures and no substantial deviations in ideology are permitted. No other type of organization could withstand the changes of course and the ceaseless combat required of the Party.

The Party is never thought of as identical with the entire mass. It is always a minority whose central task it is to guide the mass in the desired direction, to interpret doctrine, and to specify the relation of that doctrine to strategy and tactics in a given situation. The Party is, therefore, carefully organized, rigorously disciplined, constantly at war. Only when the proletariat achieves total victory will there be peace.

The mass, then, is the chief source of power for the communist strategy and in seeking to arouse, harness, and direct this power, communism turns to those points in the modern, industrial world where permanent and reliable tensions exist--to the colonial countries, to the "peasantry" where oppressive conditions still exist in wide areas of the world, to the labor movement, to any situation which creates resentment. Communism seeks to place Party agents at the

At the same time, however, the responsibility of the party is not to be confused with the responsibility of the central committee, and the party leaders, who, as every-  
 where else, represent the political party in the organization.  
 Such organization implies a strictly non-party party. It  
 is a party without a party and no substantial distinction is  
 made between the party and the party. No other type of organization could  
 withstand the changes of course and the changes of course  
 of the party.  
 The party is never stronger than it is identical with the  
 entire mass. It is always a minority whose central task is  
 to guide the mass in the social struggle, to interpret  
 doctrine, and to spread the doctrine of that doctrine to  
 the party and leading in a given situation. The party is  
 therefore, centrally organized, centrally disciplined, cen-  
 trally of mass, only when the political situation calls for  
 victory will there be power.  
 The party, then, is the direct source of power for the  
 communist party and is striving to become, through, and  
 through the power, communist party to become power in the  
 future, industrial world where technology and science are  
 the main factors in the social struggle, in the "century"  
 where oppressive conditions still exist in the form of the  
 world. In the labor movement, in any situation which creates  
 conditions, Communist must be given party power in the

head of whatever social forces will set the masses in motion and, at the appropriate time, strike paralyzing blows at the capitalistic economy. The basic communist view is "not to create a mass movement, but to link itself to one which history has already begotten, to establish leadership over it, and to ride to power on its shoulders."<sup>12</sup>

#### IV. GENERAL PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY

The role of psychological operations at this juncture is to gain adherents and transform them from adherents into agents from whom total conformance can be demanded. The propaganda employed for this purpose has a high doctrinal content.

Once the nuclei are available, the Party can begin to operate and maneuver. It works at first from within, and its targets are the nerve centers of society--key industries, political parties, and other organizations which fulfill enduring needs and which offer tensions that can be capitalized upon.

Once the nerve centers of society have been penetrated, the Party's agents can begin to maneuver in terms of government itself. The communists are, by this time, strong enough to act as political parties, unions, and the like and

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<sup>12</sup>Selznick, op. cit., p. 171.



need of whatever action there will be the answer is within  
 and, at the appropriate time, within existing laws is the  
 legislative remedy. The basic communist view is that the  
 create a mass movement, but to find itself in one which dis-  
 tory has already begun, to establish leadership over it,  
 and to ride to power on its shoulders.<sup>12</sup>

#### IV. GENERAL STRATEGICAL ANALYSIS

The role of psychological operations in this context  
 is to gain influence and leadership from those individuals who  
 regard them with great confidence and as comrades. The  
 propaganda campaign for this purpose has a high potential  
 impact.

From the social and political, the party and people in  
 operation and movement. It works at first from within, and  
 its targets are the mass centers of society—its industries,  
 political parties, and other organizations which fulfill  
 existing needs and which other people have can be replaced.

From the mass centers of society there have been  
 power, the party's needs are being to achieve in order of  
 government itself. The communist has, by this time, already  
 enough to act as political parties, unions, and the like and

<sup>12</sup> Statement of J. Edgar Hoover, p. 214.



to make alliances with other power groups. These alliances are, however, fleeting relationships to be entered into with due caution and wariness and used as steps to greater power. At no time does the Party lose sight of the fact that its momentary ally is a future enemy; and it never places more than momentary reliance on the support of outside groups.

This was the stage of maneuver when the USSR allied itself with the United States and the Western European powers against Germany, maintaining a suspicious and wary attitude throughout the relationship, and discarding its allies as soon as the objective of the alliance had been achieved.

Psychological operations during such a period are oriented towards: (1) maintaining a sense of mission among the faithful; (2) fostering a sense of complacency toward the Party amongst the present allies and future enemies; (3) diverting attention to a common enemy; (4) encouraging disunity and disaffection among other power groups.

The encouragement of conflicts among potential enemies is a late stage in the period of political maneuvering through alliances and applies not only to maneuvering within a country but also to operations on an international scene. The objective is to set the stage for the final act for which all the others are preparing: the seizure of power by the Party.

to make alliances with other power groups. These alliances are, however, tactical relationships to be entered into with one caution and restraint and used as steps to greater power.

At no time does the Party lose sight of the fact that its temporary ally is a lesser enemy; and it never places more than temporary reliance on the support of outside groups. This was the logic of alliances when the USSR allied itself with the United States and the Western European powers against Germany, maintaining a suspicious and wary attitude throughout the relationship, and dissolving the alliance as soon as the objectives of the alliance had been achieved.

Technological questions during such a period are oriented towards: (1) maintaining a sense of unity among the ranks; (2) focusing a sense of conspiracy toward the Party against the present allies and future enemies; (3) diverting attention to a lesser enemy; (4) encouraging unity and discipline among what power groups.

The development of conflict among potential enemies is a task which is the goal of political maneuvering through alliances and enemies not only to maneuvering within a country but also to operations on an international scene. The objective is to set the stage for the final act for which all the others are preplanned. The release of power by the

In a conflict between two powers, the Party will try to intervene late in the conflict and in a decisive manner. Such a policy was followed in the case of entering the war with Japan in 1945. In such a struggle, said Stalin, the Party should ". . . not sit still with idle hands. We will have to come out, but to come out after the others. And we shall come out for the purpose of throwing the decisive weight into the scales of fate."<sup>13</sup> The Party should always be ready to take advantage of such a crisis and the great opportunities for swift advancement which often present themselves. This is the objective of the organization and training of the Party--to be ever ready with proved techniques, unquestioning discipline, and a clearly understood goal in order to take advantage of every opportunity small or large.

In the final stage of operations, when the Party is strong enough to liquidate its temporary allies and seize power itself, the task of psychological operations is to demoralize the enemy, strengthen confidence within the Party, and once power is gained, maintain proper orientation of the mass.

The time table for such operations is a long one, and the rate of advance is uneven. Party patience and constant

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<sup>13</sup> Joseph Stalin, Works (Moscow: State Publishing House, 1952), p. 201.



In a similar manner, the Party will try to intensify its work in the various spheres. Such a policy was followed in the case of working for the Party in 1947. In such a situation, we must be able to say: "We will not sit still with this number. We will have to come out, but we come out after the others. And we shall come out for the purpose of showing the results of our work." The Party should always be ready to take advantage of such a crisis and the crisis opportunities for swift advancement which often presents themselves. But in the objective of the Party, we are working for the Party—to be able to work with greater speed, efficiency, discipline, and a clearly defined goal in order to take advantage of every opportunity that arises.

In the final stage of operations, when the Party is strong enough to liquidate its completely alien and alien power itself, the task of psychological operations is to demoralize the enemy, strengthen confidence within the Party and more power is gained, making proper organization of the Party.

The time scale for such operations is a long one, and the rate of advance is uneven. Party discipline and constant



pressure underlie the operations. This kind of strategy requires long-range policy. Stalin stated: "We cannot move forward without knowing where it is necessary to go, without knowing the aims of the movement. We cannot build without perspectives."<sup>14</sup>

#### V. PROPAGANDA, AGITATION, AND ORGANIZATION

Communism has never relied entirely upon propaganda for its program; rather, it has sought to control directly the arena of conflict. This has required the refinement and employment of all phases of psychological operations for effective intervention through the Combat Party and peripheral organizations. It entails the direct weakening of propaganda targets and the development of an organizational strategy designed to afford maximum accessibility and to neutralize opposition. It is, therefore, very clear that the action aspects of psychological warfare are not restricted to the "propaganda of the deed," but include efforts to control the conditions under which agitation and propaganda are carried out.<sup>15</sup> Propaganda, agitation, and organization represent an unbroken continuum within Soviet psychological warfare.

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<sup>14</sup>Cited in Selznick, op. cit., pp. 8 and 279.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., p. 7.

in order to achieve the objectives of the policy. The kind of strategy to be adopted will depend on the objectives of the policy. The strategy to be adopted will depend on the objectives of the policy.

[illegible]

Plekhanov defined the famous distinction between agitation and propaganda.<sup>16</sup> A propagandist, he stated, presents many ideas to one or a few people, whereas an agitator presents only one or a few ideas to a mass of people. An agitator fastens his attention on a concrete injustice, leaving to the propagandist the task of giving a complete explanation. There has never been a sharp dichotomy between agitator and propagandist in Soviet thinking. Both are needed in the operations of the Combat Party, and, as the technology of mass communications has developed, the distinction has faded.

Soviet psychological operations are based, in part, upon the discoveries and accomplishments of the psychologist, Pavlov. Just as Pavlov substituted the ringing of a bell for food in the mind of a dog as a stimulus to cause the reaction of hunger, so do the communists use propaganda to make their programs palatable in the minds of men.

. . . for years research has been going on in the USSR into the mechanisms of verbal propaganda, probably in conjunction with research into methods by which the effect of such verbal stimuli can be reinforced with accompanying visual stimuli.<sup>17</sup>

The application of Pavlovian principles is systematic

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<sup>16</sup>G. B. Plekhanov, Works (Moscow: State Publishing House, 1927), p. 187.

<sup>17</sup>Alan M. G. Little, "Pavlov and Propaganda," Problems of Communism, II:2 (1953), p. 18.







and pushed with great energy. As soon as the communists establish monopoly over the means of communication in a newly-acquired area, they set in motion a highly semi-scientific process of enforced indoctrination.

It is the Soviet system to analyze thoroughly the conditions prevailing in a given area and to deduce from them the ideas which are most likely to appeal to the minds of men. The propaganda is then related to men's environment and their state of mind. No values are projected into the area. The values assumed are those maintaining in the area where the party line is propagated. There is a convenient confluence at this point between the Pavlovian relationship between oral and visual stimuli and the Marxian principle of primacy of men's physical surroundings over their thinking. While these principles may be debated, the undeniable fact remains that their application in propaganda brings results.

Pavlov's dog responded to a bell only after constant repetition and reinforcement of this response. The remarkable single-mindedness of purpose and the relentless reiteration of clearly-defined ideas followed by the communists are based on this principle. "This constant repetition is the most notable feature of Bolshevik propaganda, and is the reason why Soviet newspapers and radio programs are so

[illegible]

desperately monotonous."<sup>18</sup> The repetition and pounding may seem monotonous to be sure, but the desired effect is achieved when the idea is finally lodged in man's subconscious mind. Men learn the party line not knowing how. They learn the communist way of thinking, even while they imagine they are offering resistance. Thought-provoking is the observation:

Fire and sword were necessary to impose faith upon our more remote ancestors. Pressure had to be used to make their children say their prayers. But their grandchildren and great-grandchildren prayed without constraint and from conviction.<sup>19</sup>

Soviet propaganda does not rely on overt methods alone. The several sections of the Department of Propaganda and Agitation attest to this; movies, the theatre, fictional literature, and music--all are employed for their revolutionary significance or for their portrayal of the evil and follies of bourgeois life, particularly the greed and selfishness that is provoked by money and property under the capitalist order.

Aside from the camouflage which these indirect means of conveying the party line provide, an essential feature of them all is their capacity to awaken emotion in the mind of a recipient. Coupling an aroused emotion with a suggestion

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<sup>18</sup>Alexander Uralov, The Reign of Stalin (London: The Bodley Head, 1953), p. 189.

<sup>19</sup>Uralov, op. cit., p. 191.



the manuscript

leading they are offering evidence. Though removed to  
They learn the commonest way of thinking, even while they  
continued mind. And learn the party-line and passing over  
advised when the case is finally judged in man's mind  
and sometimes to be true, but the belief which is  
helpfully means, "is the repetition and passing over

Life and good work necessary to support faith when  
our own world's uncertain. Parents had to be  
made to believe children are their future. The world  
is uncertain and many children are being  
lost.

...and finally, the

...all is still capacity for action ...



from party doctrine is effective in indoctrinating those targets of Soviet psychological operations whose lives are notably drab or without hope, and who are, therefore, especially susceptible to such methods.

## VI. THE ROLE OF MASS COMMUNICATIONS

The Soviet regime places great emphasis on wide dissemination of its decisions and policies. The monopoly over all media of mass communications gives it unique opportunity and virtually unlimited resources. It can direct and control the flow of information and, at any given moment, virtually saturate all public media with whatever subject is considered of greatest importance.

The press and radio are the principal media by which decisions of the Party and government are publicized. Pravda and Izvestia are the two largest central newspapers. Pravda, the official organ of the Party, lays particular emphasis on Party matters; Izvestia, the chief organ of the Council of Ministers, stresses government affairs. Of the two, Pravda is the more authoritative.<sup>20</sup> Pravda, Sovetskaya Rossiya--the newspaper of the Party bureau for the RSFSR (the largest

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<sup>20</sup>United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, "National Policy Machinery in the Soviet Union," Organizing For National Security, Vol. II (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 407.

from party discipline is effective in industrialized states  
because of Soviet technological operations across lines and  
definitely not in Western Europe, and was not, therefore, an  
essential characteristic of Soviet society.

#### VI. THE ROLE OF MASS COMMUNICATIONS

The Soviet regime places great emphasis on the dissemination of its policies and policies. The monopoly over all media in mass communications gives it unique opportunities and flexibility without compromise. It can direct and control the flow of information and, at the same time, it is able to disseminate all public issues with respect to subject in accordance with its needs and interests.

The press and radio are the principal means by which decisions of the Party and Government are publicized. These two agencies are the two largest mass media. In the United States, the chief organ of the Party, the political organs on the other hand, and chief organ of the Council of Ministers, are the Government organs. On the other hand, in the Soviet Union, the chief organ of the Party is the newspaper of the Party, known as the Pravda (the Truth).

<sup>10</sup> United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, "National Policy Agency in the Soviet Union," Organizing for National Security, Vol. II (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1957), p. 407.

Republic)--and Kommunist, the Party's theoretical journal, have the status of departments under the Party secretariat.<sup>21</sup> As such, they receive guidance directly from the Party secretariat and not, as in the case of Izvestia and other Soviet newspapers, from the Propaganda and Agitation Department. However, these three publications and the Department work closely together, and their activities are well coordinated.

The radio is another important medium of communication for the regime. All radio stations in the USSR are under the general supervision of the All-Union Radio and Television Committee which, although an organ of the government, is closely supervised by the Department of Propaganda and Agitation. Radio Moscow, the largest station, is equipped with the most modern and powerful transmitters for long-range broadcasts to foreign as well as domestic audiences. Its broadcasts are monitored by local stations throughout the USSR and relayed to remote areas or rebroadcast locally.

Radio stations play an important role in familiarizing the population with important Party and government decrees and in transmitting official explanations and "clarifications" of established policy. In this, the radio relies

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<sup>21</sup>Ibid., p. 408.







heavily on the press. Radio stations allot considerable time to broadcasting texts of Pravda editorials.

Pravda is an official channel for informing lower level officials of policy decisions.<sup>22</sup> Pravda not only transmits the texts of decrees but, in accompanying editorials, interprets them and lays down broad policy guidelines. Second-echelon officials are expected to read Pravda daily and act accordingly.

The Soviet wire service, Tass, is yet another medium of government communication. It is an agency of the Council of Ministers.<sup>23</sup> Tass, with offices throughout the world, gathers foreign news for the use of Soviet domestic radio and newspapers and transmits domestic Soviet news abroad. It is also a major network for the gathering and transmission of news between Moscow and the provinces. Tass bureaus throughout the Soviet Union play an important part in reporting important local developments, and Pravda prints numerous articles received from local Tass offices.

## VII. THE DEPARTMENT OF PROPAGANDA AND AGITATION

The organ of the Communist Party which is designed to mold public opinion and to conduct psychological operations is the Department of Propaganda and Agitation. The mandate

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<sup>22</sup>Ibid.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid.

heavily on the project, and the system will be considered  
 time to re-examining the state of economic  
growth in an effort to channel the increasing flow  
 level activities in policy decisions.<sup>12</sup> growth and only  
 towards the future of growth but in accompanying the  
 social, economic and legal and policy-making  
 lines. Second-order effects are expected to take place  
 daily and not occasionally.

The growth with growth, growth is the central theme  
 of government development. It is the policy of the United  
 States, growth, growth, with growth throughout the world,  
 Japan, growth and the use of growth and growth  
 and growth and growth and growth and growth  
 it is also a major element for the growth and growth  
 of both growth and growth and the growth, growth  
 throughout the world and play an important role in the  
 growth, growth and growth and growth and growth  
 throughout the world and growth and growth

## VII. THE CHALLENGE OF GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT

The growth of the growth and growth is designed to  
 and growth and growth and growth and growth  
 is the growth of growth and growth. The growth

of this Department, prescribed by the Central Committee of the Party, is as follows:

The Central Committee of the All-Russian Communist Party of Bolsheviks decrees: To concentrate in the department of propaganda and agitation all work on written and oral propaganda of Marxism-Leninism and mass political agitation (Party press; publishing of propaganda and agitation literature; organization of written and oral propaganda of Marxism-Leninism; control over the ideological content of propaganda work; selection and assignment of propaganda cadres; political training and retraining of Party cadres; organization of mass political agitation.)<sup>24</sup>

The Party maintains direct or indirect control over all public information and permits no independent commentary or analysis of its decisions and policies. Since the functions of propaganda and agitation have remained one of the most important considerations of the Party during its entire existence, control of these activities is at a very high point in the Party hierarchy.

The Department of Propaganda and Agitation is administratively located in the Executive Staff of the Party Secretariat.<sup>25</sup> Within the terms of guidance and top policy decisions developed by the Presidium, the Department determines both the general line and the specific courses of

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<sup>24</sup> Cited in Albert M. Leavitt, Propaganda and Agitation in the Soviet Union (Oberammergau: Army Institute of Advanced Russian Studies, 1956), p. 14.

<sup>25</sup> Senate Committee on Government Operations, op. cit., p. 407.





psychological action to bring the Party decisions to fruition. Both the Presidium and the Secretariat are headed by Nikita Khrushchev. Consequently, the interlocking arrangement of policy formation and implementation can be focused directly on the psychological facets of execution.

The title of the organ which has fulfilled this function within the Party has often changed, the internal arrangement has varied, and the importance of its role has fluctuated. It has always existed, however, and generally has been very important, fulfilling its functions as eyes and ears of the Party and, more important, the voice.

The directors of the Department have been prominent in Party affairs. Zhdanov reorganized the Department in 1938 and remained closely connected with it until his death in 1948;<sup>26</sup> Shepilov and Suslov served as directors.<sup>27</sup> Other lesser-known men step from the Department of Propaganda and Agitation to high government and Party posts.<sup>28</sup>

Despite the range of its responsibilities, the Department is not primarily an operational agency. The Department does not make basic propaganda policies--that function is

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<sup>26</sup>Nemzer, op. cit., pp. 72-73.

<sup>27</sup>Pravda, 26 February 1956.

<sup>28</sup>Meisel and Kozera, Materials for the Study of the Soviet Union (Ann Arbor: The George Wahr Publishing Co., 1953), pp. 193-197.





the prerogative of the Presidium and the Central Committee. Nor does the Department actually administer the program of propaganda, agitation, and psychological operations in general; responsibility for day-to-day operation of the program rests with the government agencies. The Department does no major publishing and does not operate the Soviet radio or newspaper networks. It functions, instead, as planner, director, and watch dog for all media. Its authority touches every realm of intellectual endeavor and every form of organized activity which might conceivably influence public opinion.

At every level of Party administration, there are propaganda and agitation departments with their own personnel in key positions in all local communications media as well as in important factories and other enterprises. Directives and instructions are sent out from the parent Department to local offices and the worldwide network of Party cells. Every Party cell is a nerve end for this system. From these nerve ends as well as from local offices flows a constant stream of reports back up the chain to the Department. This basic data is gathered and analyzed for the consideration of the Presidium and Central Committee in the development of psychological policies. The high-level policy decisions thus reached are then interpreted and disseminated by the Department. Thus the organization acts as a two-way channel

The perspective on the provision and the Central Committee. For these the Department actually administers the program of propaganda, agitation, and psychological operations in general, responsibility for day-to-day operation of the program rests with the government agencies. The Department does not major political and does not operate the Soviet radio or newspaper networks. It functions, instead, as planner, director, and advisor and for all intents the authority reaches every realm of intellectual endeavor and every form of organized activity which might conceivably influence public opinion.

At every level of Party administration, there are propaganda and agitation departments with their own personnel in key positions in all local communication media as well as in financial, technical and other enterprises. Directives and instructions are sent out from the highest departments to local offices and the worldwide network of Party cells. Every Party cell is a nerve end in this system. From these nerve ends as well as from local office lines a constant stream of reports flows up the chain to the Department. This basic data is gathered and analyzed for the formulation of the provision and Central Committee in the development of psychological policies. The day-to-day policy decisions have received the same intellectual and organizational by the Department. Thus the organization acts as a two-way channel

which constantly integrates the evaluated results of the "feed back" function of its operations into a regenerative cycle of psychological policy formulation and thereafter applies the policy correction to the operating conditions in the field.

Until 1920, there was no institutionalized system of propaganda and agitation in the Soviet Union. There was, of course, a propaganda and agitation effort, but it was not until 1920 that the Department of Propaganda and Agitation was created within the Secretariat of the Central Committee. In 1921, the Department was formalized as a Party organ, receiving an extensive mandate which foretold the extent of present-day activities.<sup>29</sup> In 1928, the formerly separate Press Section was incorporated into the Department structure.

In 1930, in connection with the reorganization of the Secretariat which had as its purpose the decentralization of cadre responsibilities within the Secretariat, a change was made in the Department of Propaganda and Agitation.<sup>30</sup> The functions of the old Agitation and Propaganda Section were divided between two new sections: Agitation and Mass

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<sup>29</sup>Alex Inkeles, Public Opinion in Soviet Russia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950), p. 32.

<sup>30</sup>Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953). This volume presents an outstanding, unclassified, source on the early history and administrative development of the Department of Propaganda and Agitation.



which constantly emphasized the intended result of the "back-to-back" character of the operation into a comprehensive study of psychological factors for formation and alteration of the policy question for the operating conditions in the field.

Well 1910, there was an institutionalized system of propaganda and agitation in the Soviet Union. There was, of course, a propaganda and agitation effort, but it was not until 1911 that the Department of Propaganda and Agitation was created within the Department of the Central Committee. In 1911, the Department was organized as a party organ, receiving no separate funds which covered the amount of present-day activities.<sup>18</sup> In 1912, the formerly separate party system was incorporated into the Department structure. In 1920, in connection with the transformation of the Department which had as its purpose the dissemination of party responsibilities within the Department, a change was made in the Department of Propaganda and Agitation.<sup>19</sup> The functions of the old agitation and propaganda section were divided between the new sections: agitation and party

<sup>18</sup> Also known as Public Opinion in Soviet Russia (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1920), p. 21.

<sup>19</sup> While known, the Public Opinion in Soviet Russia (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1920) also states that the Department of Propaganda and Agitation, known as the early party and administrative department of the Department of Propaganda and Agitation.

Campaigns and Culture and Propaganda. The section for Agitation and Mass Campaigns was mainly concerned with creating enthusiasm for industrialization and collectivization. The Culture and Propaganda Section had in its sphere of supervisory operation the press, education, science, literature, and propaganda of Marxism-Leninism.

In 1934, the old Culture and Propaganda Section was replaced by a new Section on Culture and Propaganda of Leninism.

In 1935, this new section was dissolved and five new ones developed to fulfill the same functions. These new sections were: Party Propaganda and Agitation, Press Publishing, Schools, Cultural-Industrial Work, and Science.

In 1939, in connection with the return of the functional arrangement of the departments of the Party, the function of propaganda and agitation now was to be fulfilled by the Propaganda and Agitation Administration. Zhadanov proclaimed:

The Central Committee of the All-Russian Communist Party of Bolsheviks must have a powerful apparatus of propaganda and agitation in the form of an Administration for Propaganda and Agitation, concentrating all work of written and oral propaganda and agitation.<sup>31</sup>

In 1948, functionalism was again discarded and the

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<sup>31</sup>Cited in Leavitt, op. cit., p. 20, from a speech by Zhadanov at the XVIII Party Congress.

and responsible for the following:

Heavy operation in field, education, science, literature, culture and propaganda section had in its sphere of influence and influence for internationalism and collaboration. The section and have therefore been mainly concerned with creating conditions and culture and propaganda. The section for age-

IN 1984, the old Clinton and Washington sections were  
replaced by a new section on Clinton and Washington of  
the same length.

in 1912, this new section was dissolved and five new

On 1939, in connection with the return of the 1939-  
Annual statement of the Department of the Navy, the  
Department of the Navy and the Department of the Navy  
by the Department of the Navy and the Department of the Navy  
Department of the Navy and the Department of the Navy

The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Solovetsky must have a general knowledge of propaganda and agitation in the form of an administrative plan for propaganda and agitation, concerning all work on editing and text propaganda and agitation."



industrial branch system re-adopted. The major change seems to have been a change of name to the Agitation and Propaganda Section and an assumed return, to the Section, of the control over assignment of key personnel within its sphere of activity. At the same time, propaganda activities were also assumed by the industrial-branch departments.

In 1952, the Rules of the Party effected a major reorganization of the higher Party organs by the formation of the Presidium. However, there was apparently no change in the organization of what had now become the Department of Propaganda and Agitation; it remains one of the departments of the Executive Staff of the Party Secretariat.

#### VIII. ORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PROPAGANDA AND AGITATION

The scope and diversity of Party psychological operations is reflected in an examination of the internal organization of the Department of Propaganda and Agitation.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>32</sup>In dealing with the organization of the Department of Propaganda and Agitation, the student immediately encounters the lack of information published concerning detailed organization of the Party, in general, and the Department of Propaganda and Agitation, in particular. Since 1952, the Rules of the Party omit the more detailed description of the higher Party organs found in the earlier rules. There is no known unclassified Soviet source. The works of Barrington Moore (Terror and Progress), Louis Nemzer ("The Kremlin's Professional Staff" and "Word-of-Mouth Communication in the Soviet Union"), Alexander Uralov (The Reign of Stalin), and



At the apex of the structure is the Chief, his deputies, and personal assistants. Under the Department Chief comes the staff of the Department's publication: "Culture and Life."

In general, four vertical division headings can be assumed for grouping the various sections of the Department. These are: (1) Press; (2) Other Means of Mass Communication; (3) Education and Science; (4) Campaigns and Lectures.

Under the Press Division are sections for the Local Press, the Central Press (nationally circulated Moscow Press), Intermediate Press (republic, territorial, and regional press activities), and Publishing Houses. These sections supervise the activities of some seven thousand local newspapers, hold regional conferences for editors, conduct briefings and criticisms, check on performance, and closely supervise the Soviet publishing industry which is one of the most extensive in the world. The system of newspapers and publishing houses is considered to be basic for all other means of propaganda. It is a "megaphone" from which all other propaganda agencies take their cue.<sup>33</sup>

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Alex Inkeles (Communist Propaganda and Counterpropaganda and Public Opinion in Soviet Russia) serve as foundations for examining the current organization that can be derived from a study of the Department's operations and the bits of organizational information on the Party and the Government which exist in widely scattered sources.

<sup>33</sup>Leavitt, op. cit., p. 21.





Under the Division of Other Means of Mass Communications are located sections for Radio, Motion Pictures, Art Affairs, and Fictional Literature. Although films and broadcasting are administered directly by other government agencies, these activities are closely watched and guided.

Communist attitudes on the role of literature, movies, and the arts--theater, music, painting, etc.--are revealing in so far as their inclusion within the purview of the Department is concerned:

. . . Communists cannot believe that an artist may be apolitical no matter how much he may wish to be. Since, in their view, a work of art is bound to have political consequences, it is understandable that, as the Communist rulers of Russia, they wish to control these consequences. Hence, they demand partiinost in art. Partiinost . . . carries all the overtones of enthusiasm, intelligent, loyal, and yet essentially uncritical acceptance of the Communist belief system.<sup>34</sup>

Also,

Art provides one of the main channels through which an approved Party idea can be conveyed to a person without that person's realizing he is being "sold" on it.<sup>35</sup>

Under the Education and Science Division are three sections: Cultural Enlightenment Institutions; Schools; and Science. The Cultural Enlightenment Institutions Section guides the activities of more than eight hundred clubhouses,

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<sup>34</sup>Moore, op. cit., p. 105.

<sup>35</sup>Cited by Leavitt, op. cit., p. 21, from the writings of Karmakov in Institute for the Study of the History and Culture of the USSR (Munich: series 2, No. 13).

Under the Division of General Affairs of the Commission-  
tions are located various law firms, public relations, and  
Affairs, and Technical Assistance. Although this and  
proceeding are administered directly by other government  
agencies, these activities are closely watched and guided.  
Communist activities in the field of literature, science,  
and the arts--theater, music, painting, and--are increasing  
in the last few years. Increasingly within the past few years  
contact is being made.

[illegible]

Also, the Bureau and Science Division are



trade union centers, reading rooms and other cultural facilities in rural areas which are established by local educational authorities and Kolkhozes throughout the soviets.

The School Section informs educational authorities of the Party Line, ascertains compliance therewith, and studies educational problems with a view to determining new policies. The school system is one of the most widespread canals through which propaganda is disseminated.

The Science Section is concerned with all scientific endeavor, from agriculture to oil and gas research and the teaching of theory in higher institutions. Convinced Communists do not believe that it is possible for science to be non-partisan and place the same demand for partiinost upon the scientist as that placed upon the artist.

The fourth division is the Division of Campaigns and Lectures and is made up of two sections--Propaganda and Agitation. The Agitation Section utilizes trained agitators to promote current Party programs. The Propaganda Section operates through trained Propagandists, personnel more highly qualified ideologically than the agitators. It is through the workings of these two sections that the Department of Propaganda and Agitation most closely approaches an operational body. Propaganda depends on techniques of communication. Agitation includes not only communication but also example and disciplined penetration by indoctrinated

these units, namely, reading rooms and other cultural facilities in local areas are established by local schools.

These activities are conducted throughout the service.

The school system in the educational authorities of the early line, education provided through the school system, with a view to developing new policies, the school system is one of the most advanced in the world.

Through which progress is maintained.

The school system is concerned with all scientific

progress, from the study of oil and gas resources and the

development of energy in other institutions. Government

ministry is not believe that it is possible for science to be

non-partisan and place one hand against the other upon

the scientific as that placed upon the other.

The school system in the Division of Campaign and

education and is also of two types—primary and high-

school. The school system in the Division of Campaign and

primary school system. The primary school

system through which progress is maintained, primary and

highly qualified teachers from the primary school. It is

through the school of these two schools that the progress

and of progress and progress are closely associated in

operational work. Progress is dependent on technical and

education. Progress involves not only communication and

also progress and development by education.

cadres. This conception underlies the continuity of propaganda, agitation, and organization.<sup>36</sup> The work of the Division of Campaigns and Lectures insinuates itself into every other division of the Department and pervades the entire scope of Soviet psychological operations.

This monolithic structure represents a total program. Its structure extends downward from the central government organization through the levels of the republics, regions, districts, and municipalities. Its specialist formation exists at every level of this vertical structure. Furthermore, at each level there is a horizontal structure which embraces the propaganda services of the Supreme Soviet, the different Ministries, the professional unions, the Communist youth, and the Armed Forces. The entire life of its target becomes the object of a program which spins a tightly-structured web of converging influences. The Combat Party operates everywhere; it uses the same organizational weapons; it responds to the same monolithic control. Its influences go into its human target's home, his work, his leisure. These influences aim at entire thought and behavior patterns.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>36</sup>Selznick, op. cit., p. 10.

<sup>37</sup>Uralov, op. cit., p. 190.



... This condition underlies the necessity of proper  
 plan, action, and organization. The work of the  
 Division of Campaigns and Lectures is to provide itself into  
 every other division of the Department and provide the  
 entire scope of their psychological operations.  
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 districts, and municipalities. Its specialized formation  
 exists at every level of total political structure. Whether  
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 embraces the programs and services of the entire level, the  
 military structure, the professional union, the Commu-  
 nist party, and the armed forces. The entire line of the  
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 structured and of converging influence. The Communist party  
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 it responds to the same monolithic concept. Its influence  
 goes into the human target's work, his work, his interests.  
 These influences are in entire thought and behavior patterns.  
 ...

10. Division of Campaigns and Lectures

11. Division of Campaigns and Lectures

## IX. EDUCATION FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Zinoviev observed: "With us, propaganda and agitation are based on instruction . . . . Propaganda, instruction, and agitation are a unity which must be realized according to the Leninist conception of education."<sup>38</sup> This concept has three parts: (1) the mastery of Marxist-Leninist doctrine by the small group of advanced leaders who, in turn, (2) supervise the instruction and organization of the masses in the light of this doctrine, employing (3) all teaching devices, formal and informal, including schools, meetings, mass communications, and personal instruction and leadership.

The Party is responsible for training the masses and carries out its assignment through a complete network of schools. The school system is under the direction of the Department of Propaganda and Agitation and extends downward from the Academy of Social Sciences through universities of Marxism-Leninism, political schools, circles, Party evening schools, and also includes much-emphasized provisions for self-study of the works of Marx and Lenin.

The indoctrination and preparation of Party leaders is conducted with extraordinary care. The political school

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<sup>38</sup>Cited in Jean-Marie Domenach, "Leninist Propaganda," Public Opinion Quarterly, Summer, 1951, p. 272.

## IX. EDUCATION AND TECHNOLOGICAL OVERSIGHT

Linovitz observed: "With us, propaganda and agitation are based on instruction . . . . Propaganda, instruction, and agitation are a unity which must be realized according to the Leninist conception of education."<sup>38</sup>

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The Party is responsible for training the masses and carries out its assignment through a complex network of schools. The school system is under the direction of the Department of Propaganda and Agitation and includes members from the Academy of Social Sciences through universities of Marxist-Leninist, political schools, classes, Party evening schools, and also includes much-emphasized provision for self-study of the works of Marx and Lenin.

The indoctrination and preparation of Party leaders is connected with extraordinary care. The political school

<sup>38</sup> Cited in Leonid Gromov, "Leninist Propaganda," Soviet Union Quarterly, Summer, 1952, p. 452.



is the basic step in this training and is conducted at the level of the primary Party organization. It is designed to give students the basis of political knowledge, to develop in them elementary knowledge of how to study, and to accustom them to systematic development of their ideological-theoretical level. The instructors are trained propaganda specialists. Those who attend classes are Party members, candidates for the Party, or non-Party activists. Upon completion of a two-year, 120-classroom-hour course of study, graduates are expected to become members of the vast army of agitators.

The school system is organized in a pyramid for candidates throughout the Soviet world, and a promising leader can rise through it as he rises in Party prominence. The schooling is a continuous operation. Refresher courses are constantly in progress on all levels of the pyramid. A two- or three-year course is usually followed at appropriate periods by a nine-months' refresher.

The first step upward in this education pyramid is the district Party school. It is attended by lower Party and Komsomol (communist youth) functionaries who study such subjects as history, geography, five-year plans, and governmental and Party structure.

From the district Party school, the path leads to schools operated at regional, territorial, or national

is the basic step in this training and is conducted at the level of the primary party organization. It is designed to give students the basis of political knowledge, to develop in them elementary knowledge of how to study, and to accustom them to systematic development of their intellectual-theoretical level. The instructors are trained specialists. Those who attend classes are party members, candidates for the party, or non-party activists. Upon completion of a 2-3 year, 100-lesson-long course of study, graduates are expected to become members of the next step of education.

The second system is organized in a pattern for continuous education and review work, and a growing level can also through it as an issue in party programs. The training is a continuous continuous. Refreshed courses are necessary in programs on all levels of the system. A two- or three-year course is usually followed by a two-year period of a nine-months' review.

The third step ahead in this education system is the district party school. It is attended by lower party and non-party Communist youth organizations and study work includes as history, geography, five-year plans, and government and party structure.

From the district party school, the party sends to various schools at regional, national, or international

republic level. At these levels, two-year courses are conducted for officials at the district and city level for assumption of duties; such as, Party or Komsomol secretary, propagandist, newspaper editor, or intermediate level government official. The courses continue the fields of study found in the district school curricula with additional courses in dialectic and historical materialism, political economy, foreign policy, and international relations.<sup>39</sup>

At the highest level in the chain of formal schools for the members of Party cadres, there are two institutions: the Higher Party School and the Academy of Social Sciences. The former is placed under the jurisdiction of the Department of Cadres and the latter under the Department of Propaganda and Agitation. The distinction made by this arrangement reflects the type of students studying at these two different, higher institutions of communist ideology. To the Higher Party School, under the Department of Cadres, go the functionaries of State and Party, Party secretaries, chairmen of ministries, and the like.<sup>40</sup> To the Academy of Social Sciences go the theoreticians, students, and teachers in

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<sup>39</sup>Inkeles, op. cit., pp. 54-71, passim.

<sup>40</sup>Decree of 2 August 1946, "On the Training and Retraining of the Leading Party and Soviet Workers" (no publishing data), p. 1020.



technical level. At these levels, two-year courses are com-  
 pleted for officials at the district and city level for  
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 propagandist, newspaper editor, or administrative level.  
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 economy, housing policy, and constitutional relations.<sup>10</sup>  
 At the highest level in the chain of Soviet schools  
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 ent, higher institutions of communist training. To the  
 Higher Party School, under the Department of Cadres, go the  
 representatives of party and party, party organizations, their  
 men of influence, and party line.<sup>11</sup> To the Academy of Social  
 Sciences go the revolutionists, students, and teachers in

<sup>10</sup> *Journal of the Communist Party, U.S.S.R.*, 1944-1945, p. 100.

<sup>11</sup> *Journal of the Communist Party, U.S.S.R.*, 1944-1945, p. 100.  
 Training of the Soviet Union, and Soviet Union, (in  
 Russian), p. 100.

such fields as government and law, international relations, logic and psychology.

In general, a Party member finds his own level in this schooling system. An agitator needs less grounding in Party doctrine than does a top leader or propagandist. A propagandist needs a firm grasp of such doctrine and an informed world view. An administrator needs a solid foundation in doctrine but also requires an understanding of his country's geography, economy, and political and economic system. A top leader or potential theorist who is to serve as "custodian of the sacred Bolshevik word" needs the most careful and continued training in all aspects of Bolshevik doctrine and practice. Any of the curricula may be supplemented by special training--military instruction for culture officers who are to serve with the armed forces; government accounting for appropriate personnel; practical experience in management and organization.

Thus educated, the Combat Party is uniformly well trained. The two-way channel of communication provided by the Department of Propaganda and Agitation insures that the Party is well informed as well. It is well disciplined and well controlled. In the totality of its program, it approaches its targets with every weapon that is available and appropriate--persuasion, infiltration, espionage, maneuver, blackmail, promise, threats; whatever is needed.

and these as government and law, international relations, logic and psychology.

In general, a party member finds his own level in this schooling system. An agitator needs this schooling in party doctrine then does a day leader in propaganda. A propagandist needs a firm grasp of such doctrine and an idea of how to use it. An agitator needs a solid foundation in doctrine for this enables an understanding of his country's geography, economy, and political and economic system. A day leader or agitator should also be able to use the "method of the dialectic" which means the use of method and dialectic thinking in all matters of propaganda, doctrine and practice. Any of the curricula may be supplemented by special training—usually instruction for culture officers and for those with the same background. Government concerning the propaganda personnel, practical experience in propaganda and organization.

Thus, indeed, the Communist party is a party of self-education. The two-way method of communication provided by the department of propaganda and relations insures that the party is well informed as well. It is well disciplined and well coordinated. In the faculty of the program, it is to provide the party with every aspect that is available and necessary—political, intellectual, economic, cultural, physical, mental, tactics, wherever is needed.



## X. PRINCIPAL TARGETS

Soviet psychological warfare directs its operations against three principal targets outside of the Party itself.

The first of these is the main enemy himself. Here the approved tactics are pressure--diplomatic, economic, propaganda, and, as appropriate, military. The struggle is intense and the pressure exerted is maximum. Since the time of Lenin, Soviet leaders have warned against making anything less than a maximum effort, or exerting any less than maximum pressure.

A second target is that part of the enemy's power structure which is "ripe for the picking." This includes the areas of tension and dissatisfaction, the colonial countries, and the semi-feudal and underdeveloped countries, which are vulnerable to the communist approach. No matter how backward a country is, it is a worthwhile target. Every doubtful area must be seized, otherwise the enemy will do so. In assaulting targets of this kind, the organizational weapon of the Combat Party is unsurpassed. No advance is too small to be worthwhile. Yet the Party is warned not to expect to communize all of these lands in accordance with pure communist principles nor to expect the subversive process to be a rapid one.

The revolution of the colonies is not going to be a Communist revolution in its first stages . . . . In



its first stages, the revolution in the colonies must be carried on with a program which will include many petty bourgeois reform classes, such as division of land, etc. But from this it does not follow at all that the leadership of the revolution will have to be surrendered to the bourgeois democrats.<sup>41</sup>

Thus, throughout Asia, the Combat Party offered a division of the land amongst the landless peasants; and when North Korea and China fell, such bourgeois arrangements as land reform were instituted. However, the Communist Party was firmly in charge, guiding the country on the desired course. All of the colonial, ex-colonial, and underdeveloped countries of Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America are regarded as targets for the Combat Party, which is willing to accept a small advance when a large one is not possible and which is constantly engaged in a war of organization, infiltration, and maneuver in an effort to split areas from the anti-Soviet power structure.

The third principal target is the Soviet mass. The struggle, in this case, is against what Lenin called that "terrible force" of values and behaviors built up in long years under capitalism. All external evidence indicates that the USSR Party leaders still feel that the Russian masses are swayed by the "bourgeois remnants of their past." The tight surveillance, the close control over communications,

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<sup>41</sup>Cited by Schramm, op. cit., p. 126, from proceedings of the Second International Congress of 1920.



its first stages, the revolution in the colonies must be carried on with a program which will include many party, bourgeois reform classes, such as divided or united, etc. But this it does not follow at all that the leadership of the revolution will have to be transferred to the bourgeois leadership.<sup>41</sup>

Thus, throughout Asia, the Chinese Party offered a division of the land among the landless peasants; and when Marx wrote and China fell, some bourgeois revolutionaries in India were interested. However, the Communist Party was clearly in charge, guiding the country on the desired course. All of the colonial, semi-colonial, and underdeveloped countries of Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America are regarded as targets for the Communist Party, which is willing to accept a small amount when a large one is not possible and which is constantly engaged in a war of organization, infiltration, and subversion in an effort to bring about the anti-imperial power structure.

The anti-imperial target is the Soviet Union. The struggle, in this case, is against what Lenin called that "parasitic layer" of rulers and parasites built up in long years under capitalism. All historical evidence indicates that the Soviet Party leaders still feel that the Russian masses are betrayed by the "bourgeois leadership of their party." The party revolution, the class control over communications,

<sup>41</sup> "Tactics of revolution," *ibid.*, p. 115, from *Program of the Second International Congress of 1920*.

the "Iron Curtain" erected against external ideas and information, the vast program of agitation--all argue that the Party places considerably less faith than could be expected, after forty-three years of hegemony, in the doctrinal purity of its masses.

Each of these three targets is integral to the program of Soviet psychological operations and each is approached with the maximum effort permitted by the situation and available resources.

#### XI. COMMUNIST PSYCHOLOGICAL TACTICS

The strategic advantages of communism include (1) its historic plausibility, as that is bolstered by its relation to the Soviet Union, and (2) the instability of democratic society. In its quest for a monopoly of power, Bolshevik political strategy links a revolutionary elite to whatever social forces are set in motion against existing authority.<sup>42</sup>

This statement penetrates to the heart of communist psychological tactics. Capitalistic society, like every other advanced society since the beginning of history, has certain areas of recurring tension. In their most severe manifestations, these tensions appear as wars, revolutions, or economic panics. In colonial or underdeveloped countries, in countries where one class or group feels discriminated against, in lands where people are hungry for food, land,

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<sup>42</sup>Selznick, op cit., p. 333.

the "Iron Curtain" against external ideas and influences. The vast program of education--all types from the Party schools consistently less with them could be mentioned, after Party-school years of hegemony, in the technical study of the masses.

Each of these three targets is integral to the program of Soviet psychological operations and each is approached with the maximum effort permitted by the situation and available resources.

## VI. COMMUNIST PSYCHOLOGICAL TACTICS

The strategic advantage of communism includes (1) its tactical flexibility, as that is dictated by its relation to the Soviet Union, and (2) the inflexibility of domestic tactics. In its quest for a monopoly of power, Bolshevik political strategy finds a revolutionary ally in whatever social forces are set in motion against existing society.<sup>42</sup>

This statement pertinent to the heart of communist psychological tactics. Capitalistic society, like every other advanced society since the beginning of history, has certain areas of security against its own most serious manifestations, those tensions against its own revolution, or economic progress. In capitalist or underdeveloped countries, in countries where one class or group feels discriminated against, in lands where people are hungry for food, land,



freedom, or status, tensions exist which are highly exploitable. It is at this point that the communist operation begins. Perhaps the greatest tactical strength lies in the capacity to ground basic arguments in these real, deeply-felt, and well-known tensions. By using these tensions as a frame of reference, a basis for understanding is achieved. With a degree of credibility established, the operations proceed using two additional advantages to broaden the scope of operations. The first of these is that a democratic society permits attacks on itself, encouraging its citizens to propose change and protecting minority viewpoints even though they may be inimical to the regime. The second advantage draws from the fact that in Soviet countries some evidence of the historic plausibility of communism as a cure for those tensions may be cited. The price of this cure in terms of terror, fear, and surrender of freedom and human dignity is not so clear and spectacular outside a sovietized country as is the need and apparent accomplishment.

The basic tactic, then, is to ground the operation of the Combat Party in real and generalized tensions throughout the world.

It is necessary to render genuine oppression even more severe by adding to it the consciousness of oppression, and to make shame even more shameful by throwing upon it the light of publicity.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>43</sup>Cited in Domenach, op. cit., p. 266, from the works of Karl Marx.

...of states, relations with which are closely con-  
 siderable. It is at this point that the communist operation  
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 capacity to ground itself on events in those years, ready-  
 felt, and well-known factors. By using these factors as a  
 frame of reference, a basis for understanding is achieved.  
 with a degree of credibility established, the operations  
 proceed using the traditional advantage to further the scope  
 of operations. The first of these is that a domestic  
 society tends to attack on itself, encouraging its citizens  
 to oppose change and protecting minority viewpoints even  
 though they may be harmful to the regime. The second  
 advantage derives from the fact that its most numerous and  
 evidence of the historic plausibility of communism as a cure  
 for those factors may be seen. The price of this cure in  
 terms of better, less, and expenditure of lives and human  
 dignity is not so clear and spectacular outside a revolution  
 country as it is in the past and appears accordingly.  
 The basic factor, then, is to ground the operation of  
 the Communist Party in real and generalized terms throughout  
 the world.  
 It is necessary to render genuine opposition even more  
 aware by adding to it the consciousness of operations  
 and to make them even more shameful by showing them  
 in the light of reality.<sup>42</sup>

Lenin applied this guidance by assigning to the Party the task of organizing those ". . . political revelations, embracing all spheres . . . [which] . . . are the necessary and fundamental condition to preparing the masses for their revolutionary activity."<sup>44</sup>

This is a mandate to the propagandist and agitator to examine events in the light of Marxist-Leninist doctrine and, in the terms of the reality of class struggle, to interpret the "real meaning" of events to the masses. Invariably following the basic tactic, the campaign begins with details which are, or seem, verifiable and which are often of a very small irritative nature and interprets them on a grand scale. A political scandal, and unwise statement by a public official, a desire to bring the young men home from military service early, a fear of nuclear fallout--any of these can provide impetus for the Party to begin to work its way along the inverse spiral of a propaganda campaign from the specific to the general doctrinal meaning, so as to "tear the mask from the face of the enemy."

In this activity, slogans become one of the chief tactical weapons of the agitator.

We are accused of creating mass opinion. This reproach is inexact; we are attempting only to formulate it . . .

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<sup>44</sup>Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, Selected Works (New York: International Publishers, 1935), pp. 1 and 22.



Lenin applied this program by assigning to the Party the task of organizing those of the political revolution, organizing all spheres of activity, and the necessary and fundamental condition for preparing the masses for their revolutionary activity.<sup>22</sup>

This is a mistake in the propagandist and agitator to assume events in the hands of Marx-Leninist doctrine and the basis of the reality of class struggle. He interprets the "real condition" of events in the manner of the usually following the Leninist line, the revision begins with details which are, in some respects, not only but often of a very small fraction of the whole and which have on a great scale. A political condition, the Leninist program by a public official, a desire to bring the Party and those from military service early, a lack of military training—any of those can provide grounds for the Party to begin to work its way along the Leninist program of a propaganda campaign. From the question to the Party's program, he is to "then the work from the Party of the Party."

In this strategy, the Party is out of the Party. The Leninist program is the Party.

We are not to be misled by the Party's program. The Party is not to be misled by the Party's program. The Party is not to be misled by the Party's program.

<sup>22</sup>Lenin, *Selected Works*, (New York: International Publishers, 1913), Vol. I, pp. 1 and 11.

the slogans which correspond to the acute need of a class and epoch themselves create thousands of channels for their own dissemination. The revolutionary milieu is marked by a high conductability of ideas.<sup>45</sup>

"Land and Peace," "bread, peace, and liberty," "for a liberal, democratic government," "Ban the bomb"--these represent some of the most successful of all the Bolshevik slogans. One of the great strengths of peace campaigns and appeals is the endless reiteration of the single word "Peace," which means "so many things to so many people and recalls so many of the bruises and hurts of society the world over."<sup>46</sup> Lenin emphasized the importance of grounding all slogans in the needs and tensions of the masses and the requirement for clarity and brevity in expressing the political line of the moment. Every slogan must appeal as broadly as possible to the deepest wishes of the common people.

Probably no propagandists have made such use, nor had the opportunity to make such use, of repetition and variation as have the communists. There are hundreds of different kinds of newspapers and magazines throughout the USSR, each saying the same thing, but translating it into the experience, the words, and the known tensions of the particular audience which the publication serves. Throughout the world,

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<sup>45</sup>Cited in Domenach, op. cit., p. 268, from the works of Leon Trotsky.

<sup>46</sup>Schramm, op. cit., p. 132.

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<sup>45</sup> Cited in *Communism*, *op. cit.*, p. 166, from the words of Lenin Trotsky.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, *op. cit.*, p. 165.



the Combat Party devotes extraordinary care to fitting its activities into the culture where its objectives lie. The leader of a unit of the Party in India is certain to be an Indian. When the Party moved into North Korea, a large cadre of Russian-trained Koreans were ready to take over leadership. When the North Korean troops advanced into South Korea, they brought with them another cadre of South Koreans who had been trained in China and North Korea to take over the South Korean government at the appropriate time. Behind Mulah Barzani of the Kurds and Khalid Backdash of the Syrians stands the parent Party, while the variation in terms of the audience, the cultural approach, and the acceptability of the local apostle of the new faith is a matter of the closest attention.

Since Lenin, Soviet Party leaders have cautioned against "adventurism" in carrying the attack to the enemy. The admonition against undertaking an action when the resources are inadequate to carry the project off successfully seems to apply to psychological operations as well as to the field of military activity. The Party strives continually to maintain the psychological initiative by carefully choosing the time, place, and issues. This doctrine of attack is another key to the Party's psychological strategy. "The tactic is constant attack--seldom answering, seldom



defending, always changing the field of battle to one of its own choosing."<sup>47</sup>

Lenin emphasized that the Party must be ready to adopt itself to changing conditions. The Party has continually been counseled to expect setbacks or temporary deviations from the long-term path and to be prepared for deals and alliances, also temporary, with enemies. This ability to make a quick shift is in accord with basic political doctrine and planning; it also parallels the pattern of anxiety and fatigue tactics which communists are reported to employ in obtaining "confessions." Some students detect in the "quick shift" the potential element of a truly grand tactic based on the same psychological approach.<sup>48</sup> It is highly credible that when the tension of a particular psychological attack has been raised to a sufficient degree, the Soviet psychological strategists deliberately give the target temporary relief from that tension in order to teach a desired response and, gradually, through a succession of such build ups, inexorably break down the resistance of the enemy.

Party psychological strategists recognize that many of their most likely converts are individuals who feel rejected by the society around them or whose values are in

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<sup>47</sup>Ibid., p. 133.

<sup>48</sup>Wilbur Schramm submits that the parallel is sufficiently striking to warrant serious study.



own recording."

It is highly

new, increasingly broad base for the existence of the army.

response and gradually, through a succession of such trials, sensory relief from that tension is order to cause a desired psychological adaptation. Subsequently, after the subject has been raised to a sufficient degree, the desired condition then when the tension of a particular psychological

to their most likely sources are individuals who have re-  
ported by the survey group or those who are in  
the category of individuals who have reported that they

[illegible]

flux, and who are looking for firm ideological guidance. Consequently, wherever the Combat Party operates in the world, it provides groups in which a convert can reinforce his new beliefs and establish an identification with a working organization which will give him a sense of mission, status, and a sense of belonging.

## XII. THE CONCEPT OF TOTAL ATTACK

The Soviet view of psychological war and psychological operations is a concept of total attack. The Party trusts no one it does not dominate. Its opponents can expect a consistently suspicious attitude toward everything that is said or done. This attitude is not an assumed defense mechanism but is the predictable heritage of Russian history and Party experience and doctrine. There is little cause to regard any settlement offered or entered into by the USSR as a permanent arrangement, for communist doctrine demands its abrogation as soon as it has served its intended purpose.

While the Party is flexible in its line and political arrangements, it never deviates far from the center of its pre-surveyed path. Every step taken is directed along the trend of this path and every step is a move in a war of maneuver. The Combat Party works in every part of the world where it can gain or force entrance and is engaged in a





program of organization, indoctrination, infiltration, and maneuver. It maintains an atmosphere of tension, utilizing every source of potential dissatisfaction, and constantly applying pressure.

From its own activities, the Party knows the dangers of infiltration, and it knows the vulnerability of the masses. It also harbors very real concern for its own masses which it considers still to be "contaminated" from life under the old regime; this concern becomes increasingly more active with the inclusion of satellite peoples within the horizons of Soviet hegemony. The existence of the Iron Curtain, the Berlin Wall, and the adamant refusal to consider effective, on-sight, inspection teams as part of an arms control settlement are not surprising. What would be surprising would be a willing removal of these obstacles. Should this occur, it might indicate that the masses were at last considered safe, or that the Party was a different Party than heretofore, or that, in the estimate of Soviet planners, there was no escape, no way out, and nothing further to be feared from the non-Soviet world.

The Western World cannot afford to overlook Nikita Khrushchev's statement in Tirana, Albania, in May of 1959.

We do not negotiate on the basis of "give and take."  
We have nothing whatsoever to give. We will not

process of organization, in creation, in institution, and  
 however, it maintains an equilibrium of tension, utilizing  
 every source of potential dissipation, and constantly  
 finding outlets.

From the very beginning, the Party knows the danger  
 of inflation, and it knows the vulnerability of the  
 masses. It also knows very well the danger of the  
 masses which is constant until it is "commenced" from  
 the moment the first signs of discontent become increasingly  
 more acute with the inclusion of smaller people within  
 the process of mass movement. The raising of the iron  
 curtain, the Latin ball, and the almost refusal to con-  
 sider anything, or-almost, anything less as part of an  
 mass control mechanism and not anything. That could be  
 anything would be a willing consent of these obstacles.  
 Since this Party, it might indicate that the years have  
 been considered, and, or that the Party has a different  
 Party even considered, or not, in the future of the  
 future, there was no escape, no way out, and nothing  
 further to be feared from the inevitable world.

The Western World cannot afford to remain within  
 the Western's framework in the future, it is not of 1950.  
 It is not negotiable on the basis of "give and take."  
 We have nothing whatever to give. We will not

make any concessions because our proposals do not form the basis of a barter deal.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>49</sup>Cited in the Washington Evening Star, July 15, 1963, p. A-7.



to make any suggestions because you know the way  
from the house to the station.

Case in the London Evening Star, July 13, 1943,  
p. 4-5.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

American history, since before the Revolution, is sprinkled with the recorded use of psychological operations. In some cases, this employment was sufficiently protracted and sufficiently integrated to approach the dimensions of psychological warfare. In the young days of the Republic, the moralistic undertone to American pragmatism was rarely allowed to stand in the way of results. Furthermore, the demanding immediacy of dealing with the day-by-day conquest and exploitation of the virgin land left insufficient time for the "native hue of resolution . . . [to become] . . . sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought." So long as the nation lived with the frontier or with a majority of a population whose recollections were filled with the actual or near actual experiences of opening a continent, conscience made cowards of very few indeed.

#### I. SOURCES OF AMERICAN AVERSION TO THE USE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Any recognized aversion to the use of psychological operations in the formative years of the Republic probably stemmed from three basic sources. American military

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allowed to stand in the way of results. Furthermore, the  
constant tendency of dealing with the day-by-day constant  
and exploitation of the virgin land left unexploited the  
for the "native use of resources" . . . (to be honest) . . .  
which was also the last word of knowledge. So long as  
the nation lived with the frontier or with a majority of a  
population whose recollections were filled with the actual  
or best actual experience of opening a country, conscience  
was bound to very few bounds.

1. HISTORY OF AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGY TO THE  
USE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Any thoughtful student of the use of psychological  
operations in the various years of the Republic properly  
should first know their names. American history



tradition sprang from Europe where it was considered much more "fitting and proper" to be shot to pieces assaulting a redoubt than to stand back and talk the defenders into surrendering. The latter performance was not cowardly, exactly, but it certainly was not a method susceptible to embellishment in the mess. The earliest basis of illegitimacy lies here.

Immediate results, drawing from an evaluation of concrete facts, were the goals of American operators of all kinds. This is still an American hallmark. The nebulous, ill-defined realm of public opinion, the impact of symbols, the role of ideology—all of these were too distant, too unsubstantial for the American style of taming a country; lack of means of rapid, mass communications only served to relegate such methods to an even lower priority. Consequently, the effectiveness of psychological operations as a tool of policy never approached the proven worth of the Minié ball. There developed, therefore, no national basis for confidence in the employment of psychological operations.

Suspicion of authority and a parallel determination to compartmentalize all authority into legally controllable units provided with powers shared with and, thereby, balanced by other competing units have been features of American political consideration since 1787. In this context, reflective thought on the nature of psychological operations early

transition agency from Europe which it was considered worth more "lifting and moving" in the end to give something a redoubt than to stand back and tell the Europeans into surrendering. The latter governments was not completely, mostly, but it certainly was not a wholehearted acceptance to anything went in the end. The earliest basis of ill-considered line

... transition agency, started from an intention of states today, were the goals of American operations of all kinds. This is well as American intention. The intention, ill-considered basis of policy opinion, the impact of symbols, the role of ideology--all of these were too distant, too far removed for the American style of being a country; lack of sense of right, need consideration only served to make sure that subjects of an even more policy. Consequently, the effectiveness of psychological operations as a tool of policy never approached the power which in the mind half those involved, therefore, no national basis for confidence in the assignment of psychological operations.

... suggestion of authority and a partial determination to centralize all authority into totally centralized units provided with power shared with and, thereby, limited by other agencies which have been involved in American political operations since 1947. In this context, policy and thought as the basis of psychological operations early

discovers the threat of subversion of one organizational unit by another through the employment of a force which can leap the barriers of law and a carefully balanced set of checks and balances. This potential strikes at the heart of American constitutionalism and gives rise to the "round house" statement, so frequently used to dismiss its use: that psychological war is "antithetical to the American way of life."<sup>1</sup> The habitual objection to its employment has been the inference that psychological operations are not consonant with either the past experience or the present-day interests of the nation.

When forced to resort to arms for redress, an appeal to the tribunal of the world was deemed proper for our justification. This was the object of the Declaration of Independence. Not to find out new principles, or new arguments, never before thought of, not merely to say things which had never been said before; but to

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<sup>1</sup>A "round house" statement is, by definition, a verbal refuge where it is difficult to be cornered. The tone of contemporary reference to that diaphanous web spun of mores, values, style, heritage, and image of America and her people is a distressing fact of American political writing. A search for the stage in our national life when the aforementioned terms ceased to be employed as reasons for acting and became excuses for not acting at all or in an ineffective way might be most enlightening. Perhaps there is validity in the observation that America has ceased to be a Father-land and has become a Mother-land: that the idiosyncratic feature of the American conscience is that it is predominantly feminine. Perhaps, also, the old naval shibboleth that "things aren't like they were in the old Navy--and besides they never were" is also applicable. Nonetheless, the Hamlet pattern is discernible in our quest for moral strength and guidance.





place before mankind the common sense of the subject, in terms so plain and firm as to command their assent and to justify ourselves in the independent stand we are compelled to take. Neither aiming at originality of principle or sentiment, nor yet copied from any particular or previous writing, it was intended to be an expression of the American mind, and to give to that expression the proper tone and spirit called for by the occasion.<sup>2</sup>

Thus, what has come to be one of the documents of the American spirit was first and foremost a propaganda tract. It was effective as a psychological instrument not only because of its powerful annunciation, but because its moral suasions were supported by action which clearly demonstrated that Americans had the strength of their convictions.

## II. EARLY INSTANCES OF AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Both Franklin and Jefferson were involved in a large-scale psychological operation against the Hessian mercenaries. Their "Plan to Cause Hessian Desertions" was an early example of the necessity for high-level political support as a prerequisite to successful psychological warfare. Without a congressional resolution authorizing protection, citizenship, and up to one thousand acres of land, depending upon the rank of the deserter, the program could never have been

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<sup>2</sup>Cited by Oren Stephens, Facts to A Candid World (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1955), p. 29, from a letter to Henry Lee, May 8, 1825, written by Thomas Jefferson.

place before making the same form as the subject, in terms of this and this as to content itself. And to justify ourselves in the independent stand we are entitled to take. Neither taking it as a matter of principle or principle, nor yet taking it as a matter of principle or principle, it was intended to be an expression of the human mind, and to give to each individual the power to make his own choice by the individual.

Thus, what was done to be one of the elements of the American spirit was first and foremost a propaganda effort. It was effective as a psychological instrument not only because of its powerful announcement, but because its words were supported by action which clearly demonstrated that Americans had the strength of their convictions.

## II. EARLY HISTORY OF AMERICAN

### PSYCHOLOGICAL ORIGIN

Both Franklin and Jefferson were involved in a large-scale psychological operation against the British empire. Their "Plan to Create Mental Revolution" was an early example of the necessity for high-level political thought in a psychological or successful psychological warfare. A psychological revolution suggesting revolution, dissent, and up to one thousand years of time, depending upon the type of the device. The process could never have been

<sup>1</sup> "The Great American Revolution: From a Common World to a New World," *Journal of American Studies*, 1971, 5, 1, 1-10.   
 Lecture by Henry J. May, Jr., 1971, written by Thomas J. May.



carried out. It has been estimated that between five and six thousand men deserted as a result.<sup>3</sup> Since this represented 20 per cent of the Hessian force, the success of the venture was obvious.

The use of psychological operations, therefore, is grounded in the very founding of the nation. The individuals involved certainly did not believe they were engaged in any sinister or unethical action.

The United States army encountered very effective psychological operations by the Mexicans during the Mexican War. A forceful religious appeal, an offer of citizenship, and 320 acres of land addressed to U. S. soldiers of foreign birth, particularly the Irish Catholics, had marked effect. The majority of the deserters were Irishmen who had become convinced by Mexican propaganda that they were on the wrong side in a religious war. These men formed the core of the San Particio Battalion of U. S. deserters in the Mexican Army. Most of the heavy American losses sustained in the seizure of Churubusco were attributed to the skill with which the Mexican cannon were served by members of this battalion.

Sixty-nine members of the battalion were captured at Churubusco. Those who had deserted prior to the declaration

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<sup>3</sup>Douglas Southall Freeman, George Washington (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951), Vol. III, pp. 517-518.

German side. It was then believed that between five and six thousand men deserted as a result. About this number is not sure of the German figure, the account of the German was obvious.

The use of psychological operations, therefore, is presented in the way founding of the nation. The latter-mentioned certainly did not believe they were engaged in any kind of tactical action.

The latest German army instructions very clearly psychological operations by the Germans during the war. A tactical military aspect, as well as a strategic, and the aspect of land addressed in a soldier on foreign side, particularly the latter, had marked effect. The majority of the soldiers were trained who had become convinced by tactical propaganda that they were on the way to a religious war. There are found the core of the German military training of U.S. soldiers in the German army. Most of the heavy American losses resulted in the hands of German soldiers who attributed to the skill with which the German command was served by soldiers of this

organization. The German military was equipped as a result. Those who had believed that the German

of war were flogged and branded on the cheek with a "D." Fifty were hanged, the last thirty of which were executed in sight of the actual storming of Chapultepec, having been "let live long enough to see the flag raised on the castle."<sup>4</sup>

The failure of the U. S. Army to develop an effective counter propaganda program presaged a similar failure to counter the strong ideological approach used by the Communists against American soldiers in Korea a century later.

### III. LINCOLN'S EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION

The composition and timing of the Emancipation Proclamation places it in a category with the Declaration of Independence as one of the classic feats of American psychological operations. Lincoln was under attack from the Northern Abolitionists to which he replied that his "paramount object in this struggle . . . [was] . . . to save the Union, and . . . [was] not either to save or to destroy slavery."<sup>5</sup> In formulating his proclamation, he had to consider the effect of such an instrument not only on the Northern Abolitionist, but also upon the white population of

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<sup>4</sup> Marshal Andrews, "Psychological Warfare in the Mexican War," A Psychological Warfare Case Book, William E. Daugherty and Morris Janowitz (eds.) (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1958), pp. 72-73.

<sup>5</sup> J. G. Randall, Lincoln The President (New York: Dodd, Mead, and Co., 1945), Vol. II, p. 158.



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<sup>6</sup>Harold J. May, "Psychological Warfare in the  
 Mexican War," *A Psychological Warfare Case Book*, edited by  
 Randolph and Joseph J. May (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1955), pp. 12-13.

<sup>7</sup>J. G. Randall, *Lincoln the President* (New York:  
 Doubleday, 1955), pp. 12-13.

the Confederacy; the slave population of the Southern States; the white population of the Slave States still on the side of the North; those Northerners who were opposed to challenging Southern slavery; and, last, the British, whose government was seriously considering recognizing the Confederacy as an independent state. The record of these considerations indicates that the last factor ranked in the forefront. Many Americans were convinced that only when the rebellion was officially declared to be a war between slavery and individual freedom as well as one against disunion would the British be placed upon such morally thin ice that they would be forced to cease threatening the Union through their thinly-veiled support of the Confederate States.

The proper psychological moment to issue the proclamation was a matter of great importance. Improperly timed, the effect could have been one of "whistling in the dark" or, as Secretary Seward phrased it, "a last shriek on the retreat."<sup>6</sup> The Federal victory at Antietam provided the opportunity.

The wording of the document was military and non-abolitionist in flavor. It opened with a declaration that reunion (not abolition) was the object of the war and later stated that it was warranted by the Constitution upon military necessity. This suggestion of military expediency was

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<sup>6</sup>Ibid., pp. 155-156.





inserted as an attempt to vitiate ideological reactions in both the North and the South.

The proclamation placed the North on the side of humane progress. It retained "the 50,000 bayonets" of the slave-holding states still loyal to the Union. It aroused such popular support in England that the British Government could no longer consider overt support of the Southern States. As an instrument of psychological warfare, it has been ranked with the Declaration of Independence and the Fourteen Points.

#### IV. ROOSEVELT AND THE GREAT WHITE FLEET

By 1907, America had begun her emergence into the broader scope of the world stage and was encountering some of the difficulties that accompany such a role. America's popularity in Japan declined precipitously following the conclusion of the Treaty of Portsmouth and as a result of the State of California's discriminatory actions against Japanese immigrants. Newspaper sensationalism and political agitation had created a full-blown issue in the American West, while public Japanese disappointment over the absence of a Russian indemnity, a feeling that America had tried to deprive Japan of the full reward of victory, and outrage over the treatment of Japanese nationals in America combined to produce widespread ill will and anti-American riots in

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#### IV. ROOSEVELT AND THE GREAT WHITE FLEET

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Tokyo. It was very clear that Japan had emerged as a world power, equal, in military strength, to France of that day; in a dominant position in the Far East; and possessed of an imperialistic drive and hunger. Roosevelt was both conciliatory and pacific. He was outraged by the California action and feared that in the aftermath of a successful war, public opinion in Japan might actually force the government, over its own better judgment, to take up arms in defense of national honor.

I am exceedingly anxious to impress upon the Japanese that I have nothing but the friendliest possible intentions toward them, but I am none the less anxious that they should realize that I am not afraid of them and that the US will no more submit to bullying than it will bully.<sup>7</sup>

The world cruise of the White Fleet, 1907-1909, was the tactic decided upon. The psychological implications were varied. It was directed inward toward the American people themselves. No comparable fleet had ever rounded Cape Horn before, and the accomplishment of such a maneuver would have great domestic impact. The voyage would formally announce to the world the fact of American interest in the Pacific with a simultaneous demonstration of the power available to protect that interest. It certainly was intended to deter the Japanese militarists from any over-hasty

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<sup>7</sup>Cited by Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (third edition; New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1946), pp. 571-572.



Tokyo. It was very clear that Japan had achieved a world power, equal in military strength to France of that day, in a dominant position in the Far East, and possessed of an important share in Europe. Moreover, her past colonialism and her position as a world power had been developed by the Japanese nation and raised them to the position of a world power. public opinion in Japan might actually force the government over the new world situation, to take up arms in defense of national honor.

I am exceedingly anxious to forget upon the Japanese that I have nothing but the Japanese position in the Pacific world, and I am sure that the Japanese will not be able to do so. I am not afraid of them and that the US will be more able to handle them. It will help.

The world crisis of the White Fleet, 1907-1909, was the factor decided upon. The Japanese naval mission was stated. It was directed toward the American Pacific themselves. No comparable fleet had ever rounded San Francisco, and the recognition of such a navy would have great domestic impact. The voyage would formally announce to the world the fact of American interest in the Pacific with a simultaneous demonstration of the power available to protect that interest. It certainly was intended to deter the Japanese fleet from any over-hasty

decisions. This action was an excellent psychological operation. Its results were carefully calculated, the operations were well executed, and its effect was decisive.

The conduct of American psychological operations prior to World War I, although on occasion quite effective, was sporadic and ad hoc in nature. In the light of present-day definitions of psychological warfare, these activities would certainly fall under the purview of agencies or advisers assigned the task of coordinating the nation's activities in the fields of diplomacy, military operations, and economics. Such, of course, was not the case. The situations requiring such action generated the need which produced a practical solution based upon an analysis of the known or suspected variables. There was no coordinating machinery for a continual sifting of the inputs. There was no organization to study the effect of long-range trends. The world was a much larger globe in those earlier years. Distance, slow travel, and the absence of the means for high speed, long-range and mass communications were obstacles in the path of any effective, large psychological campaigns. When compared to the wide scale and long-term nature of that integrated series of operations which is connoted by the term "psychological warfare," it is probably correct to regard these earlier examples as psychological operations.

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## V. AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

### EFFORTS IN WORLD WAR I

World War I witnessed psychological operations transformed from an incidental to a major instrument of national policy. In fact, the post-war period of the 1920's saw the Germans lauding American psychological warfare and counting it as a major factor of defeat. If psychological warfare is considered in the broadest sense, it is true that it was among the decisive instruments. The political policies of the Allies, the appeal of Wilson's Fourteen Points, the obsolescence of the German Imperial system, and the resurgence of Eastern European Nationalism all played important roles in forcing Germany to surrender. However, it must be remembered that following the War, German apologists seized on every pretext to convince the world, and themselves, that their surrender had been due to everything but a military defeat. Therefore, one must be wary of any German evaluation of the efficacy of the American psychological effort.

Propaganda came into prominence in World War I because the nations involved had already made mass communications part of their daily lives. It was inevitable that such civilian developments as huge newspapers, systematic advertising, calculated political publicity, and other forms of opinion manipulation would be integrated into the governmental programs. It followed, naturally, that the

# THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

## REPORT IN 1945

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 mental programs. It followed, naturally, that the

psychological warfare effort of each of the belligerents was the direct derivative of peacetime, non-political advertising patterns.

The American psychological warfare effort of 1917 to 1919 was no exception and drew heavily on familiar skills. Soon after the entrance of the United States into the war, President Wilson appointed a Committee on Public Information. This committee--known as the Creel Committee--was composed of the Secretaries of the Navy, State, and War Departments with Mr. George Creel as chairman. This was equivalent to appointing a separate cabinet member for psychological warfare; and Mr. Creel was responsible for every aspect of propaganda work, both at home, and abroad. One result of this method of organization was to confer upon the overseas representatives of the committee something of the prestige of the three great Government Departments. The Creel Committee enjoyed a tremendous advantage in the person of the chairman, George Creel. Creel was highly regarded by the President, enjoyed his complete confidence, and had direct access to him. Creel's participation in national policy formulation was, therefore, at a sufficiently high level to provide propaganda coordination to other governmental policies on a credible basis.

The Creel view was that previous wars had been purely physical struggles in which public opinion was of no



psychological warfare effort of each of the defendants and the direct objective of psychological, non-political subversion against them.

The American psychological warfare effort of 1919 to 1920 was no exception and drew heavily on similar skills. Soon after the entrance of the United States into the war, President Wilson appointed a Committee on Public Information. This committee--known as the Creel Committee--was composed of the secretaries of the Navy, State, and War Departments with Mr. George Creel as chairman. This was equivalent to appointing a separate cabinet member for psychological warfare and Mr. Creel was responsible for every aspect of propaganda work, both at home, and abroad. One result of this method of organization was its center upon the overseas representation of the committee consisting of the principle of the United States Government Department. The Creel Committee enjoyed a prominent advantage in the person of the chairman, George Creel. Creel was highly regarded by the President, enjoyed his complete confidence, and had direct access to him. Creel's participation in national policy formulation was, therefore, at a sufficiently high level to provide propaganda coordination to other governmental policies on a credible basis.

The Creel idea was that previous wars had been purely physical struggles in which public opinion was of no

importance, whereas World War I was primarily a test of strength between opposed ideals, with "moral verdicts" having as much significance as military decisions. "It was . . . [a] fight for the minds of men, for the 'conquest of their convictions,' and the battle line ran through every home in every country."<sup>8</sup>

The Creel Committee was created to conduct this psychological struggle both at home and abroad. Creel himself considered this task to be one of advertising. His book, How We Advertised America, explained in great detail his efforts and, by its title, indicated the principal shortcoming of the American effort.

The Creel Committee was loosely organized and was run in a simple, almost chaotic, fashion. Agencies proliferated whenever a new idea turned up. The basic concept was that of domestic American agitation as practiced, commercially, through advertising and, socially, through the civic clubs.<sup>9</sup>

A news bureau in Washington was established which supplied material to the domestic and international commercial press and processed other material to publicity missions abroad. Missions were sent to France, England, Italy,

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<sup>8</sup>George Creel, How We Advertised America (New York: Harper and Bros., 1920), p. 3.

<sup>9</sup>Paul M. A. Linebarger, Psychological Warfare (second edition; New York: Duell, Sloane, and Pearce, 1960), p. 68.

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<sup>6</sup>George C. K. How We Advertised America (New York:  
Doubleday and Co., 1920), p. 34.

<sup>7</sup>Paul M. A. Diederichs, Psychological Warfare (London:  
New York: Dutton, 1920), p. 43.



Switzerland, Holland, Spain, Scandanavia, the Latin American countries, China, and Russia. The Japanese were given the American propaganda file and were asked to use it. Heavy emphasis was placed on the home audience, for the committee's mission covered all phases of propaganda work. Sections were established for posters, advertising, "Four Minute Men" (volunteer local speakers in all American communities), films, American minority groups and the foreign-language press, women's organizations, information bureaus, syndicated features, and cartoons. The American motion picture industry was employed as a channel for domestic and foreign distribution of American propaganda. Foreign countries, unwilling to run the propaganda films, found that the American producers would not supply any feature productions.

It was hardly an exaggeration to say that no special machinery had to be built up for the conduct of operations. The major task was more one of coordination and guidance. The extent of voluntary contribution was amazing.

The Pamphlet Division commanded the services of any writer it chose to call, and it had ready access to over three thousand of the leading historians of the country. Novelists, essayists, and the publicists, without payment, worked in the production of articles for syndicated distribution. The objective of the Division of Syndicate Features was "to sell the war" to the people and to present in

Switzerland, Holland, Spain, Scandinavia, the Latin American countries, China, and Russia. The Japanese were given the American propaganda film and were asked to get it. Navy especially was placed on the home audience, for the Committee's mission covered all phases of propaganda work. For films were recommended for posters, advertising, "Four Minute Men" (two-minute local speakers in all American communities), Youth, American minority groups and the foreign language press, women's organizations, information bureaus, syndicated columns, and cartoons. For American political parties, industry and employer to a certain, for domestic and foreign distribution of American propaganda. Foreign countries, unwilling to run the propaganda film, found that the American producers would not supply any further production. It was really an exaggeration to say that no special machinery had to be built up for the conduct of operations. The major task was not one of coordination and guidance. The extent of voluntary cooperation was amazing. The Propaganda Division conducted its business of war which it chose to call, and it had ready access to over three thousand of the leading distributors of the country. Novelists, essayists, and the publisher, without payment, worked in the production of articles for syndicated distribution. The objective of the Division of Political Warfare was to get the war to the people and to spread it.

acceptable newspaper style not only the story of the war but also the "spirit that was back of the whole adventure." The stories reached a circulation of twelve million a month. Of the seventy-five million pamphlets that were distributed, three quarters were sent out on request. Similarly, American painters, sculptors, designers, poster men, illustrators, and cartoonists were "mobilized on a volunteer basis." The foreign-language press was kept informed through the efforts of several hundred volunteer translators.

Through teachers' institutes, summer sessions, and educational organizations, the school was reached. Twice a month, a sixteen-page paper was issued to every one of the five hundred and twenty thousand teachers in the United States. It gave to the schools the needs and messages of government in concise and usable form, and it provided the government a direct medium for reaching the twenty million homes represented in the schools.

The creation of the "four minute man" was another effective device. No less than 75,000 speakers volunteered in 5,200 communities of the United States. They spoke chiefly in moving picture houses, but, later, this area was extended to include Sunday schools, churches, lumber camps, colleges, lodges, and women's clubs. Within a period of eighteen months, they made about a million speeches and reached some four hundred million people.



accessible newspaper office not only the body of the war but also the "whole" that was the back of the whole education. The school reached a circulation of twenty million a month, of the twenty-five million pamphlets that were distributed, three quarters were sent out on request, directly, indirectly, can printers, typists, designers, poster men, illustrators, and cartoonists were employed on a voluntary basis. The foreign-language press was kept informed through the efforts of several hundred volunteer translators.

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The creation of the "four minute war" was another effective device. We lost then 75,000 speakers volunteered in 2,500 communities of the United States. They spoke chiefly in evening district houses, but later, this work was extended to include Sunday schools, churches, lunch groups, colleges, lodges, and women's clubs. Within a period of eighteen months, they made about a million speeches and reached some four hundred million people.

Nor was the potential of the advertising industry ignored. The large organizations representing advertising agencies, advertising clubs, and business papers were requested to name a board of control that would "mobilize the advertising forces of the country." Advertising space of various periodic publications having a total circulation of about 549,000,000 was purchased by advertisers of merchandise or contributed by the publishers without charge and turned over to the state. The International Association of Display Men donated display resources in six hundred cities. Sixty-thousand patriotic window displays could be timed exactly to supplement the campaigns in periodicals.

We were fighting for ideas and ideals, and somebody who realized that, and knew it, had to say it and keep on saying it until it was believed. That was a part of the function of the Committee on Public Information. . . . It was this unseen but persuasive and unending flood of ideas that aroused a correct apprehension of the true spirit and idealism of America in the war.<sup>10</sup>

Many in Congress did not share this evaluation by the Secretary of War. The Committee was the subject of bitter and continuous attack, not only for its activities in this country but also for its overseas operations. There were ugly accusations of partisanship, dishonesty, inaccuracy, and inefficiency. Congress explored Mr. Creel's background

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<sup>10</sup>Creel, op. cit., pp. xiv-xvi; Foreword by Newton D. Baker.

and the potential of the advertising industry. The large organizations representing advertising agencies, advertising clubs, and business groups were represented by a board of control that would handle the advertising budget of the country. Advertising would be a national business having a central organization. About \$100,000 was proposed by advertisement of members. This is controlled by the publisher without charge and is added to the fund. The International Association of Display has several display resources in the United States. State-sponsored graphics window displays could be added to the equipment the campaign for localities.

We were fighting for ideas and details, and suddenly we realized that, not only is, but also is, and we were on saying it was it was believed. That was a part of the function of the Committee on Public Information. It was this unusual but extensive and mounting flood of ideas that created a current of opinion of the free spirit and idealism of America in the war.<sup>10</sup>

Many in Congress did not share this conviction by the Secretary of War. The Committee was the subject of bitter and continuous attack, not only for its activities in this country but also for its overseas operations. There were many accusations of extravagance, dishonesty, inefficiency, and ineffectiveness. Congress explored Mr. Clegg's background

<sup>10</sup>Clegg, op. cit., pp. 114-115; followed by Gordon G. ...



to study his writings and political thought. As the months passed, the attacks became more bitter. Additional allegations were developed charging that the program was infiltrated by spies and saboteurs--a charge to be echoed a generation later against a successor to the Creel Committee. Part of the resentment manifested was grounded in the very heavy emphasis--almost blatant--directed at the home audience. Creel, as a representative of the administration in power, was propagandizing the American people. This situation was inevitably viewed with alarm (and perhaps with some reason) by the minority party, as well as by a number of the members of the majority party, in Congress.

The purely technical side of the work was done well but at the disastrous cost of over-shooting national commitments. "The conquering idea of justice and freedom as expressed in American idealism" and the heated propaganda of "making the world safe for democracy" were discredited at home and abroad. America emerged from the war disappointed and with the definite bad taste of its own soured propaganda in its mouth. In the clear, ever-penetrating light of hind sight, a less boisterous, a more modest, a more calculated propaganda effort might have helped forestall certain attitudes which, in a matured form, contributed to the advent of World War II.

These difficulties also graphically represent the



repercussions to be experienced from the development and annunciation of national policy objectives which are beyond the State's capacity to implement. Wilson's Fourteen Points Speech was made, in part, upon Creel's request for a clear enunciation of United States peace objectives in order to create dissension between the Bolsheviks and the Imperial Germans at the Brest-Litovsk Peace Conference.<sup>11</sup> Tactically, the speech provided the operators on the spot with the high-level support necessary to take bold and aggressive propaganda action. As a psychologically significant annunciation, the Fourteen Points are regarded as being on a par with the Declaration of Independence and the Emancipation Proclamation with respect to the clear, deep appeal voiced, in the name of universal justice and natural law, to the democratic conscience of mankind. Strategically, it marked a colossal venture towards ends, the means for the achievement of which were not even available at the time of promulgation. Psychological operations grounded on such a policy can be disastrous.

In both the formulation and annunciation of the Fourteen Points and in the conduct of psychological war, the United States was involved in matters which were operationally and philosophically new and advanced by several orders of

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<sup>11</sup>Edgar Sisson, One Hundred Red Days: A Personal Chronicle of Bolshevik Revolution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1931), p. 187.



representation to be expected from the development and  
 announcement of national policy objectives which are beyond  
 the state's capacity to implement. Wilson's Trustees believe  
 French was right, in fact, when Gress's request for a clear  
 enumeration of United States goals objectives in order to  
 create a distinction between the objectives and the tactical  
 means to the ends. Wilson's Trustees<sup>11</sup> tactically,  
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 Trustees believe the request is being on a par with the  
 Declaration of Independence and the American Revolution  
 with respect to the state, that speech is being in the name of  
 universal justice and natural law, to the democratic conscience  
 of mankind. Accordingly, it is a constant reminder to  
 each man, the state for the achievement of which we are not  
 even capable at the time of proclamation. Psychologically  
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 In both the revolution and the American Revolution, the  
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<sup>11</sup> Wilson's Trustees, One Hundred and Days: A Personal  
 Chronicle of the Wilson Revolution (New York: The Wilson-  
 Trustees Press, 1931), p. 107.

magnitude beyond any operations heretofore attempted. Inexperience, naiveté, unrestrained idealism, all of these contributed to the failure. America had forgotten that beyond the war lay a peace which would be as grim and difficult to win as the war. The Federal Government had won wars, but it had never been involved in anything that remotely resembled the approaching peace conferences. It had never conducted psychological warfare on the scale attempted in World War I. In both cases, the government had advanced far beyond any of its experience. The classic American approach to the problem had little basis of fact from which to project forward for a solution. The failure may have been tragic, but it was not shameful. World War I was to be the last of all wars; perhaps Wilson and Creel believed it themselves.

## VI. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IGNORED BETWEEN THE WARS

On the thirtieth of June, 1919, the Committee on Public Information, in the pained words of Creel, "was wiped out of existence . . . by action of Congress." The work of the Committee had been discontinued months before and only an orderly liquidation was in progress. It was this liquidation that Congress sought to interrupt and confuse. No one was left with authority to rent a building, employ a clerk, transfer a bank balance, or to collect a dollar. Creel's

...beyond my operational responsibilities. These  
 technical, scientific, and financial matters, all of which were  
 referred to the Board. I believe that the Board was not  
 the one to say a word which would be as plain as daylight to  
 all of the staff. The Federal Government had not made, and it  
 had never been involved in anything that was really needed  
 the operational part of the work. It had never conducted  
 technical matters on the same level as it was in the  
 the past, and the government had intended for many years to  
 its operations. The classic American approach to the problem  
 was that there was a gap between the project and the  
 business. The business was not being done, but it was not  
 necessary. I was in the line of all these things.  
 The business was not being done, but it was not

VI. ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL MATTERS  
 BETWEEN THE WARS

...on the subject of the 1930s, and I was  
 Public Information, in the United States of America, was  
 one of the most important. It was not only the  
 the Committee had been established many years ago and  
 an advisory institution was in operation. It was not only  
 from that Congress enough to interest and control. It was  
 was left with authority to make a decision, and it was  
 created a new body, or to create a new body.



final report was made only through the medium of a book printed by a private publisher.

The bitter battle over the "winning" of the peace led to complete disillusionment when it became apparent that the peace had not been won at all. Once more, America turned its energies inward. The experience of the Creel Committee received practically no attention and little reference was directed to the lessons learned. The Army War College files reveal that only two research papers were written on the subject from 1919 to 1929, and no officer was assigned between 1925 and 1935 to the full-time study of the problems of psychological warfare.<sup>12</sup> This manifestation of reluctance on the part of the military to accept psychological warfare was widespread and existed in every department and agency of the government to a greater or lesser degree. Consequently, when World War II arrived, the United States was too busy to devote the time necessary to plan and organize intelligently. The thinking on the nature of the organization required for effective operations in psychological warfare was neither clear nor consistent. The decisions were, once again, ad hoc. The men who made them were, in many cases, unfamiliar with, or indifferent to, the instrument they were to use and the nature of its relationship to the already-established

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<sup>12</sup>Linebarger, op. cit., p. 77.

final report was submitted through the middle of a long  
 period by a private publisher.  
 The subject matter of the "Review" of the same year  
 is completely different from the previous report, and the  
 results are not only more complete, but also more  
 interesting. The explanation of the great difference  
 between the two reports is that the first report was  
 written by the second author, the first author being  
 dead, and only two research papers were written of the  
 subject from 1917 to 1922, and no other was assigned be-  
 tween 1917 and 1922 to the following study of the progress of  
 psychological science.<sup>12</sup> This investigation of scientific  
 progress of the military or society psychological science  
 was assigned and carried in every department and agency of  
 the government as a general or general subject. Consequently,  
 when the first report was written, the United States was not busy in  
 general and time necessarily in plan and organization intelligently.  
 The training of the service of the organization evolved for  
 extensive operations in psychological science was not  
 clear and dominant. The decision was made to make it  
 the new and more than ever, in every way, including this,  
 on indifferent for the first time, they were in the first  
 nature of the relationship to the psychological

instruments of state policy. At that time, the Government literally did not know what it was getting into when it undertook psychological warfare. News still appeared to be the main prop and little time was wasted on other considerations. Yet this was news as the term was understood by the American press. The importance of selecting, explaining, and interpreting that news was not always grasped, even by those concerned with distributing it. Before the war, as well as after the Government entered the field, private American news and publishing agencies continued to engage in operations which had the effect, if not the intention, of propaganda. The Office of War Information (OWI) could scarcely have reached the audience of the Time-Life-Fortune group and the Reader's Digest, both of which achieved global coverage during the course of the war. The unwitting propaganda turned out by such sources possessed a quality no Government information program had--a readership which was unmistakably voluntary, obtained by the appeal of authentic interest and entertainment.

## VII. ORGANIZING FOR WORLD WAR II

On Sunday, December 7, 1941, the task of disseminating propaganda to foreign audiences was assigned to two emergency agencies: The Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (CIAA) which confined its activities to



statements of state policy. At that time, the Government  
literally did not know what it was getting into when it  
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the main group and little time was wasted on other considera-  
tions. Yet this was not at the time was understood by the  
American press. The importance of collecting, explaining,  
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gled turned out by each sector possessed a quality no  
government information program had a leadership which was  
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interest and excitement.

## VII. ORGANIZING FOR WORLD WAR II

On January, December 1, 1941, the task of disseminat-  
ing propaganda to foreign audiences was assigned to two  
emergency agencies. The Office of the Coordinator of Inter-  
national Affairs (CIA) which continued for several years

developing good inter-American relations, and the Coordinator of Information (COI) which operated in the rest of the world.

The Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (CIAA) had been created on 16 August 1940, under the direction of Nelson Rockefeller. The information aspects of the CIAA's program was regarded as an integral part of its general cultural and commercial relations program which was carried out in close cooperation with the Department of State.

The Office of the Coordinator of Information (COI) had been established by a military order of President Roosevelt on 11 July 1941. It was assigned two major functions: the coordination of intelligence collection and analysis from all sources, including the armed forces; and the transmission of information abroad to areas outside Latin America. The second of these two missions was not clearly stated in the order establishing COI. Although it was not specifically stated in the order, it was clearly understood by the Coordinator, William J. Donovan, and the President that a Foreign Information Service (FIS) was to be established as an integral part of COI.<sup>13</sup> This service was

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<sup>13</sup>William E. Daugherty, "US Psychological Warfare Organizations in World War II," A Psychological Warfare Case-book, William E. Daugherty and Morris Janowitz (eds.) (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1958), p. 127.

developing good inter-ethnic relations, and the Council-  
 of Information (COTI) which operated in the area of the  
 Council.

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<sup>17</sup> William G. Donovan, "The Psychological Warfare  
 Organization in World War II, A Psychological Warfare Case-  
 Study, William G. Donovan and Walter J. Donovan, 1941,  
 Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1941, p. 127.



directed by the President not to engage in domestic information activities.<sup>14</sup>

Robert Sherwood was appointed as the director of FIS with principal headquarters established in New York City. In accordance with its mission, this service, which from the very beginning was virtually an autonomous agency, undertook to spread the gospel of democracy and to explain the objectives of the United States throughout the world (except, of course, in Latin America). Unfortunately, the early radio scripts were poorly checked; there was chaos in the matter of policy; little policing was possible; and the output reflected the enthusiasm of whatever individual happened to be near the microphone.

#### VIII. THE LACK OF CENTRALIZED GUIDANCE

The FIS early encountered a pattern of difficulty that would plague all the information programs. From the earliest World War II efforts, President Roosevelt's advisers appeared to be opposed to central direction of any information program. The inevitable result was disunity in the voices that undertook to set forth our position to the

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<sup>14</sup>James Paul Warburg, Unwritten Treaty (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1946) contains this document as well as the other major documents relevant to the conduct of American Psychological Warfare in World War II.

directed by the President not to engage in domestic interest-  
less activities.<sup>14</sup>

Robert S. Wood was appointed as the Director of the  
with principal headquarters established in New York City.

In accordance with the mission, the results, which have been  
very beginning was viewed as an enormous agency, undertaken  
to spread the gospel of democracy and to maintain the object-  
ivity of the United States throughout the world. Except, at  
times, in Latin America, (internationally, the early radio  
outlets were mostly one-way; there was communication in the other  
of radio; this policy was possible; and the agency  
reflected the ambivalence of whatever individual appeared to  
be was the intention.

VIII. THE LACK OF CENTRALIZED GUIDANCE

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that would plague all the information programs. From the  
earliest world war II efforts, President Roosevelt's ad-  
visers appeared to be opposed to a central direction of any  
information program. The intelligence service was clearly in  
the vanguard that indicated to the world our position as the

<sup>14</sup>James Earl Ray, Unlabeled Prisoner (New York:  
Harper & Row, 1968), 114-115. This document is  
well as the other major documents reviewed in the context of  
American psychological warfare in World War II.

world. The information agencies were not advised of political or military plans and consequently had no idea how a government agency should react to developments. Many of the tools of psychological war remained in private hands. FIS would provide information to the private American broadcasting companies, but there was no assurance that these companies would use the data, or if they used it, that they would hue to the text. Not until the time of the North African invasions was it decided that official overseas broadcast should be taken out of private hands and made the responsibility of the Government.

Although the FIS did not make an effort to find out what the major policy-formulating departments wanted done in the field of American propaganda, it would not advise these same departments on its own intentions or current operations. Consequently, the departments became uncertain of the trustworthiness and security restrictions of FIS. Since they had no knowledge or control over the FIS operation, the Army, Navy, and State Departments pursued the policy of providing the least information and no outline of national plans and policies on the theory that such action would reduce the possibility of official embarrassment.<sup>15</sup> It was a sad

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<sup>15</sup>Murray Dyer, The Weapon on the Wall (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1959), p. 105.



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making or military plans and consequently had no idea how a  
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agencies should be taken out of private hands and made the  
responsibility of the government.  
Although the TIS did not make an effort to find out  
what the major policy-formulating departments wanted done in  
the field of Russian propaganda, it would not adjust these  
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the least discussion and no outline of national plans and  
policies in the theory that such action would reduce the  
possibility of ethical enhancement.<sup>18</sup> It was a sad

<sup>18</sup> Murray Gell, The Russian in the War (Washington:  
Johns Hopkins Press, 1950), p. 103.

commentary that the source of such vital information for psychological operations was the British Political Warfare Executive (PWE). This organization, which was an acknowledged member of the British Policy Organization, shared the information with its American counterparts in London and Washington.

#### IX. ADMINISTRATIVE DIFFICULTIES AND REORGANIZATIONS

The overwhelming majority of the major difficulties encountered by the American psychological warfare effort were administrative and not operational. The number of agencies involved in psychological operations literally mushroomed. A partial list included the following: The Office of Facts and Figures; The Office of Government Reports; the general information activities of the Office of Emergency Management; The Foreign Information Service and the Research and Analysis Branch of the Office of the Coordinator of Information; Military Intelligence; Naval Intelligence; the State Department; the Office of the Assistant to the President; the Office of Civilian Defense; the Office of the Librarian of Congress; the Department of Agriculture; and The Board of Economic Warfare. Thousands of words in dozens of languages were promulgated throughout the world. These were composed by personnel who had little





if any contact with Federal policy and none with the military establishment, except for formal security. The plans at the top bore little discernible relation to the operations at the bottom. When Washington agencies wanted to find out what the broadcasts were saying, the working offices at New York and San Francisco refused--on the basis of their own security regulations--to let anyone see a word of what they were sending out.<sup>16</sup>

It is not surprising that jurisdictional disputes, tests of power, and unwillingness to cooperate were rife. Rockefeller (Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs) considered the CIAA responsible solely to the President and refused to submit his proposed operations in Latin America to the State Department or to predicate CIAA actions on the Department's approval. Sherwood did not want the State Department to have any hand in the operations of the Foreign Information Service.<sup>17</sup>

This confusion inevitably led to numerous reorganization plans, all of which recognized the need for clearly-fixed lines of administrative responsibility, better integration of planning, and a system for the coordination of output.

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<sup>16</sup>Linebarger, op. cit., pp. 96-97.

<sup>17</sup>Charles A. H. Thomson, Overseas Information Service of the United States Government (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1948), pp. 17-18.



After a joint psychological warfare committee had been established under the Joint Chiefs of Staff and had failed to fulfill an effective policy-coordinating function, on 13 June 1942, the President, by Executive Order 9182, established the Office of War Information (OWI). This order was based upon suggestions contained in a memorandum on the reorganization of war-information services submitted by the Director of the Budget on 7 March 1942. Rockefeller successfully resisted the integration of the Office of Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs into a single organization engaged in foreign information work, and, consequently, the order establishing OWI left CIAA out of the new organization.

The OWI was created by the transfer of various information services, both domestic and foreign, to it. Included among the war-information agencies or services merged into OWI were the following: Office of Facts and Figures (OFF); Office of Government Reports (OGR); the general information activities of the Office of Emergency Management (OEM); and the Foreign Information Service (FIS) of the Office of Coordinator of Information (COI).

Upon merger into OWI, FIS became the Overseas Branch. The Domestic Branch was originally comprised, mainly, of the personnel transferred from OFF, OGR, and OEM. Between the two branches was interposed a Program Planning and Review





Board to provide the horizontal lines of communication and coordination.

The Office of Coordinator of Information (COI), shorn of its FIS, was transformed into the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) under which name three major functions were assigned: (1) continuation of scholastic and informal intelligence; (2) black propaganda operations (authorized in March, 1943); and (3) subversive operations in collaboration with regular military authority. The OSS, led by Colonel Donovan, was made an agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). It was unfortunate that the order creating OWI did not clearly establish a division of responsibility between it and OSS for the conduct of psychological operations.

#### X. FACTORS INFLUENCING THE DEVELOPMENT AND CONDUCT OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

From the date of OWI's establishment in June of 1942 until March of 1943, three factors influenced the conduct of psychological operations and were to be the bases for the final form of the organization that would at last evolve. First, the overseas activities of both OWI and OSS were vaguely defined. The Overseas Branch of OWI continued to function virtually as an autonomous unit until mid-1943. The Domestic-Information Activities of OWI were dominant. Second, the units comprising the developing psychological

...to provide the essential link of communication and coordination.

The Office of Coordinator of Information (OCI), when it was established in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) under which came three major functions were assigned: (1) coordination of technical and material intelligence; (2) direct operations; and (3) administrative operations. In March, 1943, the (1) administrative operations in collaboration with military authority. The OSI, led by Colonel Foxworth, had made an agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was understood that the OSI was to be a division of responsibility between OSI and OSI for the conduct of psychological operations.

X. FACTORS INFLUENCING THE DEVELOPMENT AND CONDUCT OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

From the date of OSI's establishment in June of 1943 until March of 1945, three factors influenced the conduct of psychological operations and were to be the basis for the final form of the organization that would be last revised. First, the overseas activities of both OSI and OSS were largely defined. The Overseas Branch of OSI continued to function virtually as an autonomous unit until mid-1944. The Domestic-Information Division of OSI was reorganized. Second, the units comprising the developing psychological



warfare organization--OWI, OSS, and CIAA--were all rent with inter-agency as well as intra-agency disputes. Third, while the major efforts of the top echelon leaders in OWI were largely concerned with the domestic program, OSS developed far-reaching plans for the conduct of psychological warfare in connection with the then forthcoming military campaigns. These plans, however, were not accepted by Robert Sherwood--Chief of the Overseas Branch, or Elmer Davis, Director of OWI.<sup>18</sup>

#### XI. ATTEMPTS AT COORDINATION

The compartmentalized nature of the various agencies prevented any one of them from knowing what the others were planning or doing. In the early days of the OWI, a War Information Policy Committee was established. It met only three times! At the first meeting, either the Director or Assistant Secretaries of such agencies and departments as CIAA, the War Production Board, War, and Navy were present. The Department of State sent only its Public Relations Officer. At the second meeting, the War and Navy Departments sent their opposite numbers to the representative of the State Department. At the third meeting, the representatives were all information chiefs, none of whom were empowered to make policy. The committee never reconvened.

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<sup>18</sup>Daugherty, op. cit., p. 128.

writing organization, OAS, and OASIS were also with  
 information as well as inter-agency disputes. Third, while  
 the major efforts of the top command leaders in 1965 were  
 largely concerned with the strategic program, the development  
 for planning plans for the conduct of psychological warfare  
 in connection with the then forthcoming military campaign.  
 These plans, however, were not accepted by Robert Kennedy,  
 Chief of the Central Intelligence Agency, in June 1965. Division of  
 OAS, 18

## II. ATTEMPTS AT COORDINATION

The organizational nature of the various agencies  
 prevented any one of them from knowing what the others were  
 planning to do. In the early days of the OAS, a War  
 Information Policy Committee was established. It had only  
 four members: the first meeting, called the Director of  
 Defense, the second meeting, called the Director of  
 OAS, the third meeting, called the Director of  
 the Department of State, and the fourth meeting, called  
 the Director of the Navy and Navy Department.  
 At the second meeting, the Navy and Navy Department  
 sent their respective members to the representative of the  
 State Department. At the third meeting, the representatives  
 were all informed of the, some of them were referred to  
 each other. The committee never convened.

As a very interested bystander, the Military Branch of the Government had made an early attempt to lend continuity by the establishment of the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee (JPWC) within the structure of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Its functions were defined as:

. . . to initiate, formulate and develop psychological warfare plans . . . [and] under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff committee to coordinate psychological warfare of other US governmental agencies and to collaborate with interested nations to the end that all psychological warfare is in accord with approved strategy.<sup>19</sup>

This was an ambitious undertaking in the light of the intense rivalries that existed. Very little ever came from the JPWC, and after the establishment of OWI this organization refused to cooperate with JPWC. By late 1942, JPWC ceased to be active and was finally abolished by the JCS. Following this abolition, no JCS committee possessed or attempted to exercise any consistent responsibility for psychological warfare operations.

In December, 1942, the JCS tried once again, this time to resolve the conflict between OSS and OWI in view of the first extensive United States military operations of the war. An order was issued stating that OSS was to have complete authority "to plan, develop, coordinate and execute the military program of psychological warfare." As a

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<sup>19</sup>Cited in ibid., p. 130.



[illegible][illegible]

consequence, both the head of OWI, Mr. Davis, and the head of CIAA, Mr. Rockefeller, appealed directly to the President, protesting the military usurpation of a Presidential delegation of authority.

## XII. EXECUTIVE ORDER NUMBER 9312

Executive Order No. 9312 was issued on 9 March 1943 and set forth more clearly the responsibility of OWI in the overseas commands. The order stated that OWI was the designated agency to conduct foreign information and overt propaganda operations abroad, but "in areas of actual or projected military operations" all plans and projects "should be coordinated with the military plans" and would be "subject to the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to the approval of the theater Commander."

The order did not define clearly what, if any, psychological warfare functions were retained by OSS. The order did not state whether OWI or OSS had jurisdiction over subversive activities, covert propaganda campaigns, and the like, and it did little to resolve the problems of coordination between the separate agencies.

Executive Order No. 9312 was, in large measure, responsible for the character of the psychological warfare organizations that developed during the war in the overseas commands. The provision that "all plans and projects . . .

consequence, both the Head of UMI, Mr. Davis, and the Head of UMI, Mr. Robinson, appeared directly to the President, protesting the military application of a psychological damage from its activity.

### III. EXECUTIVE ORDER NUMBER 111

Executive Order No. 111 was issued on 2 March 1961 and its text was clearly the responsibility of the President. The order stated that UMI was the design agency to conduct foreign information and overt psychological operations abroad, but the area of actual operations was "all plans and projects" should be coordinated with the military plans and would be "in accordance with the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the approval of the President."

The order did not define clearly what it meant by "all plans and projects" and it was retained by OMB. The order did not state whether or not UMI was involved in overt activities, covert propaganda activities, and the like, and it did not define the concept of "all plans and projects" in a general sense.

Executive Order No. 111, in its essence, is a psychological warfare operation that developed during the war in the Vietnam. The President had all plans and projects . . .



shall be subject to the approval . . . of the theater commander" was rigidly adhered to and greatly influenced the type and extent of operations conducted. The organizations everywhere were improvised and largely established on an ad hoc basis. There was relatively little interchange of information from one major military command to another. There were important differences in structure from one command to the next. Perhaps the single clear-cut element common to all was the concept that the theater Commander had final authority.

In each of the theaters, the psychological operation fell into four categories.<sup>20</sup>

1. In enemy countries, to undermine and destroy the morale of the enemy population.
2. In enemy-occupied countries, to keep alive hope of liberation and stimulate resistance to the enemy forces of occupation.
3. In neutral countries, to win the moral support of the neutral population.
4. In allied countries, to counter all enemy propaganda aimed at dividing the United Nations, to promote the morale of the allies, and to foster a better understanding of the United States.

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<sup>20</sup>Thomson, op. cit., p. 40.



It was perfectly conceivable that a theater Commander would encounter psychological operations in all four of these categories, simultaneously. Such broad operations should involve major national policy and decision at the highest political level. However, both the OWI and the OSS were under the theater Commander's control and he, in the last analysis, was the authority--not Washington. Furthermore, whether or not either the OWI or the OSS carried on operations in a theater was left to the Commander's discretion. The OSS, for example, was not permitted access to the Southwest Pacific area theater, while, in the same theater, OWI, although allowed to be present, found that its weekly directive from Washington was unacceptable.<sup>21</sup> In the South Pacific Command, OSS and OWI personnel were refused clearance for operations. No formal provisions were ever made in this area for a psychological warfare planning staff; in fact, it was just five days before the surrender of Japan that the Central Pacific Command reached the decision that psychological warfare was a sufficiently potent support weapon to deserve the status of a special headquarters branch. The omnipotence of the theater Commander within his purview was matched by the refusal of the agencies to accept his supremacy in matters extending beyond his theater.

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<sup>21</sup>Dyer, op. cit., p. 112.



It was generally recognized that a theater commander

would encounter psychological opposition in all four of

these categories, simultaneously. Such broad opposition

should involve major national policy and decision at the

highest political level. However, both the GWT and the CWT

were under the theater commander's control and he, in the

last analysis, was the authority--not Washington. Therefore,

more, defined or not within the GWT or the CWT carried on

operations in a theater was left to the commander's discretion.

Thus, the GWT, for example, was not restricted solely to the

southeast Pacific area but, while, in the same theater,

GWT, although allowed to be present, found that its weekly

directive from Washington was unworkable.<sup>41</sup> In the south

Pacific Command, CWT and GWT personnel were retained in the

for operations. No formal provisions were ever made in this

area for a psychological warfare planning staff; in fact, it

was just five days before the surrender at Japan that the

Central Pacific Command received the decision that psycho-

logical warfare was a militarily potent support weapon to

deserve the status of a special headquarters command. The

consequence of the theater commander's decision was

reflected by the removal of the agencies to support his

efficiency in various operations beyond his theater.

### XIII. SECURITY AND PLANNING FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

One of the most vexing problems drawing from this administrative "gordian knot" was that of the vicious circle established between suspicion, distrust, and security. Clear-cut authority, judgment, discretion, and a broad understanding of the interrelationship between the proper balance of security and information are factors entering into the decision to disclose knowledge. If the planners responsible for the development of psychological operations are not informed of national policy, then there can be no possibility of effective planning and, on occasion, the political repercussions can be of tremendous import.

OWI was not informed about the forthcoming landings in North Africa, even though its members were to participate; of even greater significance was the fact that our psychological planners were confronted by the Hiroshima and Nagasaki nuclear detonations with no "forewarning and had no chance to plan what should be done to maximize favorable effects and to offset bad ones; nor was there any plan offered by the leaders."<sup>22</sup> Effective psychological warfare demands that national plans and operations be known to, at least, the senior responsible official of the psychological

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<sup>22</sup>Thomas, op. cit., pp. 364-365.

## III. SECURITY AND PLANNING FOR

## TECHNICAL MATTERS

One of the most serious problems arising from this administrative "gordon knot" was that of the various risks associated with nuclear weapons, nuclear energy, and security. Clear-cut authority, judgment, discretion, and a broad understanding of the interrelationship between the types of risks of security and information are factors entering into the decision to assist knowledge. It has become increasingly clear for the development of technological operations and not informed of national policy, from there can be no possibility of effective planning and, on occasion, the political repercussions can be of tremendous impact.

One can not pretend about the forthcoming findings in North Africa, even though its members were to participate of even greater significance was the fact that our political planners were confronted by the situation and Hagerman nuclear operations with an "overlapping and not no chance to plan what would be done to maintain favorable efforts and to obtain the most, not was lower any time offered by the leaders. The effective psychological warfare demands that national plans and operations be done so, at least, the senior responsible officials of the psychological



warfare agency. Without this knowledge, it is impossible to explain and interpret intelligently. There is always present the danger that what may be said because of ignorance will be proven false by events. If this truism were even recognized, it did not govern United States psychological operations in World War II.

#### XIV. TOP LEVEL ATTITUDES

It is difficult to explain this American failure to organize effectively. Probably the single most important answer lies in the complete lack of interest in psychological warfare displayed by the majority of top-level American officials responsible for the policies and conduct of the war. Following an interview with President Roosevelt, one author wrote:

It was a curious fact--and I had confirmation of it later--that the President, who established the OWI, never knew what it was doing and sometimes, apparently, confused it with the Office of Censorship. He had been opposed to the creation of a propaganda service and had established OWI with considerable reluctance, under pressure from his advisors, whose primary aim was to provide an adequate flow of information to the American public. Once the organization was established, he did not want to be bothered with it. In his own right Roosevelt was a great propagandist . . . but he did not understand the systematic use of propaganda in total war.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>23</sup>Wallace Carrol, Persuade or Perish (Boston: Houghton, 1948), p. 7.

written agency. Without this knowledge, it is impossible to explain and interpret intelligently. There is always great danger that one may be said because of ignorance will be proven false by events. If such claims were even recognized, it did not prevent United States psychological operations in World War II.

#### IV. CONCLUSIONS

It is difficult to explain this American failure to organize effectively. Presumably the single most important factor lies in the complete lack of interest in psychological matters displayed by the majority of top-level American officials responsible for the policies and conduct of the war. Following an interview with President Roosevelt, the author stated:

It was a curious fact--and I had confirmation of it later--that the President, who consulted me often, never knew that I was doing and teaching, especially, concerned with the Office of Communications. He had been opposed to the creation of a propaganda service and had rejected the OWI only because, in his opinion, under pressure from his advisors, I was too young and inexperienced to provide an adequate time of the foundation for the American people. Once the system was established, he did not want to be bothered with it. In his own right Roosevelt was a great propagandist. . . . But he did not understand the systematic use of propaganda in total war.

The same author goes on to add that "Cordell Hull knew even less than the President about OWI and cared about as much." It is not surprising that American psychological operations ended the war never having been properly organized or coordinated as a national instrument and never having smoothly functioned as one of the nation's policy tools for the conduct of international affairs.

#### XV. POST WORLD WAR II DEVELOPMENTS

Two days prior to the formal surrender of Japan, on 31 August 1945, President Truman issued Executive Order No. 9608 which established an Interim International Information Service (IIIS) in the Department of State and transferred to it the overseas information functions of OWI and the information activities of CIAA. "The nature of present day foreign relations," he stated, "makes it essential for the United States to maintain informational activities abroad as an integral part of the conduct of our foreign affairs."<sup>24</sup> The Order provided for the liquidation of OWI and IIIS by 31 December 1945. The Secretary of State was authorized to continue within the Department such foreign information functions as he considered necessary, to abolish any he thought undesirable, and to eliminate any or to transfer any

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<sup>24</sup>Executive Order No. 9608, August 31, 1945.



The new system goes on to say that "it is well known that even today the President's Office (C-1) and certain other agencies are not equipped to handle the American psychological operations which the war have never been properly organized or coordinated as a national Government and never having been so coordinated as one of the nation's policy tools for the conduct of international affairs."

#### IV. POLY WORLD WAR II EXPERIENCES

The new policy of the United States of America, as announced in August 1945, President Truman issued Executive Order No. 9808 which established an Inter-Departmental Information Service (IDIS) in the Department of State and transferred to it the overseas information functions of OWI and the Information Activities of CIAA. "The nature of present day foreign relations," he stated, "makes it essential for the United States to maintain international activities which are an integral part of the conduct of our foreign affairs."<sup>12</sup> The new system for the Information Service (OWI and IDIS) as announced in August 1945. The Secretary of State was authorized to continue with the overseas information activities which he considered necessary, to eliminate any or all of the existing, and to eliminate any or all of the existing

<sup>12</sup> Executive Order No. 9808, August 11, 1945.

to other executive agencies. He was to study the entire question of continuing a foreign information program and was to recommend a solution to the President.

William Benton was appointed Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and made the responsible head of the new IIIS. Despite his efforts, the program languished. Diplomats of the traditional school were unconvinced and Congress was uninterested. An Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs (OIC) was established in the Department in early 1946 as an outcome of the study requested by President Truman. Its activities remained unchanged until 1948 although its name was changed to the Office of International Information and Education Exchange (OIE). The OIE was later to split, amoeba-like, into the Office of International Information (OII) and the Office of Educational Exchange (OEX), both of which were later to be recombined into the International Information Administration (IIA). Meanwhile, in the atmosphere of the "return to normalcy" and the glow of victory, the overseas information services languished, diminished steadily, and came close to vanishing entirely.

The American people and Congress failed to appreciate the menace of Communist propaganda to American security and failed to grasp the potentialities of psychological operations as an instrument of national policy during time of

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 question of controlling foreign information program and was  
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William E. Wilson was appointed Assistant Secretary of

State for Public Affairs and was the representative head of  
 the new IIA. During his tenure, the program for  
 diploma of the national system was announced and

Congress was informed. An Office of International

Information and Cultural Affairs (OICA) was established in

the Department in early 1955 as an outcome of the study.

Directed by William E. Wilson, the activities centered on  
 changed until 1955 when the name was changed to the

Office of International Information and Cultural Exchange

(OICE). The old was later to split, essentially, into the

Office of International Information (OII) and the Office of

International Exchange (OIE), both of which were later to be

reorganized into the International Information Administration

(IIA) respectively, in the structure of the "United States

Agency" and the Office of Culture, the Overseas Information

services included: information, radio, and news close to

existing activity.

The American people and Congress failed to appreciate

the needs of Communist propaganda for American security and

failed to grasp the potential of psychological opera-

tions as an instrument of national policy during the



peace. There was wide opposition from United States commercial press, radio, and film media, which feared government competition abroad. Many of the most able and skilled personnel in the fields of information and psychological warfare left government service. This loss was irreplaceable.

Throughout the military establishment in Washington, staff planning activities involving psychological operations and warfare ceased with the end of hostilities. Not until June of 1950 did the Department of the Army create the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare as a special staff section. The Department of the Air Force later established a Psychological Warfare Division within the Air Force's Directorate of Plans. The Navy subsequently assigned the task to a branch of the Strategic Plans Division of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

## XVI. THE INFORMATION AND EDUCATION

### EXCHANGE ACT OF 1948

By 1948, the chill winds of ideological war were blowing out of Eurasia in such an unmistakable manner that Congressional action resulted in the United States Information and Education Exchange Act of 1948, Public Law 402 (The Smith-Mundt Act). This act directed the Secretary of State

to provide for the preparation and dissemination abroad of information about the United States, its people, and its policies, through press, publications



radio, motion pictures, and other information media, and through information centers and instructors abroad.

The act also provided for

an educational exchange service to cooperate with other nations in (a) the interchange of persons, knowledge, and skills; (b) the rendering of technical and other services; and (c) the interchange of developments in the field of education, the arts, and science.<sup>25</sup>

The educational exchange concept was subsequently given substance with the enactment of the Fulbright Act, which provided that funds derived from the sale abroad of surplus war material should be used to finance the exchange of persons. The administration of the Smith-Mundt Act was placed under the International Information Administration (IIA) of the Department of State.

The Smith-Mundt Act remains the basic legislation for the conduct of the United States information program today. The concept in 1948 was defensive and unrealistic. It was based on the assumption that if other people understood us they would like us, and, if they liked us, they would do what we wanted them to do. This concept has not been completely laid to rest in 1964.

The objective was interpreted once again, as a gigantic advertising campaign, carried on, for the most part, by the broadside telling of America's story. The Secretary of

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<sup>25</sup>Cited by Stephens, op. cit., p. 38.



radio, motion pictures, and other information media, and through information centers and instructors abroad.

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what we wanted them to do. This concept has not been completely valid so far in 1984.

The objective was interpreted once again, as a sign-

ific revolutionary campaign, carried on, for the most part, by the provision of America's story. The necessity of

State had been directed by Public Law 402 to "reduce such government activities whenever corresponding private information dissemination . . . [was] found to be adequate."

There followed extensive contracts with domestic broadcasting companies for an overseas broadcasting service to present to the world "a full and fair picture" of the United States. Very shortly thereafter, Congressional concern over scripts, art exhibits, and the general concept of operations developed and threatened, by 1950, to cancel the entire program.

By 1950, however, the international arena was so troubled that the United States was thoroughly awakened to the Soviet threat. There could be no disagreement on the need for a program, and President Truman was given a record appropriation of \$121,000,000 to carry on a "campaign of truth" against communism. However, the, apparently inevitable, bureaucratic struggle was raging behind the scenes. In addition to the International Information Administration (IIA), the Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA), the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), the Mutual Security Administration (MSA), the three Armed Services, and the Department of Defense all operated, at one time or another, in the international field and possessed their own overt international information services. Many foreigners preferred the Armed Forces Radio Service (AFRS) newscasts over those of the Voice of America in the conviction that

State and were directed by Executive Order 405 to "reduce such government activities whenever circumstances permitted private enterprise administration." These efforts to be observed.

There followed extensive contacts with domestic business and companies for an extensive production service to provide to the world "the best and latest information" of the United States, very shortly thereafter, Congressional hearings over rights and welfare, and the general concept of a national development and resources, by 1950, to include the entire program.

By 1950, however, the international arena was so crowded that the United States was thoroughly weakened to the world power. There could be no displacement on the part of a program, and President Truman was given a second

opportunity of \$12,000,000 to carry on a "campaign of study" against communism. However, the, apparently level, business and industry was being pulled into the arena. In addition to the International Information Administration (IIA), the Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA), the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), and Mutual Security Administration (MSA), the three armed services, and

the Department of Defense all operated, at one time or another, in the international arena and possessed their own over international information services. Many foreign governments and Armed Forces Radio Service (AFRS) networks were known to the State of America in the countries that



what the United States Government said to its own citizens would be free of propaganda. Thus, while AFRS broadcast all over the world for the entertainment and enlightenment of American servicemen, large foreign audiences could and did eavesdrop.

#### XVII. POST WORLD WAR II EFFORTS TOWARDS COORDINATION

In the years following World War II, there had been sporadic efforts between the various Departments towards the more effective integration of their activities; however, the concept of all these efforts was that of the coordination of separate, independent, component parts. Originally, this work began at the direction of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC). It continued under the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee (SANACC). The direction of action was continued by the later Interdepartmental Foreign Information Organization (IFIO) which was the policy-making board for the Interdepartmental Foreign Information Staff (IFIS). After the IFIS came the Psychological Operations Coordinating Board (PCB).

Finally, early in 1950, an official peacetime role, in name, was assigned to psychological warfare with the creation of the Interdepartmental Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee in the Department of State. Through



this device, the Armed Forces had hoped to have a direct voice in advising the Secretary of State on the development and conduct of an integrated, current foreign information program, and to plan for full-scale use of psychological warfare in the case of hostilities. The Department of State evidenced a reluctance to accept much advice from the military, and the committee, contrary to the position taken by its military members, prepared a plan for a psychological mechanism which was to be created when, as, and if World War III began. The Secretary of Defense, through whose office the plan was routed for approval, took strong exception--based on the representations of his military chiefs. In a letter to the President, it was forcefully argued that such a mechanism should be created not when the war was actually upon the nation but immediately. This proposal found no support within the Department of State.

The result of this divergence was the creation, by Executive Order, on 20 June 1951, of the Psychological Strategy Board which placed psychological warfare on an even higher plane. This was to be a high-level planning and coordinating body responsible to the National Security Council. Its mission was to plan long-term psychological approaches to the nation's problems, and to help influence opinions, attitudes, and behavior abroad in support of



This action, the United States had hoped to have a direct  
 voice in advising the Secretary of State on the development  
 and conduct of an integrated, national foreign intelligence  
 program, and to plan for this action was not psychological  
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 tary, and the Committee, contrary to the position taken by  
 the military members, prepared a plan for a psychological  
 mechanism which was to be created when, at, and in which was  
 III pages. The members, at present, cannot know what  
 the plan was meant for, especially, took strong exception—  
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 a mechanism would be created not when the war was actually  
 upon the nation but immediately. This proposal found no  
 support within the Department of State.

The result of this divergence was the creation by  
 Executive Order, on 15 June 1951, of the Psychological Warfare  
 Policy Board which placed psychological warfare on an even  
 higher plane. This was to be a high-level planning and  
 coordinating body responsible to the National Security  
 Council. Its mission was to plan long-term psychological  
 operations to the nation's enemies, and to have influence

national objectives.<sup>26</sup> It was also assigned responsibility for the

formulation and promulgation, as guidance to the departments and agencies responsible for psychological operations, of over-all national psychological objectives, policies, and programs, and for the coordination and evaluation of the national psychological effort.

Regular members were the Under Secretary of State, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Other agencies, such as the Mutual Security Administration, participated as needed. A representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was principal adviser. A staff was provided to do the planning and the Board's director was appointed by the President.

#### XVIII. THE KOREAN WAR

When the Korean War began, psychological warfare once again was called upon to contribute to the effort. The Korean experience paralleled far too closely the experience in World War II. Once again psychological operations were hampered by security, faulty intelligence, and imperfect organization. Most of the lessons that should have been learned from World War II had to be relearned. The experience

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<sup>26</sup>United States Congress, Senate, Overseas Information Programs of the United States, Report 406, 83rd Congress, 1st Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1953), p. 48.

national objectives. It was also assigned responsibility

for the

formation and development, as outlined in the  
agreements and specific responsibilities for psychology-  
and management, of various national psychological  
objectives, policies, and programs, and for the  
coordination and evaluation of the national psycho-  
logical effort.

Other members were the Under Secretary of State, Deputy  
Secretary of Defense, and the Director of the Central Intelli-  
gence Agency. Other agencies, such as the National Security  
Administration, participated as needed. A representative of  
the Joint Chiefs of Staff was principal witness. A staff  
was provided to the planning and the Board's Director was  
appointed by the President.

#### VIII. THE BOARD

When the Board was begun, psychological warfare was

again was called upon to contribute to the effort. The

Board's experience provided for too closely the experience

in World War II. Once again psychological operations were

performed by security, foreign intelligence, and intelligence

organization. Most of the lessons that should have been

learned from World War II had to be repeated. The experience



and manpower available in the United States Information Service operation in Korea prior to hostilities was almost totally ignored. The Psychological Warfare Section of the Far East Command was virtually autonomous, and the Far Eastern operation proceeded independent of political authority on many of its most urgent problems of psychological policy.<sup>27</sup> The strategic radio operation felt the lack of adequate preparatory measures in terms of organization and training.

In August of 1950, the Operations Research Office of Johns Hopkins University observed that at that date:

. . . it was assumed . . . that there were some masters of the problem, authorities who had a systematic understanding of its full scope. The growing realization that no transmissible, reliable, fundamental, true body of knowledge exists on psychological warfare demanded, and still demands, basic research on the problem so that valid operational research can be built up. The lack of a general doctrine on . . . [psychological] war is now recognized.<sup>28</sup>

It should not be a source of surprise to discover that the Psychological Strategy Board floundered and failed. It shortly discovered that there was no such thing as "psychological strategy" apart from the other strategies which together comprise national security strategy. Although it

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<sup>27</sup>Dyer, op. cit., pp. 114-117.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., p. 114, cited from an internal memorandum of the Operations Research Office.

and equipment available in the United States. The service position in some cases to be filled was almost totally ignored. The psychological needs of the men were not vitally important, and the men were organized to operate independent of political considerations on many of the most urgent problems of psychological policy. The strategic radio operation left the lack of adequate preliminary measures in terms of organization and training.

In August of 1950, the Operations Research Office at Johns Hopkins University observed that at that time:

... it was assumed . . . that there were some masters of the problem, individuals who had a systematic understanding of the full scope. The growing realization that no individual, reliable, fundamental, from body of knowledge exists on psychological warfare demands, and still demands, basic research on the problem as such which operational research can build up. The lack of a general synthesis of . . . (psychological) war is now recognized.<sup>27</sup>

It should not be a source of surprise to discover that the psychological strategy Board recommended and failed. It shortly discovered that there was no such thing as "psychological strategy" apart from the other strategies which together comprise national security. Although it

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., pp. 114-115.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., p. 114, which also in general summarizes the Operations Research Office.

was recognized that the tools of foreign policy--diplomacy, military policy, economic activity, and psychological operations--were interdependent, it was not recognized that they were inseparable. It was believed that if the activities of these four instruments were "coordinated," as each proceeded with its own, independent planning and action, a unified, integrated whole would result. It is, at least, to the credit of the Board that the hermaphroditic nature of this concept came to be recognized. In its planning, the Board swung to the only plausible course of action--one which encroached upon the diplomatic, economic, and military fields of activity. Thus was precipitated a continuous series of struggles with the responsible officials who were supposed to execute the Board's plans in those fields.

The foreign information program, itself, became an increasing source of difficulty. The operation grew so large and complex that it simply was beyond the capacity of the existing organization headed by an assistant Secretary of State. Coordination between all the agencies and negotiation towards voluntary consolidation of redundant operations were attempted without success. The regular administrative mechanism of the Department of State was not designed to cope with such an arrangement. The solution lay in the establishment of the semi-autonomous International Information Administration within the State Department. The



was recognized that the basis of foreign policy—diplomacy, military policy, economic activity, and psychological operations—were interdependent, it was not recognized that they were inseparable. It was believed that if the activities of these four instruments were "coordinated," as they proceeded with its own, independent planning and action, a unified,

integrated world would result. It is, of course, the credit of the Board that the interdependent nature of this concept came to be recognized. In its planning, the Board viewed as the only plausible course of action—and which was treated upon the diplomatic, economic, and military fields of activity. Thus was developed a composite picture of strategies with the responsible officials and were supposed to execute the Board's plan in those fields.

The foreign information program, finally, became an

integrated source of activity. The operation grew in size and complexity as it grew and the responsibility of the entire organization rested on an unified activity of State. Coordination between all the agencies and organizations—military, economic, and political—of the United States was required. The regular

administrative mechanism of the Department of State was not designed to cope with such an arrangement. The solution lay in the establishment of the Joint-Departmental Committee for Information Administration within the State Department. The

new activity was to continue to receive policy guidance from the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs but was to have a free hand in operations. Dr. Wilson Compton, the Administrator, quickly found that the achievement of

semi-autonomy implies a high degree of consolidation of authorities and responsibilities which heretofore . . . [had] been widely dispersed. There . . . [was] within the Department a reluctance to accept these changes, and if not a resistance, at least a formidable inertia.<sup>29</sup>

## XIX. AFTERMATH OF THE 1952

### PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

Following the 1952 Presidential election, the entire United States information and psychological warfare structure became the target for searching investigations. The President's Committee on Foreign Information Activities, known as the Jackson Committee after William H. Jackson, its Chairman, was to report by the summer of 1953. A subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, under the Chairmanship of Senator Fulbright, initially, and subsequently, Senator Hickenlooper examined subjects related to the overseas information program. An Advisory Commission on Information, established pursuant to the Smith-Mundt Act, convened to examine the conduct of that program. Simultaneously,

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<sup>29</sup>Stephens, op. cit., p. 42, cited from the June 30, 1952, report of Dr. Wilson Compton to the Secretary of State.

new activity was to continue to receive policy guidance from the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and was to have a free hand in operations. Dr. Wilson composed the administration, which found that the achievement of

semi-autonomous limited a high degree of control  
of activities and responsibilities which necessitate  
a high degree of responsibility. There . . . (was)  
within the Department a reluctance to accept these  
commitments, and it was a realization, at least a realization

Following the 1977 Presidential election, the entire  
ONASAS research information and psychological warfare programs  
passed the agency for continuing investigations. The work  
of the Committee on Foreign Information Activities, known as  
the Research Committee after William E. Jackson, its chairman,  
was no longer by the summer of 1977. A subcommittee of the  
Research Committee was established, under the chairmanship  
of Senator Whitford, initially, and subsequently, Senator  
Dick Lugar, chairman, to study the activities of the  
Foreign Information Committee in connection  
with the country of this program. Additionally,



Senator McCarthy conducted his own widely-publicized investigation of the foreign information program. Except for the latter "witch-hunt," the results of the investigations, and, in particular, the findings of the Jackson Committee had far-reaching effects on the reorganization of United States Psychological Strategy and Operations.

. . . data has been available to the committee which suggests that the . . . [Psychological Strategy] Board is not effectively discharging its function. The Executive Order (June 20, 1951), creating the Psychological Strategy Board is loosely drawn. It lodges various responsibilities in the Board but limits its authority to "guidance" and "reporting" . . . . Observations of members of the committee abroad and other evidence moreover suggest that the component agencies of the board (CIA, Defense, State) are continuing to go their separate ways in matters of psychological policy.<sup>30</sup>

There is no "strategic concept for psychological operations" separate and distinct from a strategic concept for gaining national aims from war . . . . We find that the "psychological" aspect of policy is not separable from policy, but is inherent in every diplomatic, economic or military action. There is a "psychological" implication in every act but this does not have life apart from the act.<sup>31</sup>

## XX. REORGANIZING FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE--

### THE USIA

Out of the recommendations of the three groups emerged

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<sup>30</sup>United States Congress, Senate, Overseas Information Programs of the United States, op. cit., p. 6.

<sup>31</sup>Dyer, op. cit., p. 135, cited from the Report of the President's Committee on International Information Activities.

... the results of the investigation, and  
 the findings of the National Committee on  
 Psychological Warfare and Propaganda.

... data and conclusions to the committee which  
 suggest that the ... (Psychological Warfare)  
 Board is not effectively discharging its duties.  
 The Executive Order (June 30, 1951), creating the  
 Psychological Warfare Board is hereby amended. It  
 hereby directs the members of the Board to  
 limit its activities to "propaganda and persuasion"  
 ... . . . . .  
 ... and other persons involved suggest that the  
 committee should be ... (Psychological Warfare)  
 are continuing to go their separate ways in regard to  
 psychological policy.

There is no "strategic concept for psychological  
 operations" separate and distinct from a strategic  
 concept for general national aims and ... . . . .  
 We find that the "psychological" aspect of policy is  
 not separate from policy, but is inherent in every  
 diplomatic, economic or military action. There is a  
 "psychological" dimension to every act and this  
 does not have its roots in the act.

... recommendations for psychological warfare.

... and ...

Out of the recommendations of the Board group emerged

... (Psychological Warfare) ...

... (Psychological Warfare) ...

Presidential Reorganization Plan 8, approved by the 83rd Congress and made effective on the first of August, 1953. By this plan, the overseas information function was removed from the Department of State and reassigned, along with the foreign information programs of all other agencies, to a new and autonomous United States Information Agency (USIA). The Director of the new Agency was made directly responsible to the President through the National Security Council; he was to receive foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of State.

On recommendation of the National Security Council, in a directive dated 22 October 1953, the President established the basic mission of the Agency as:

to submit evidence to peoples of other nations by means of communication techniques that the objectives and policies of the US are in harmony with and will advance their legitimate aspirations for freedom, progress, and peace.<sup>32</sup>

This mission was to be accomplished by:<sup>33</sup>

1. Explaining and interpreting to foreign peoples the objectives and policies of the United States Government;
2. Depicting imaginatively the correlation between US policies and the legitimate aspirations of other peoples of the world;
3. By unmasking and countering hostile attempts to distort or to frustrate the objective and policies of the Government of the US;

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<sup>32</sup>United States Information Agency, Background Information (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1953), p. 3.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid.



President's Commission Plan 2, approved by the 92nd Congress and made effective on the 1st of January, 1951. By this plan, the various information functions were removed from the Department of State and reassigned, along with the Foreign Information Program of all other agencies, to a new United States Information Agency (USIA). The Division of the new Agency was made directly responsible to the President through the National Security Council; he was to exercise foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of State.

In recommendation of the National Security Council, in a directive dated 12 October 1950, the President assigned the basic mission of the Agency as:

To inform Americans to provide to other nations of means of communication designed with the objectives and policies of the US and in harmony with and will promote their national objectives for freedom, progress, and peace.

This mission was to be accomplished by:

1. Obtaining and interpreting to foreign peoples the objectives and policies of the United States Government;
2. Repeating faithfully the correlation between US policies and the legitimate aspirations of other peoples of the world;
3. By examining and comparing foreign attitudes to assist or to strengthen the objectives and policies of the Government of the US.

United States Information Agency, Background Paper -  
Mission Statement, Government Printing Office, 1951, p. 1.

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4. By delineating those important aspects of the life and culture of the United States which facilitate understanding of the policies and objectives of the Government of the United States.

Under this mission, the USIA was to concentrate on objective, factual news reporting with appropriate commentaries, designed to present a full exposition of important United States actions and policies, especially as they affected individual countries and areas.

#### XXI. THE OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD

Pursuant to the Jackson Committee report, the President, by Executive Order No. 10483, on 2 September 1953, abolished the Psychological Strategy Board and replaced it with the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB), under the National Security Council. However, it was not until 25 February 1957, that the President issued a revised Executive Order formally placing the OCB within the structure of the National Security Council as of 1 July 1957. The members of the Board were the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration, the Director of Central Intelligence, a representative of the President (the Special Assistant for Cold War Planning), and the Director of the USIA (though not formally appointed a member of the board until the spring of 1955). The Jackson Committee had declared that "except for

4. By highlighting those important aspects of the life and culture of the United States which facilitate understanding of the policies and objectives of the Government of the United States.

Under this mission, the USA was to concentrate on objective, factual news reporting with appropriate comment, designed to present a full exposition of important United States affairs and policies, especially as they affected individual countries and areas.

#### XVI. THE COMMISSION'S COORDINATING BOARD

According to the Jackson Committee report, the President, by Executive Order No. 10483, on 1 September 1953, established the Psychological Strategy Board and related it with the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB), under the National Security Council. However, it was not until 28 February 1957, that the President issued a revised Executive Order formally placing the OCB within the structure of the National Security Council as of 1 July 1957. The members of the Board were the Vice Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of the National Intelligence Administration, the Director of Central Intelligence, a representative of the President's Special Assistant for Cold War Planning, and the Director of the USA through out formally appointed a member of the Board until the spring of 1957. The Jackson Committee had decided that "because the



propaganda, there are no 'psychological warfare' instruments distinct from traditional instruments of policy." In his Executive Order, the President stated the mission of the Operations Coordinating Board as follows:

The National Security Council having recommended a national security policy and the President having approved it, the Board shall (1) whenever the President shall hereafter so direct, advise with the agencies concerned as to (a) their detailed operational planning responsibilities respecting such policy, (b) the coordination of the interdepartmental aspects of the detailed operational plans developed by the agencies to carry out such policy, (c) the timely and coordinate execution of such policy and plans, and (d) the execution of each security action or project so that it shall make its full contribution to the attainment of national security objectives and to the particular climate of opinion the United States is seeking to achieve in the world, and (2) initiate new proposals for actions within the framework of national security policies in response to opportunity and changes in the situation.<sup>34</sup>

Thus, it was to be the responsibility of this body to see that actions by other agencies to implement policy were taken in a coordinated manner. Furthermore, as initially conceived by the Jackson Committee and as the concept was first accepted by President Eisenhower, the purpose of this coordination was to achieve maximum psychological impact from the integrated application of all the instruments of policy. However, the OCB not only failed to bring together the opposing viewpoints held by representatives of the

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<sup>34</sup>United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Organizing for National Security, Vol. II (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 455.

propaganda, there are no 'typological' matters, instruments distinct from traditional instruments of policy. In his Executive Order, the President stated the mission of the Operations Coordinating Board as follows:

The National Security Council having recommended a national security policy and the President having approved it, the Board shall (1) whenever the President shall have directed so clearly, advise with the Board and coordinate as to (a) their detailed recommendations, (b) the coordination of the instrumental aspects of the detailed operational plans developed by the agencies to carry out such policy, (c) the timely and coordinate execution of such policy and plans, and (d) the execution of such security action or project as that is shall make the full contribution to the attainment of national security objectives and to the peaceful attitude of opinion and United States in seeking to achieve in the world, and (e) initiate and coordinate the actions within the framework of national security policies in response to opportunities and changes in the situation.<sup>14</sup>

Thus, it was to be the responsibility of this body to see that action by other agencies to implement policy were taken in a coordinated manner. Furthermore, as initially conceived by the Jackson Committee and as the concept was first adopted by President Eisenhower, the purpose of this coordination was to achieve maximum psychological impact from the integrated application of all the instruments of policy. However, the OCB not only failed to bring together the operating agencies but by representatives of them

<sup>14</sup>United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Organizing for National Security, Vol. II (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 488.

Department of State, Department of Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency but also gradually evolved almost completely away from its initial concept as a means for facilitating the development of psychological strategy and the integrated psychological operations of psychological warfare.

The old Psychological Strategy Board had been abolished, among other reasons because it had no authority--it was limited to "guidance." Paradoxically, the OCB was created in a similar manner: it lacked authority to formulate a single, unified course when opinions differed. Its actual deliberations bore a close similarity to and paralleled the experience of its early predecessor committees (starting with the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee) when the subject of forging an effective psychological structure was taken up. The members of the OCB were, first, departmental representatives and, second, members of a board intended to coordinate and strengthen the voice with which government speaks. It follows that any member of the board could, in effect, veto any proposed action in the field of psychological operations (or any other field, for that matter) since the chairman had no authority to proceed on majority decisions. The board had to agree as a unit. If a member objected in the name of his department, that department was able to prevent the board's achieving anything but a compromise decision.



Department of State, Department of Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency but also gradually evolved almost completely away from its initial concept as a means for facilitating the development of psychological strategy and for integrated psychological operations of psychological warfare.

The old Psychological Strategy Group had been established, among other reasons because it had no authority--it was listed as "advisory," tentatively, the OCS was created in a similar manner. It lacked authority to formulate a policy, initiate courses when opinions differed, to actual deliberations have a more standing to and control the experience of the early predecessor committees (starting with the State-Defense Coordinating Committee) when the subject of foreign or domestic psychological structure was taken up. The members of the OCS were, first, governmental representatives and, second, members of a board included in coordination and strategy and voice with which government speaks. It follows that any member of the board could, in effect, veto any proposed action in the field of psychological operations for any given field, for that matter, since the chairman had no authority to proceed on majority decision. The board had no equal as a unit. It was never objected in the name of its department, that department was able to prevent the board's endorsing anything but a unanimous decision.

XXII. THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT  
FOR COLD WAR PLANNING

A third development, stemming from the recommendations of the Jackson Committee, was the appointment of a Special Presidential Assistant to advise on matters relating to foreign public opinion. The voice of the President of the United States was the Voice of America, and his words had a powerful effect upon foreign audiences. It was, therefore, absolutely necessary that the President consider the role of public opinion in World affairs whenever he spoke. To aid in developing effective Presidential communications, the requirement for specialized assistance in the formulation of public pronouncements had come to be recognized. This was the purview of the Special Assistant for Cold War Planning who was also designated as the President's representative on the OCB. The position was first held by C. D. Jackson who was followed by Nelson Rockefeller, and thereafter, William H. Jackson. These three men had each accumulated extensive experience in propaganda and psychological operations. Planners, as well as operators, had long felt the need for ready access to the President. Before the establishment of the Special Assistant, access had been primarily through press secretaries and speech writers who, preoccupied with problems of domestic public opinion, were not always

EXIT: THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT

FOR GOLD AND BLANKING

A third development, stemming from the reorganization of the Jackson Committee, was the appointment of a Special Presidential Assistant to advise on matters relating to foreign public opinion. The voice of the President of the United States was the voice of America, and his words had a powerful effect upon foreign audiences. It was, therefore, absolutely necessary that the President consider the role of public opinion in foreign affairs whenever he spoke. To aid in developing effective Presidential communications, the Department for Specialized Assistance in the formulation of public pronouncements was now to be organized. This was the function of the Special Assistant for Gold and Blanking who was also designated as the President's representative on the GOC. The position was first held by U. S. Jackson who was followed by Nelson Rockefeller, and thereafter, William H. Jackson. These three men had some accumulated experience in propaganda and psychological operations. Moreover, as well as operations, had long held the need for ready access to the President. Before the establishment of the Special Assistant, access had been extremely through press secretaries and speech writers who, preoccupied with problems of domestic public opinion, were not always



knowledgeable or sympathetic on matters of foreign public opinion. Short of placing the foreign information function in the Executive Office of the President or investing a new cabinet status department with this mission, a special Presidential Assistant seemed to offer an arrangement which should go far toward satisfying the requirement for close liaison.

The high point of the role of the Special Assistant for Cold War Planning within the OCB structure was reached early in the life of that body when this Special Assistant served as the Board's Executive Officer.<sup>35</sup> The long-term impact of the Special Assistant for Cold War Planning on the OCB mission can only be inferred from the mutation of the field of operations within the OCB of the President's representative from concern for the "climate of opinion" to a "follow-up function."<sup>36</sup> In July of 1957, with the establishment of the post of Special Assistant to the President for Security Operations Coordination, the Cold War Planning Assistant was demoted from the role of the President's representative on the OCB.

#### XXIII. THE OCB FAILS

By this time, however, the OCB had completely

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<sup>35</sup>Ibid., p. 459. On 4 November 1953, a full-time Executive Officer was appointed.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid.

knowledgeable as to the situation in the field of foreign policy. That is, the fact of the situation in the field of foreign policy is the basis of the President's decision to take the Executive Order of the President on January 12, 1953. The President's decision to take the Executive Order of the President on January 12, 1953, is based on the fact that the President is the only one who can make such a decision. The President's decision to take the Executive Order of the President on January 12, 1953, is based on the fact that the President is the only one who can make such a decision.

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WILLIAM W. OCS 1953

By this time, however, the OCS had completely

ST. LOUIS, MO. 63101, ON 10/10/53, 1953, 10/10/53  
Executive Order was signed.

10/10/53

developed away from the 1953 concept of a sort of lens which would gather the departmental threads of potential psychological operations and focus them into an instrument of national psychological warfare. Already, it was evident that the OCB had little impact on the real coordination of policy execution. The OCB was an interagency committee which lacked command authority. It always acted by "agreement" or "concurrence." It did not "decide" or "direct" action on a document; rather it concurred in it and agreed to carry out any actions it contained. A difference of view among the OCB members which could not be resolved within the Board was referred to the respective agency heads. Failing of resolution at that level, the matter found its way to the President, either directly or through the National Security Council. Consequently, many of the most important decisions affecting the course of programs under the OCB surveillance were made outside the framework of the Board. Furthermore, the departments often bypassed the OCB, pursuing their own interpretations of policy or engaging in "bootleg" coordination through extramural means.<sup>37</sup> It appeared ever more clearly, that an interdepartmental committee cast in the organizational mold of the OCB could not be counted upon to discharge effective major responsibilities for follow through.

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<sup>37</sup>United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Organizing for National Security, Vol. III (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 37.



developed very soon the 1953 concept of a Joint Chiefs of Staff which would give the Departmental Chiefs of Potential Policy-logical operations and would have an influence on the national policy-making process. Already, it was evident that the OCS had little impact on the real coordination of policy decisions. The OCS was an interagency committee which lacked command authority. It was not by "appeal" or "recommendation". It did not "decide" or "advise" action on a document; rather it coordinated it and acted to carry out any action it considered. A difference of view among the OCS members which could not be resolved within the staff was referred to the respective agency heads. Calling of operations at this level, and action taken by the staff, was usually taken care of through the National Security Council. Consequently, many of the most important decisions affecting the course of programs under the OCS jurisdiction were made outside the framework of the staff. Furthermore, the departments often bypassed the staff, pursuing their own independent lines of policy or engaging in "policy" coordination through external means.<sup>17</sup> It appeared even more clearly that in interdepartmental coordination was in the organizational mind of the OCS could not be counted upon to achieve effective policy coordination for policy decisions.

<sup>17</sup>United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Investigation of National Security, Vol. III (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1957), p. 47.

## XXIV. CONFUSION IN THE AREA OF POLICY GUIDANCE

One of the areas heavily scored in the three 1953 investigations was that of the confusion which existed over responsibility in the field of foreign policy. There was no clear chain of command below the President. Practice had nearly shattered the role of the Secretary of State as the President's executive agent in the field of foreign affairs. Much of the Secretary's authority had been usurped by President Roosevelt during the course of World War II. The post-war and Korean problems had resulted in the acquisition by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense of an ever-increasing voice in foreign affairs. Furthermore, Congress had created the Economic Cooperation Administration as an independent agency with cabinet status and, by statute, gave its administrator direct access to the President.

Overseas, the confusion was even worse where the separate agencies pursued their own courses of action and interpreted United States foreign policy as they saw fit. At one time, in Paris, there were four United States representatives with the rank of Ambassador, each independent of the other three. In the foreign information field, a variety of separate and un-coordinated programs were being conducted simultaneously.

President Eisenhower restored the Secretary of State to his traditional role, stating that all other officers

## XIII. CONCLUSION IN THE CASE OF POLICY COORDINATION

One of the most heavily scored in the three 1955 investigations was that of the confusion which existed over responsibility in the field of foreign policy. There was no clear chain of command below the President. Practice had clearly obscured the role of the Secretary of State as the President's executive agent in the field of foreign affairs. Much of the Secretary's authority had been usurped by the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the course of World War II. The post-war era had found programs and policies in the possession of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense as an independent agency with limited status and, by statute, gave the administration direct access to the President. However, the confusion was even worse than before. Separate agencies pursued their own courses of action and independent foreign policy was being set by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, while the President, with the aid of the Secretary of Defense, was being kept in the dark. In the other cases. In the foreign relations field, a lack of coordination and uncoordinated programs were being conducted simultaneously.

Foreign relations received the highest of scores to his traditional role; setting and all other policies



were to receive policy guidance from the Department of State and clear their plans through that Department. The State Department was, in so far as possible, to restrict its own activities to policy-making and diplomacy. Overseas, to the American ambassador or minister in each mission was delegated the same responsibility within his purview as the Secretary of State was now to discharge within the United States Government. Policy was thus to be placed exclusively in the hands of the chief of mission and all agency programs would be under his control.

Reorganization Plan No. 8 and the three additional corrective actions laid a basis in 1953 for an effective psychological structure. It never emerged! The failure, once again, was basically a failure of top-level American officials responsible for policy formulation and execution. The OCB failed not only because it was structurally incapable of accomplishing the job set out for it, but also because it was permitted to develop, or grow away, from the concept from which it was born. The role of the President's Special Assistant for Cold War Planning was permitted to degenerate; it did not deteriorate of its own accord. Both of these deteriorations were directly the responsibility of President Eisenhower and lend credence to the observation that, like his predecessors, he neither understood nor placed appreciable store in the worth of psychological warfare, his frequent protestations to the contrary notwithstanding.

There were no restrictive policy guidelines from the Department of State and that State plans should have been developed. The State Department was, in the best of possible, to restrict its own activities to policy-making and diplomacy. Moreover, in the function, importance of the State in each mission was determined and the responsibility within the system was determined. The State was not to discharge within the United States Government. Policy was to be decided exclusively in the name of the United States and all agency proposals would be under its control.

## XXV. THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION APPROACH

In January, 1960, John Kennedy, inherited the United States structure for Psychological War. Basically, there was but one tool available--the USIA. Kennedy's subsequent elimination of the OCB struck no new blow to psychological operations--the Board had ceased to contribute to a national psychological effort long before and, even before that, the impact of the Special Assistant for Cold War Planning had been eliminated.

Although a highly-classified Cold War Advisory Panel was created in the Department of Defense, the Kennedy Administration's failure to establish any machinery for the formulation of integrated psychological policy is a source for speculation. Possibly the attitude was that the administration was canny enough to "dead reckon" its way along. The tendency toward ad hoc solutions would serve to support this thesis. Perhaps the announced Presidential policy that each department head was solely responsible for the total effort of his agency was considered sufficient to insure that perfect staff work--both vertical and horizontal--would result in a magic integration. It seems hard to believe that this was the case, and there early developed some question as to the interaction of the functions of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs and the Secretary of State with regard to the formulation of foreign policy. The



## XIV. THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATIVE SITUATION

In January, 1950, John Kennedy, President of the United

States, delivered the following address to Congress:

"We are not too far from the point where we can begin to

eliminate the need for the use of force in the world."

Kennedy's statement was a direct challenge to the traditional

policy of the United States, which has been to maintain a

policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other

countries.

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countries.

United States Government is, simply, too vast to rely upon the belief that the complex interrelationship of all its departments can be ordered merely by informing each department head that he is responsible for running his department correctly. There is also the possibility that the Kennedy Administration was no more or less interested or knowledgeable in effective psychological operations than any other administration, and that it was satisfied to proceed with its only remaining tool, the USIA, in an attempt to obtain as much mileage out of the "campaign of truth" and news media facilities available as possible.

#### XXVI. THE USIA--1964

The USIA in 1963-1964 is a giant organization and under the very effective guidance of Edward R. Murrow, capable of giving Mr. Kennedy and, subsequently, Mr. Johnson much mileage. It employs over eleven thousand people--three thousand within the United States and the remainder staffing some two hundred and nineteen overseas posts in ninety-nine countries. This shift in emphasis from Washington to the field was a most significant factor in the effective development of the USIA. Previously, the field missions were essentially service organizations, receiving and disseminating material supplied to them by the home office. The result was that much of this mass-produced material was of little

United States Government is, finally, the fact that only one

the belief that the complex interrelationships of all the

organizations can be defined solely by referring each separate

unit back to the responsibility for defining the department

correctly. There is also the possibility that the necessary

administration was no more or less interested in maintaining

its in effective psychological operations than any other

organization, and that it was satisfied to proceed with

its only remaining goal, the DDA, in an attempt to obtain

as much mileage out of the "psychic" as it could and more

could be said to be possible.

#### THE DDA, 1941-1944

The year in 1941-1944 is a giant organization and

under the very effective guidance of Edward J. Bremer,

chief of the DDA, Bremer and, subsequently, Dr. Johnson

were active. It appears that when Bremer was in the

position of chief of the United States and the various leading

from the various and various overseas groups in almost every

country. This unit in emphasis from Washington to the

field was a most significant factor in the effective develop-

ment of the DDA. Finally, the field mission was

especially active organizations, including and distinguish-

ing material supplied to them by the home office. The result

was that much of this work-product material was of value



or no value in a specific area. By shifting emphasis to the forward theaters, the specific area needs could be examined and dealt with on the spot within the limits established by policy from Washington.

With the expanding overseas program, the annual budget has also grown.<sup>38</sup> From 1954 to 1960, the budget varied from eighty-four to one hundred and four million dollars. In fiscal 1963, the figure climbed to one hundred and forty-three million, and a proposed 1964 budget of over one hundred and ninety million dollars was placed before Congress.

The extent of the USIA operation is impressive and encompasses the entire spectrum of communications media.<sup>39</sup> The Voice of America produces continuous short wave broadcasts to an estimated weekly audience of over twenty million people. It produces over seven thousand five hundred weekly hours of taped programs in twenty-seven languages which are made available to approximately two thousand five hundred local medium wave radio stations which, in turn, reach an additional forty-five million people a week. In the field

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<sup>38</sup>Edward R. Murrow, Improved Communication for Better Understanding (Washington: United States Information Agency, Office of Public Information, press release No. 32, September 14, 1961), p. 7.

<sup>39</sup>United States Information Agency, 18th and 19th Reviews of Operations (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962).

on no value in a specific area. By shifting emphasis to the forward thrust, the specific area needs could be examined and dealt with on the spot within the limits established by policy and management.

With the expanding overseas program, the total budget has also grown.<sup>38</sup> From 1954 to 1960, the budget varied from eighty-four to one hundred and ten million dollars. In fiscal 1961, the figure climbed to one hundred and forty-four million, and a proposed 1962 budget of over one hundred and ninety million dollars was placed before Congress.

The extent of the USAID operation is impressive and encompasses the entire spectrum of communications media.<sup>39</sup> The Voice of America broadcasts continuous short wave broadcasts to an estimated weekly audience of over twenty million people. It produced over seven thousand five hundred weekly hours of light programs in twenty-seven languages which are made available to approximately two thousand five hundred local media via radio stations which, in turn, reach an additional twenty-five million people a week. In the field

<sup>38</sup> Howard R. Murray, Improved Communication for Public Understanding (Washington: United States Information Agency, Office of Public Information, Press Release No. 32, Washington 11, 1961), p. 7.

<sup>39</sup> United States Information Agency, 1960 and 1961 Review of Operations (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961).

of television, video tapes and films of special merit are made available to stations in sixty-six countries serving fifty million sets and reaching approximately one hundred and sixty million people. The agency also maintains two hundred and ten film libraries in ninety-eight countries with each library having between five hundred to one thousand separate titles all in the native language. Where no theaters are available, USIA has a limited number of mobile units. The weekly audience for these films averages one hundred and fifty million people. In addition, the agency prints and distributes more than eighty magazines and newspapers, operates a worldwide radio teletype which runs to ten thousand words a day directed to eighty-three countries, operates almost two hundred libraries containing over two and one-half million volumes, and presents exhibits such as the Friendship Seven space capsule.

Technically and material wise, the USIA is exceptionally well equipped and is improving itself yearly. Its most effective director, Edward R. Murrow, enjoyed an improved, though less than adequate, participation in the formulation of psychological policy.<sup>40</sup> It is possible that this was a function of the prestige which Mr. Murrow brought

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<sup>40</sup>The following observations on Mr. Murrow's role in the policy-making process are drawn and inferred from a series of interviews with Mrs. Edna King of the Office of Public Information in the United States Information Agency.





to the Agency, and which, undeniably, was transferred to USIA. It will be necessary to observe the role of his successor, Carl Rowan, to determine the extent of this factor.

Mr. Murrow received policy guidance from the Secretary of State. With the elimination of the OCB, he lost his formal membership in the National Security Council Structure and seat, as the only observer, at the council table; this was somewhat compensated for by his designation as a "Special-Request Member" which gave him a standing Presidential Invitation to attend those Council meetings which were concerned with matters relating to his official responsibilities. It should be noted, however, that he attended as a "junior member," as a guest, not as an equal to the members designated by law and Executive Order. There does not seem to be any clear definition or guidance to indicate at what point his presence would not be required. The President sought his advice on the impact that policies would have on world opinion before and not after they were implemented. This was all well and good, but it was, of course, a one-way arrangement and could be considered as a valid source of policy formulation and guidance only so long as the President saw fit (or remembered) to consult Mr. Murrow. On occasion, he was asked to attend Cabinet meetings, but at unpredictable times. He was also included in small meetings with the President, the Special Assistant for National

to the Agency, and which, incidentally, was considered to  
 data. It will be necessary to advise the role of his ap-  
 parent, Carl Brown, in defining the nature of this Agency.  
 Mr. Brown received initial guidance from the Secre-  
 tary of State. With the allocation of the 1970, he had his  
 formal membership in the National Security Council, and  
 was seen, at the only occasion, at the Council, that  
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 unpredictable times. He was also included in small meetings  
 with the President, the Special Assistant to the President



Security Affairs (Bundy), the Director of the State Department Policy Planning Council (Rostow), and the Secretary of State (Rusk). He did not participate in the Policy Planning Council's work. His representative sat with the Cold War Advisory Panel. All of this reenforces an underlying suspicion that USIA policy guidance is a "jury rig" and definitely ad hoc. The general flow is downward to the Agency and while there, quite obviously, is a degree of counter flow of advice and staff work to figure in national policy consideration, this input to the national policy machinery is in the nature of a guest performance and not as a permanent, integral factor.

#### XXVII. THE UNITED STATES REMAINS UNPREPARED

It would seem that in the last forty-six years, the United States Government has not yet concluded that the conduct of foreign affairs demands identification and consideration of psychological processes in every phase of international relations. The alleged increased participation of the USIA in our policy planning is rated by some observers as a distinct plus. A more restrained view is that it is, at least, not a minus. It is important that the people of the world hear and understand, as much as their intellects will permit, the position and policies of the United States. The fact that they hear and, hopefully, understand has no relationship,



necessarily, with their support for United States objectives. The danger in becoming euphoric over one's information activities lies in failing to recognize this limitation on what "truth" can do. An information program, undeniably, can have marked psychological effect. It is, however, but one psychological operation. Psychological war is a product of many psychological operations, carried on simultaneously, intensively, for indefinite periods, and so blended, one with the other, that the cause and effects of each weave together into a single integrated whole aimed at achieving national goals. The United States pays lip service to this theorem but has yet to turn its organizational and creative genius to the task of accomplishing such an integrated foreign policy.



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## CHAPTER V

### ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON OF SOVIET AND UNITED STATES EFFORTS

Any comparison of Soviet and United States efforts in the field of psychological operations must begin by noting the differences between the basic aims of foreign policy and the conceptions of how foreign policy is to be conducted.

#### I. INTRODUCTION

The Soviet Union is a revolutionary power with long-term ideological claims. Its leaders intend to further the socialist revolution throughout the world. Though different nations are at different stages, some more or less ripe than others, for one or another type of revolution, the road is essentially the same for all. The Soviet leaders are not necessarily in a hurry. Their determination to expedite the process of history does not impel them to adventurous or aggressive action. However, they are unshakeably convinced that their diagnosis of history is scientific, and they are constantly on the watch for opportunities to promote their cause.

The United States is conservative and defensive. It is not that American leaders do not also hold convictions, but that they do not plot, through their foreign policies,

## REALITY AND CONCEPTION OF JUSTICE

## THEORY OF JUSTICE

Any conception of justice and limited efforts to  
the limit of philosophical speculation must begin by asking  
the difference between the basic aim of justice policy and  
the conception of how justice policy is to be conducted.

## I. INTRODUCTION

The justice issue is a revolutionary power after long-  
term ideological change. Its leaders intend to replace the  
existing revolutionary structure of the world. They differ  
regions are at different stages, some more or less ripe than  
others, for one or another type of revolution, and each is  
essentially the same for all. The justice leaders are not  
necessarily in a hurry. Their determination to achieve the  
process of history does not imply that to achieve it  
aggressive action. However, they are unambiguously convinced  
that their diagnosis of history is accurate, and they are  
unambiguously as far from the revolutionaries as possible.

## CONCLUSION

The justice issue is comprehensive and extensive. It  
is not that justice leaders do not also have political,  
and that they do not have, strategic and tactical policies.



to convert other nations. There is, of course, a strong strain of missionary zeal which is very dear to the American heart, but it cannot be said that the makers of United States policy have set themselves the long-term, ideological aim of converting the people either of the Soviet bloc or of the uncommitted countries to the American way of life. Rather, they are concerned to defend the United States national interest and to foster a world order in which all men are uninterfered with and free to choose their own way of life and government so long as in so doing they do not impinge upon the same rights of other states and men.

If, in the aims of policy, the Soviet leaders are doctrinaire and the United States government is empirical, in the choice of means the opposite is generally the case. In the United States, there is a great deal of public discussion, which can hardly fail to make itself felt within the Government policy machinery and Department of State, as to whether the United States should rely on military strength or economic action, on propaganda or negotiations. This "either-or-ism" must be incomprehensible to Soviet students of American affairs. In Soviet foreign policy, all available instruments are used, in whatever admixture the circumstances of the case would suggest.

## II. ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES EFFORTS

A democracy, by its very nature, contains certain

to control other nations. There is, of course, a strong  
 sense of altruism, and this is very dear to the American  
 heart, but it seems to me that the nature of United States  
 policy have not themselves. The long-term, strategic aim  
 at controlling the people living on the border line of the  
 communist countries in the Western way of life. After  
 they are convinced to defend the United States nation;  
 interest and to foster a world order in which all men are  
 united with and live in peace with one another and  
 the government as good as is doing best to see things  
 done the same spirit of peace and order and unity.

It is the aim of policy, the United States and  
 the United States government is implied,  
 in the choice of means and the manner in which the case  
 is the United States, there is a great deal of public opinion  
 which can hardly fail to make itself felt again  
 the government policy machinery and department of state, as  
 we should the United States should help to achieve through  
 its economic action, its development or cooperation. This  
 is the aim of policy, the United States and the United States  
 government is implied, in the choice of means and the manner in  
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 we should the United States should help to achieve through  
 its economic action, its development or cooperation. This

## II. AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD THE UNITED STATES

A democracy, by its very nature, cannot remain

inherent disadvantages in the conduct of psychological operations. The United States is a republic and a democracy and, consequently, subject to the sharp limitations which republican, democratic governments possess.

The United States cannot impose a purpose upon mankind. It cannot enunciate a policy and then hue to that line for years on end. Americans are not messiahs. The limitations of American civilization over and above those restraints imposed by American political institutions are such as to make it impossible for the United States to lead a fanatical counter crusade against communism or to guarantee to the world that America of 1963 can promise that America of 1975 will perform any particular action.

#### Limitations on Psychological Operations

American psychological operations are limited precisely because they are American. To be American means, to a certain degree, to be free. The American citizen has a definite influence and role in the operation of his government. A new election and a hostile Congress can cut off the funds for any project no matter what its merits may be in the eyes of the policy planners. The rest of the world is acutely aware of this fact, even though Washington politicians and bureaucrats sometimes seem to forget. The promise of a dictator is generally good for his lifetime. The promise of the United States is good only within the



inherent disadvantages in the conduct of psychological experiments. The United States is a republic and a democracy, and, consequently, subject to the strong limitations which popularly elected governments possess. The United States cannot ignore a nation upon which it has a moral obligation to help and that has to stand. It cannot abandon a policy and that has to stand. It has been on our American and our continent. The limitations of American civilization were not above those limitations imposed by American political institutions and we are not to make it impossible for the United States to lead a national counter against movements of its kind. We do not think that America of 1945 has become that America of 1945 will forever any American nation.

#### Limitations on Psychological Operations

American psychological operations are limited by a variety of factors that are American. To be American means, in a certain degree, to be free. The American mind has a certain influence and role in the operation of his government. A new direction and a new direction can not be the same for any project or action that the world may be in the eyes of the policy planner. The way of the world is not only a matter of fact, even though American political and economic conditions seem to favor. The power of a decision is generally good for the nation. The power of the United States is good only within the

letter of the law: a specific treaty, a definite commercial agreement, a very sharp and very narrow commitment. "In the propaganda field, America certainly is not promise."<sup>1</sup>

The American strength in international affairs, therefore, does not lie in a propaganda capacity to promise, to threaten, or to commit the United States Government to future courses of action. The American strength lies in the immense probabilities of American life, in the virtual certainty that the American people will react in a positive manner to aggression; that the American people will, if attacked, fight in an implacable manner with every intention of destroying their attacker; and that the American people, despite their occasional shortcomings in matters of racial tolerance and political freedom, will, in the long run, be solidly ranged behind whatever policies seem to promise equality, prosperity, and freedom for all men.

The limitations on the United States as a source of propaganda are sharp. There is no United States party line; it is virtually impossible to imagine that within the American civilization, as it exists today, there could be one. There might be an official United States policy, unanimous and binding upon all Federal departments, but the Federal

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<sup>1</sup>Paul M. A. Linebarger, Psychological Warfare (second edition; New York: Duell, Sloane, and Pearce, 1960), p. 279.





Government itself, is only one among fifty-one separate governments operating within the United States of America. The state governments, the cities within the states, and the people-at-large are free to contradict what the Federal Government may say at any given point. Therefore, exploitation of United States propaganda strength must always be developed from the probable or apparent center of American opinion at that moment. It is impossible to find a United States policy which can be made compulsory and unanimous upon all Americans, both public and private. American policy planners are faced with the domestic requirement of devising foreign-policy programs which will command the decisive assent of the American people--this demands an adroit combination of leadership, foresight, and a keen awareness of domestic politics.

#### The Quest for Lost National Purpose

The less peaceful the world is, the more effective a "peacetime" psychological campaign can be. In times of obvious peril, the American people close ranks. In times of relaxation, they scatter in every direction. The American people seem to be incapable, psychologically, of carrying out a crusade without the external stimulus of danger and trouble. Once a war breaks out, Americans, heretofore, have shown an excellent capacity to unite in winning and finishing the conflict. The perplexing question, lies in how the



American people, short of involvement in war can develop the purpose, decision, and unanimity necessary to take those actions which will prevent war.

It has been a century since the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse rode through the American countryside. America's sheltered and peaceful society has diverted the people into a timid and near sterile pattern of political thought. The "more abundant life," the quest for security, the adulation of the "common man" have been thematic byways down which the American people have wandered away from the highway of national character and purpose that built their magnificent country out of a howling wilderness. The character and purpose to which reference is so frequently made did not shrink from destroying the native population when such a course of action augured well for the security of a portion of the American people. Today, it is highly improbable that American exploration and colonization of another planet would be carried out in a comparable manner. Perhaps this is for the good. Brutality or atrocity generally breed more of the same. Nevertheless, it is the manifestation of purpose, the unalterable and unswerving dedication to doing what must be done to perpetuate this land and its system which has relaxed under the eroding effect of security.

Part of the answer probably lies in the field of education. The American people are still largely ignorant or



American people, about the Government in fact can develop the  
 power, wealth, and material resources to face them  
 nations which will follow us.

It has been a country since the first settlement of the  
 settlement with through the American continent, America's  
 history and present reality has always the people has  
 a state and the political system of political thought. The  
 "new American life," the quest for reality, the realization  
 of the common and the new American spirit from which the  
 American people have emerged from the highway to

national character and people that will build together  
 country as a living organism. The character and  
 progress to which nations is no frequently made the old  
 value from destroying the native population when men's  
 course of action requires well for the security of a position  
 of the American people. Today, it is highly probable that  
 American civilization and civilization of another place.

will be the only way to a complete success. Today this  
 is for the good. Humanity is slowly becoming aware of  
 of the same. Nevertheless, it is the realization of the  
 good, the material and immaterial dedication to the  
 that will be able to participate in the new and its system  
 which has refused when the world effort is reality.

and of the future probably lies in the field of the  
 culture. The American people are still largely ignorant of

misinformed as to the nature of communism and its relationship to the power politics of the Soviet Union. A small start has been made in the public school systems of certain of the states. Florida now requires a course, employing the text The Meaning of Communism (Simon and Schuster) to be given in the last years of high school. It is hoped that such programs will spread. While the American possesses patience, endurance, and curiosity, the latter faculty is not generally directed along the historical or political veins. So long as a rational consensus or basis of understanding in these fields is not developed, to that extent will there continue to be just that much more impetus to this aimless drifting or lack of felt national purpose.

The never-ending complaints for a regenerated national purpose and the literary wringing-of-hands over the need for a rededication overlook the fact that it is not so much a matter of having lost but more a matter of having forgotten the already valid and existing precepts that the American people have developed. Here lies a challenge for the political leadership of the nation. It is a double challenge, for unless conducted scrupulously free of partisan and minority politics and free of a propaganda tone and motif it can never succeed. The propagandizing efforts of the Creel Committee amongst the American people have stood as a bar for forty-five years to governmental efforts to develop the requisite foundation of understanding which is necessary to

maintained as to the views of Communism and its relations

with the power politics of the Soviet Union. It will

also be seen from the public school system of certain

of the states. This is the kind of a course, regarding the

fact that the Communist Party is in

power in the last years of this century. It is hoped that

each country will accept. While the American position

isolation, however, and certainly, the latter policy is

not generally shared since the historical or political

reasons for it are a national movement, or better of inter-

national in scope. It is not necessary, in fact, to

will have countries to be that they were more limited to

this stage during at least in this country.

The contemporary situation has a significant historical

background and the literary situation is also the same for

a substantial number of the fact that it is not as much a

matter of having lost but more a matter of having lost

the already valid and existing grounds for the American

people have suffered. There is a challenge for the politi-

cal leadership of the nation. It is a double challenge, for

there is a double challenge, first to leadership and secondly

to the people and first of a propaganda loss and second to the

other aspects. The propaganda efforts of the Soviet Com-

munist Party are the American people have since as a rule for

every-five years to governmental efforts to restore the

political situation of international relations is necessary to



its policies. It most certainly is a responsibility of leadership to insure that the public is grounded and informed of the factors which determine the national future. This is no program for a series of press conferences or an occasional fireside chat; it is a long-term, continuing, integrated education effort that would require direct participation by the President and his most senior advisers.

#### Statement of the Problem

Over a decade ago, the crux of psychological war was ably annunciated by President Eisenhower in a campaign speech at San Francisco:

The present Administration has never yet been able to grasp the full impact of a psychological effort put forth on a national scale. What would such a peacetime of "cold war" national strategy mean? It would mean, in the first place, the selection of broad national purposes and the designation within these purposes of principal targets. Then it would mean this: every significant act of government should be so timed and so directed at a principal target and so related to other governmental actions that it will produce the maximum effect. It means that our government in this critical matter will no longer be divided into airtight compartments. It means that in carrying out a national policy every department and every agency of government that can make a useful contribution will bring its full strength to bear under a coordinated program. We shall no longer have a Department of State that deals with foreign policy in an aloof cloister; a defense establishment that makes military appraisals in a vacuum; a mutual security administration that, with sovereign independence, spends billions overseas. We must bring the dozens of agencies and bureaus into concerted action under an overall scheme of strategy. And we must have a



firm hand on the tiller to sail the ship along a consistent course.<sup>2</sup>

Beyond this clear annunciation, little advance has been made. Total strategies have never been fully developed or implemented by the United States. The strategies that have been employed have not provided for the integrated use of the four major instruments of foreign policy--the diplomatic, military, economic, and psychological. There are many reasons for this. The presidential form of government with its division of powers between the executive and the legislature imposes limitations on the probable amount of integration that can be developed. The democratic process itself inhibits the type of central control which can most readily achieve the coordination necessary to actual totality of action in the implementation of a decision. The inherent frictions that exist between Congress and the White House can and often result in budgetary or other restrictions on the scope of implementation of plans developed by the executive.

The aforementioned limitations are constitutional weaknesses which must be endured for the sake of the great strengths and rewards that the system simultaneously affords us. However, there are at least two additional areas which are blocked only by inertia or bureaucratic, vested interest.

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<sup>2</sup>Speech delivered October 8, 1952, at San Francisco.



their hands on the matter to tell the ship along a  
certain course.

Beyond this clear demonstration, little advance has  
been made. Civilized nations have been fully developed  
on land, but the United States, the Atlantic and  
have been employed for the purpose of the  
of the four major instruments of foreign policy—the diplo-  
matic, military, economic, and psychological. There are  
many reasons for this. The principal form of government  
with its division of power between the executive and the  
legislative branches, limitations on the power of the  
executive that can be exercised. The democratic process  
itself includes the type of control which can be  
readily achieved for the purpose of actual control  
of action in the implementation of a decision. The lack of  
flexibility that exists between Congress and the White House  
can and often result in independence or even resistance to  
the policy of implementation of plans devised by the execu-  
tive.

The effectiveness of limitations on constitutional  
powers which must be subject to the test of the great  
principles and concepts that the system fundamentally offers  
us. However, there are at least two additional points which  
are raised only by limits on independence, versus interest.

It is in these areas where effective Presidential leadership and sound organization can produce a total diplomacy or total strategy. In fact, it has always been in these areas where the answer has lain, and, in the harsh light of responsibility and accountability, the failure of the United States Government to develop this totality of effort has been solely the responsibility of its Chief-Executive-Officer--the President of the United States.

### The Multiplicity of Agencies

The first of these correctable areas centers on the problem of the multiplicity of agencies with overlapping authority and responsibility which stultify the foreign policy decision-making apparatus within the executive branch. In such a vast operation, it is literally impossible to develop a neat series of compartmentalized units which are pure unto themselves. Such an organization could never work for the simple reason that each is, in some degree, dependent upon the other and finds implications of all the tasks performed by the other agencies within its own field. Therefore, the line of attack should be through the "coordinating" machinery and not by successive layering of agency upon agency or by ad hoc, "shooting from the hip," emergency methods of dealing with individual situations as they arise. Since World War II, there has been a stately procession of

It is in these areas that the most serious problems are found. In these areas, the Government has a special responsibility. It is the duty of the Government to ensure that the people have access to the services they need. This is especially true in the case of health care, education, and social services. The Government must ensure that these services are available to all people, regardless of their income or social status. This is a fundamental principle of justice and fairness. The Government must also ensure that these services are of high quality and that they are delivered in a timely and efficient manner. This is a challenge, but it is one that the Government must meet if it is to fulfill its duty to the people.

### The Role of the Government

The role of the government is to provide a framework within which the private sector can operate. This includes the establishment of laws and regulations that govern the behavior of businesses and individuals. The government also has a responsibility to provide public services that are not provided by the private sector. These services include education, health care, and social services. The government must also ensure that these services are of high quality and that they are delivered in a timely and efficient manner. This is a challenge, but it is one that the government must meet if it is to fulfill its duty to the people. The government must also ensure that these services are available to all people, regardless of their income or social status. This is a fundamental principle of justice and fairness. The government must also ensure that these services are of high quality and that they are delivered in a timely and efficient manner. This is a challenge, but it is one that the government must meet if it is to fulfill its duty to the people.



"coordinating" committees or boards. All have been formed with the best of intentions; each has represented some improvement; and the late OCB even offered promise. All have failed for the same reason--their titles hold the key:

"Coordination." If any country should have had its fill of this term, the United States would rank at the very head of the list. From the days of the Continental Congress when "Congress could beg, plead, and implore, but it could not command," this nation has had nothing but the most unfortunate experience with "coordination." The entire history of the American people indicates that they simply do not "coordinate" of their own free wills. The vernacular of the Marine gunnery sergeant, "semper fie, I've got mine, how are you doing?" seems to express the attitude; it probably lies deeply grounded in the independence bred of the frontier experience which is part of American heritage. It cannot be tolerated within an administrative organization, yet it has been tolerated. Eisenhower virtually prostituted his San Francisco campaign speech of 8 October 1952, with the coordinative mandate expressed in the promulgation of the OCB. Probably his concept of military "coordination" colored his judgment of the effectiveness of a civilian, interdepartmental coordinating board. Having lived all one's life in the glowering shadow of the Articles of War, it would be very easy to overlook the absence of such an impelling



incentive to effective coordination. That there is no such sanction renders the coordinating concept useless in the face of vested bureaucratic practices.

### The Lack of Understanding

There is a second reason for the United States failure to develop total strategies. American leaders have never truly understood the nature of psychological operations; and, because the full implications of these operations have not been understood, they have never been fully exploited. Although the history of psychological policy implications can be traced back to earliest recorded time, traditionally, psychological operations were not recognized as a separate instrument of statecraft. This was probably due to the very narrow, special audience against which the implications of the traditional tools--diplomacy, military force, and economic activities--were used, whether singly or collectively. However, in the twentieth century, for the first time, it has become possible for the leaders of one nation to communicate directly with the population of another nation. Simultaneously, there has been an immense expansion of the potential or actual power base of a society. Even the most totalitarian of today's dictatorships is forced to solicit the active support of its subjects, whereas its predecessors could exist with mere passive acquiescence. Thus, the new-found power of the masses and the ability of a



[illegible]

foreign power to speak directly to these masses have raised the psychological tool to a level comparable with that of the three traditional instruments.

### American Conceptions and Misconceptions

The American concept of psychological warfare has always been tainted with a suspicion of the instrument. Part of this stems from the American public's fear of being influenced psychologically by the government--a fear which is inevitable to a certain degree. This has been reenforced by the spectre of Nazi, Soviet, and Chinese psychological operations and propaganda. There is also the influence of the intriguing "all-American boy" complex that is periodically manifest in a preoccupation with a variation of the Marquis of Queensberry rules in so far as international relations are concerned. The U-2 incident was disturbing to many people simply because we were occupied in spying (and blatant spying at that), not because we got caught at it. The pathetic performance put on by every senior official concerned was capped only by the even more pathetically noble assumption of responsibility by the President. Of course, he was responsible! And every international politician knew that. The public expiation of this international sin was a reflection of the American bent of character which is somehow ashamed of anything that smacks of the underhanded or devious. Under this spell, the word

thought, even to speak honestly to those whom they regard  
the psychological test as a useful psychological instrument  
and whose practical instruments.

### Psychological Instruments and Psychological

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the widespread "all-American day" complex even in political  
unity matters in a psychological sense with a suspicion of the  
methods of governmentality roles in order to international  
relations are concerned. The U-S position was disturbed by  
many people simply because we were occupied in spying and  
being spied on by us, and because we had caught at it.  
The political position was not so very much different.  
Domestic and foreign policy in the same must necessarily  
have something of a similarity by the President. In  
contrast, in the psychological and every individual point-  
of-view from now. The public opinion in this regard  
factual and a reflection of the American heart of  
conscience which is deeply rooted in the history of the nation  
of the relationship to history. Under this spell, the word



propaganda has meant something evil. It has meant the dirty weapon of the opponent. Extensive literary effort has been expended to develop some nice, clean, unalarming substitute for such terms as psychological war and propaganda—evidently on the assumption that a rose by any other name will somehow not smell like a rose.

### American Usage and Propaganda

Psychological warfare and psychological operations, in American usage, have come largely to connote propaganda. The earliest large-scale experience of the nation was in World War I with the efforts of the Creel Committee. This was primarily a propaganda campaign based almost entirely upon an expansion of domestic advertising techniques. Two basic misconceptions have generally expressed themselves in all American psychological warfare programs ever since. The first is the idea that the conduct of psychological warfare and propaganda is just like advertising. The second is that foreigners think, or wish to think, like Americans.

There has been, for many years, a wide-spread belief that, since Americans are smart advertisers, all that the government needs to do is project this domestic form of agitation on a worldwide basis. Yet this approach is precisely what the world situation does not require. The United States is dealing with a world revolutionary situation involving races, cultures, and aspirations totally alien to American

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### Psychological Warfare and Propaganda

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 is dealing with a world revolutionary situation involving  
 racial, cultural, and religious conflict which is American

experience. Political propaganda is a task of extraordinary complexity and demands the most skilled and sophisticated American political guidance.

What is Good for the United States is Good for the World

Since the earliest days of the Republic, Americans have demonstrated a national ethnocentrism. The New World was, in fact, new, and it bred a new type of man, a new set of values, and new outlooks. Those who did not develop returned to Europe or were swallowed up in the process of the development of American culture. The period of the nineteenth century, during which the great focus of American attention was turned inward to continental consolidation, reenforced the opinion that the American way was a superior way; the spectacular growth which burst forth in the last quarter of the nineteenth and early decades of the twentieth centuries served as proof of the theorem. The American inclination to assume that what was good for America was good for everyone, the tendency to disregard the basic interest and outlooks of the foreign audiences to which America has addressed itself stem from this experience. Consequently, factual statements that the American working man or farmer has a carpet in his home, shoes for all his children, an automobile of his own, and liberty to do as he pleases are regarded as blatant lies by the Transcaucasian



experiment. Political propaganda is a case of extraordinary complexity and demands the most skillful and sophisticated American political techniques.

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of values, and new outlooks. Those who did not share the

values of Europe or were excluded by the process of the

development of American culture. The failure of the first

century century, during which the great force of American

democracy was based on the national community,

remained the same, and the American way was a superior

way, and American people which have been in the past

center of the American and early decades of the twentieth

century have been at the heart of the American. The American

inclination to believe that there was something new and

good for everyone, the tendency to disregard the basic in-

terest and values of the people, and to believe in which

America has enjoyed itself since from this experience.

Consequently, the American people have been working

and in the past have been in the past, there has been

nothing, an American of his own, and liberty for all

people are regarded as the same by the Americans.

peasant, who simply cannot imagine that one worker or farmer could possibly own such tangible and intangible things.

There has been a realistic trend away from this form of propaganda as the USIA has matured. The non-governmental media of communication, however, film, television, and magazines still convey this message and under the American system cannot be restrained from so doing. This poses an even greater problem for the USIA, for America possesses no revolutionary ideology to fire imaginations and to substitute for the material yearnings of the less-developed peoples of the world. Unfortunately, "you can't fill the baby's bottle with liberty";<sup>3</sup> and there is the ever-present danger of talking only to one's friends who already share American expectations and thereby losing "the great majority of mankind that is still searching for a hope and a vision."<sup>4</sup>

### III. ANALYSIS OF SOVIET EFFORTS

When one pauses to contemplate the use that the Soviet Union has made of the psychological tool, one cannot fail to be impressed by the efficient and workmanlike manner in which psychological operations have been woven through

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<sup>3</sup>Saul K. Padover, "Psychological Warfare and Foreign Policy," Propaganda and International Relations, Urban G. Whitaker, Jr. (ed.) (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1962), p. 143, cited from a quotation of Maury Mavencck.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

possess, who simply cannot imagine that the world is fair and  
cannot possibly see any logical and reasonable thing.

There has been a terrible trend away from this form  
of propaganda as the war has ended. The non-governmental  
media of communication, however, this, television, and radio  
still convey this message and know the American system  
cannot be sustained from its basis. This power is even

greater power for the U.S. for America possesses an ever-  
increasing ability to find imagination and to project  
for the mental viewpoint of the non-developed people of  
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with liberty, and there is the ever-present danger of false-  
hood only to our friends and already some American super-  
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power is still necessary for a hope and a vision.<sup>4</sup>

### III. ABILITY OF COVERT POWER

When one speaks of manipulating the war that the  
United States has made in the psychological field, one cannot  
fail to be impressed by the skillful and sophisticated manner  
in which psychological operations have been carried through.

<sup>1</sup>Paul E. Johnson, "Psychological Warfare and Foreign  
Policy," *Psychological Warfare*, 1964, p. 1.  
<sup>2</sup>Johnson, *Psychological Warfare*, 1964, p. 1.  
<sup>3</sup>Johnson, *Psychological Warfare*, 1964, p. 1.  
<sup>4</sup>Johnson, *Psychological Warfare*, 1964, p. 1.



the Soviet system. This does not mean that free men should adopt a similar course, but it does indicate that psychological operations can be effective. The United States would be foolish not to recognize the operational strength of the Soviet structure and profit from those lessons which may be drawn in the light of the American experience.

#### A Total Program

The goals of Soviet foreign policy have been achieved and projected in terms of all resources, capabilities, and the entire machinery of Government. In Soviet hands, psychological operations have proven to be both flexible and responsive to initiative. Time after time in the last twenty years, the speed and efficiency with which the Soviets have moved from a military posture to political action and thence to economic pressure have caught the United States unprepared with any reply except one devised under the impelling pressure of the latest challenge.

Perhaps the single most striking feature of the Soviet effort is its totality, for the Soviet operation is an organizational one, and its strength lies in the rise of organization as a weapon. It is not the power of persuasion so much as it is the power that flows from a dedicated, disciplined, ruthless Combat Party.

The Soviet system. This does not mean that there are no  
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### A Total System

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 have shown some military success in political action and  
 threat to economic progress and progress in United States  
 cooperation with any single country and divided under the in-  
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 Soviet effort is its flexibility. For the Soviet system is  
 an organizational one, and its strength lies in the fact of  
 organization as a weapon. It is not the power of persuasion  
 as much as it is the power that flows from a dedicated,  
 almost fanatical, belief.

### The Soviet Value System

The national values which ground the employment of the Combat Party derive from Marxist-Leninist Bolshevik doctrine, portions of which have expanded and contracted, mutated and atrophied as the Soviet Union has progressed from the virulent, but "have not," revolutionary stage to the status of a great world power, rich and growing richer--a definite "have" state. Nevertheless, the communist ideology underlies the organizational and operational frame of the nation.

There exists a considerable body of opinion that holds that this Bolshevik ideology has little or no bearing on the operations or planning factors of the USSR. The observation that "dialectical materialism affected Stalin . . . (and by implication any of the Soviet leaders) . . . about as much and as little as the doctrine of Christian charity affected Ivan the Terrible" is picturesque and perhaps of value, in a rhetorical sense.<sup>5</sup> Such opinion maintains that the confrontation of the mid-twentieth century is a derivative of pure power politics, and that its polar star is power--nothing more nor less. This approach neglects the important role of values in the development of national goals and a national security policy. The leaders of the

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<sup>5</sup>Robert V. Daniels, "What the Russians Mean," Commentary (October, 1962), p. 47.



The national values which govern the equipment of the Soviet party derive from Marxist-Leninist philosophy, ethics, traditions of action have expanded and accumulated, merged and crystallized as the Soviet Union has progressed from one victory, one "revolutionary step" to the region of a great world power, rich and growing richer. A definite "new" trend, nevertheless, the communist ideology emphasizes the organizational and operational forms of the nation.

There exists a considerable body of opinion that holds that this Soviet ideology has little or no bearing on the questions of national factors of the USSR. The observation that "nationalism remains attached to the land by legislation and by the Soviet leaders" . . . about as much as little as the doctrine of Christ. Similarly attached even the "terrible" is "impossible" and "no" form of value, in a spiritual sense, "and spiritual" is that the contradiction of the mid-twentieth century is a derivative of two lower policies, and that the point even is "most-likely" was not true. This approach requires the importance of value in the development of national goals and a national security policy. The leaders of the

<sup>1</sup>Robert V. Daniels, "What the Soviet Union Means," Foreign Affairs (October, 1951), p. 47.

Soviet Union believe in their value system--Marxist-Leninism--as firmly and deeply as their American counterparts believe in democracy. It is no more possible to claim that Soviet foreign policy is conceived independent of that nation's value system, than it is to hold that American values are eliminated during the development of United States policy.

Unless we are able to devise political tactics and an organizational plan based precisely upon calculations for work over a long period of time, and at the same time, in the very process of this work, put our party in readiness to spring to its post . . . at the very first, even unexpected, call, as soon as the progress of events becomes accelerated, we will prove to be but miserable political adventurers . . . . It would be a grievous error indeed to build up the party organization in the expectation only of outbreaks of street-fighting, or only upon the "forward march of the drab, everyday struggle." We must always carry on our every day work and always be prepared for everything, for very frequently it is almost impossible to foresee beforehand when periods of outbreaks will give away to periods of calm. And even in those cases when it is possible to do so, it will not be possible to utilize this foresight for the purpose of reconstructing our organization, because . . . these changes from turmoil to calm take place with astonishing rapidity.<sup>6</sup>

Thus, in 1902, Lenin enunciated the basic organizational requirements for flexibility and long-range planning with no sharp distinction between words and deeds or between psychological or military warfare.

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<sup>6</sup>Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, Collected Works (New York: International Publishers, 1927), pp. 4 and 244-245.

...the same belief in their value system--

...is likely to be their common

...It is no more possible to claim

...that Soviet foreign policy is consistent

...that it is to build a new

...the development of

...policy.

...we are able to develop political parties and an

...based gradually upon rational

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### The Department of Propaganda and Agitation

To accomplish this organization, control of psychological operations is located at a very high point in the hierarchy of the government. The Department of Propaganda and Agitation, located within the Executive Staff of the Party Secretariat, exercises vast authority. This mandate touches every form of activity which might conceivably influence opinion. It functions as the planner, director, and supervisor for all media. Its mission includes that of providing the Presidium and Central Committee with analyzed data upon which these two high policy bodies can act in the development of a total national policy. The Department supervises the rigorous political education program from which it develops and maintains a well-trained and well-informed Combat Party structure throughout the world.

### Agitatsya i Propaganda

Soviet Russia is the first nation in history to produce such a trained class of full-time propagandists, administrators, agitators, and organizers in a Combat Party. Contrary to the democratic attitude towards propaganda and psychological warfare and those who conduct it, AGITATSYA i PROPAGANDA are honorific words in the Soviet Union. They are honorable because the importance of these activities in the pattern of world revolution is recognized and respected. Consequently, the "psychological troops" have a sense of

# The Department of Propaganda and Information

The Department of Propaganda and Information, created in 1941, is the central organ of the Party for the dissemination of its policy and for the mobilization of the masses. It is the main link between the Party and the people. The Department is responsible for the preparation and dissemination of all Party propaganda, including the press, radio, television, and the arts. It also coordinates the work of all other propaganda organizations in the country. The Department is headed by the Secretary of the Central Committee, who is responsible to the Politburo. The Department is divided into several departments, each responsible for a specific area of propaganda work. These departments include the Department of Press and Publications, the Department of Radio and Television, the Department of the Arts, and the Department of International Propaganda. The Department also has a number of research and administrative departments. The Department's work is carried out through a network of propaganda organizations at all levels of the Party and the State. These organizations include the Central Committee, the Provincial Committees, the District Committees, and the local Party organizations. The Department's work is essential for the success of the Party's policy and for the unity of the people.

## Propaganda and Information

Propaganda and information are the two main functions of the Party. Propaganda is the process of spreading the Party's policy and program among the people. Information is the process of gathering and disseminating news and facts about the Party and the country. Both functions are essential for the success of the Party. Propaganda and information work together to create a unified front for the Party and to mobilize the masses for its work. The Department of Propaganda and Information is the central organ for the coordination of these two functions. It is responsible for the preparation and dissemination of all Party propaganda and for the gathering and dissemination of all Party information. The Department is headed by the Secretary of the Central Committee, who is responsible to the Politburo. The Department is divided into several departments, each responsible for a specific area of propaganda and information work. These departments include the Department of Press and Publications, the Department of Radio and Television, the Department of the Arts, and the Department of International Propaganda and Information. The Department also has a number of research and administrative departments. The Department's work is carried out through a network of propaganda and information organizations at all levels of the Party and the State. These organizations include the Central Committee, the Provincial Committees, the District Committees, and the local Party organizations. The Department's work is essential for the success of the Party's policy and for the unity of the people.

mission, a sense of contributing to the National destiny. Such regard is not accorded to American operators by their nation. Since there is no such division or separation of political, military, and civilian planning and executive efforts as exist within the American governmental structure, the Soviets experience little trouble in extracting the maximum psychological return from the integrated, total policy.

#### The Soviet Concept of Public Opinion

There are additional factors that render the organization of the Combat Party even more formidable. One of these lies in the fundamental distinction between public opinion as it is conceived in a democratic state and as it is conceived in the USSR. A democracy regards public opinion in terms of citizens freely taking a stand on an issue of public importance. The various media of mass communications are operated so as to present facts on which citizens may make up their minds on any given issue--the creation of diversity of opinions is encouraged. Through a process of free elections, the majority opinion is expressed and the government is modified accordingly. In the Soviet Union, quite the opposite is the case. A highly-organized central control of the media of mass communications is manipulated as a guide since the reader looks at the official communications to discover the correct position--not to find



mission, a number of countries in the Eastern Hemisphere  
such regard is not accorded to American operations by their  
media. Since there is no such division of responsibility at  
political, military, and civilian levels, and especially  
although we must stress the American governmental structure,  
the political system, the media is extremely free  
to make psychological attacks from the information, both  
policy.

### The Social Control of Public Opinion

There are additional factors that govern the control  
of the Social Party very much. The media, one of  
these is in the fundamental distinction between public  
opinion as it is conceived in a democratic state and as it  
is conceived in the USSR. A necessary requisite  
operation is found in states freely having a right to do  
things of public importance. The various media of mass com-  
munications are viewed as an integral part of the state  
apparatus and are not free to give their own  
version of events. The media is controlled through a  
system of state censorship. The media is controlled  
and the government is entitled to control. In the Soviet  
Union, the media is controlled in the same way. The media  
control of the media of mass communications is  
viewed as a part of the state apparatus and is not  
viewed as a part of the state apparatus and is not

conflicting arguments from which he may make up his mind. The Party and its communications serve to mobilize and formulate public opinion on all important issues. This is not to ignore the state of public attitudes and understanding, however. The Department of Propaganda and Agitation is careful to maintain a close evaluation of the attitudes of the masses so as to be able to estimate how ready they are to support a given policy. Once the direction and intensity of the attitudinal winds are determined, the Department then guides the vanguard and persuades or coerces the laggards. The elections which are held are designed to provide a symbolic expression of this unity. The change which follows such an election will not be reflected upward but downward. The state continues along a predetermined course and the population is expected to conform to the established Party line.

### Scope of Operations

The sheer size and variety of the combat resources available are staggering. In all the Soviet world, the entire communications system is at the service of the Party. In any part of the world where the Combat Party functions, it may draw on as many of the proved devices as it can maintain. Furthermore, this Soviet program is a total program. The Combat Party at work outside the Soviet orbit may be

conflicting arguments from which he may select his final  
 The Party and its communications serve to enlighten and in-  
 struct the public opinion on all important issues. This is not  
 to ignore the state of public opinion and understanding,  
 however. The department of propaganda and agitation is  
 careful to maintain a close evaluation of the opinions of  
 the masses so as to be able to estimate how ready they are  
 to support a given policy. Once the direction and intensity  
 of the systematic work are determined, the Government then  
 defines the viewpoint and prepares to conduct the campaign.  
 The education which is held are designed to provide a vir-  
 tuous expression of this policy. The change which follows  
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Scope of Education  
 The scope and variety of the mass education  
 program are expanding. In all the Soviet Union, the  
 public communication system is at the service of the Party.  
 In any part of the world where the Communist Party functions,  
 it has been or is about to be given priority as its main  
 task. Furthermore, this Soviet program is a total program.  
 The Communist Party is now making the Soviet Union a



expected to approach its targets with every weapon that is available and appropriate.

It has been estimated that the cost of the most direct means, measures stemming from the professional propagandists, amount to at least five hundred million dollars a year. Indirect means of operation appear in the form of support for parallel organizations that do not openly avow the communist ideology but covertly follow the directions of Moscow; in infiltration tactics employed in schools, churches, trade unions, the press and most other communications media; and in the promotion of various front organizations which are directed at specific objectives such as the anti-European Defense Community campaign and the Stockholm Peace Appeal, as well as in the popular front movement which embrace nationalistic aspirations. When these are all added together they represent an immense psychological effort. A rough estimate is that the entire program involves the utilization of five hundred thousand men and an annual expenditure of some two billion dollars.<sup>7</sup> In comparison, the USIA's total budget is more than matched by the Soviet expenditures simply to jam the Voice of America.<sup>8</sup> This gigantic total is

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<sup>7</sup>United States Congress, Senate, The Technique of Soviet Propaganda (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1960), pp. 2-17 passim.

<sup>8</sup>Edward R. Murrow, Who Speaks for America (Washington: United States Information Agency Office of Public Information, Press Release No. 24, May 24, 1961), p. 13.

expected in programs for targets with every weapon that is available and appropriate.

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activity in international action engaged in schools, churches, trade unions, the press and most other communications media;

and in the promotion of various kind organizations which are

directed at specific objectives such as the anti-Soviet

between community campaign and the Scientific Forum Appeal,

as well as in the popular front movement which unites the

ideological organizations. When these are all added together

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simply to run the police of America.<sup>8</sup> This gigantic task is

<sup>7</sup>United States Congress, Senate, The Committee on Governmental Activities (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 1-11 (passim).

<sup>8</sup>Thomas A. Knutson, Who Speaks for America (Washington: United States Information Agency Office of Public Information, Press Release No. 24, May 24, 1961), p. 12.

one indication of the value placed on propaganda and the worth of psychological operations.

### Role of the Philosophy of Class Struggle

The philosophy of class struggle conceives of every group not dominated by the Party as an enemy and permits no solution to world tension until the Party dominates all other groups--or is itself destroyed. The Combat Party is not a political party such as democratic countries are accustomed to foster and protect, but, rather, an instrument of war in a conflict which the Communists expect ultimately to win.

It would be a great mistake to believe that a peaceful agreement about concessions is a peaceful agreement with capitalists. This agreement is equivalent to war.<sup>9</sup>

In the face of this point of view, so often and clearly stated, it is hard to believe that a settlement between the Soviets and the United States, by which they can live together indefinitely in peace, is conceivable to the Party leaders. On the other hand, arrangements with the United States, "codifying the momentary relationship of forces"<sup>10</sup> and permitting time to regroup forces for the next advance, are possible and often desirable.

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<sup>9</sup>Nathan Leites, The Operational Code of the Politburo (New York: McGraw Hill, 1951), p. 88, quoted from Lenin.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 90.



the functioning of the state power in accordance with the  
 spirit of capitalist operations.

### Role of the Ideology of Class Struggle

The ideology of class struggle consists of every

group and individual in the party as an enemy and partner of

revolution in world politics until the party achieves all

other things—its final objective. The class party is

not a political party, such as democratic societies and others

formed to defend the interests, not, rather, an instrument of

war in a world which the Communist expects to achieve by

the

It would be a great error to believe that a permanent  
 agreement about Communism is a permanent agreement  
 with capitalism. This agreement is subject to  
 change.

In the face of this point of view, we often see

stated clearly, it is hard to believe that a permanent

between the United States and the United States, in which they can

live together peacefully in peace, is impossible in the

party interest. On the other hand, arrangements with the

United States, including the necessary relationship of

forces<sup>12</sup> and resulting from the necessary forces for the party

interest, are possible and often desirable.

<sup>12</sup>James L. Ladd, *The Communist Party of the United States*, New York, 1951, p. 100. Ladd also states that the party is not a party of the people.

### The Worldwide Opinion Campaigns

The great worldwide opinion campaigns are notable for their length and for the skill with which changes and variations were introduced so as to maintain interest over a long period. They all illustrate the choice of agitational material for wide and continued psychological operations. The peace campaign, the germ warfare campaign, the disarmament campaign, the peaceful coexistence campaign: they are all grounded in tensions of great potency and wide extent. The world is sick of war. The world is fearful of what Chemical-Biological-Radiological (CBR) warfare may bring. The world dreads the possibility of a thermonuclear exchange. In the latter case, the people of Asia are keenly aware that the United States has employed the nuclear weapon only against the yellow people of the Far East. These themes lend themselves to all kinds of specific as well as "rigged" events and evidence. In addition, they possess the beauty of being susceptible to simplification down to the level where the agitator can operate most effectively.

These campaigns have also served as most effective political lubricants for Soviet foreign policy. In his report on "Peace and War," made during the Seventh Congress of the Russian Communist Party, following the signing of the 1918 Brest-Litovsk peace treaty with Germany, Lenin established the fundamental pattern for the communist peace strategy:

# The American Culture Campaign

The great worldwide culture campaign are certain for  
 each temple and for the still with courage and will-  
 given were introduced as it to achieve interest over a long  
 period. They all illustrate the power of spiritual re-  
 turn for with and profound psychological operations. The  
 power remains. The great culture campaign, the literature  
 campaign, the political consciousness campaign, they are all  
 grounded in a sense of great power and also within. The  
 world is rich of art. The way is toward of total human-  
 ity and biological (the) culture and science. The world  
 needs the possibility of a transcendent campaign. In the  
 future, the power of art and beauty will be the  
 United States has enjoyed the nuclear world only against  
 the future people of the world. The future will be  
 better to all kinds of people as well as "right" people  
 and victory. In addition, they provide the power of being  
 everywhere on a mission to look for the best of the  
 system and people with victory.

These campaigns have also moved as well as other  
 political objectives for great human beings. In the  
 report on "The Great Campaign" and during the recent Congress  
 of the American Communist Party, following the signing of the  
 1918 Anti-Communist Act, they were given. They were  
 listed the political power for the communist party



1. Compare strengths and avoid war under unfavorable circumstances.
2. Peace negotiations are a means of accumulating power and should be used to seek temporary respite in preparation for new wars.
3. Be willing to retreat so as to plan for future attacks. If all men cannot be withdrawn in complete safety, at least try in half safety. Never hesitate to counter-attack in order to take the best advantage for all chances and opportunities.
4. Trade space for time.
5. Divide the enemies' strength and secure the fruits of revolution. Take maximum advantage of mistrust and discord within the enemy.
6. Crawl in deep mud to brew world revolution.  
There is nothing to which one cannot or must not resort in order to accomplish one's goals.

Thus Lenin projected the teachings of Marx and Engels who, when faced with serious defeats or frustrations, were always ready to resort to the so-called "peaceful" strategies. Engels, in this connection, held that on occasion one might be forced by circumstances to accept a compromise. When so confronted, however, the true revolutionary aim must never be abandoned; rather, with it firmly fixed in mind,

[illegible]

under whatever circumstances, its ultimate achievement must be pursued.

Stalin wielded the "peace strategy" weapons most effectively. During his dictatorship, the "united front" and "peaceful coexistence" themes were developed as means to seek cooperation with the Western democracies. During the late 1930's, Russian policy had led her to enter into peaceful coexistence arrangements with both sides of the approaching war.

#### Stalin's Strategic Concept for Peaceful Coexistence

Less than a year before his death, in an article in the September 15, 1952, issue of Pravda, entitled "Economic Problems of Socialism in Soviet Russia," Stalin, following in Lenin's steps, bequeathed the basic strategic direction for the skillful use of the "peaceful coexistence" campaign which was soon to blossom forth. Peaceful coexistence was to be employed as a psychological instrument of Soviet foreign policy so as to:

1. Prevent the premature outbreak of the decisive war against the Western World; i.e., before the Soviet Union was completely prepared, so as to avoid an irreparable defeat.
2. Win sufficient time behind the banner of "peaceful coexistence" so that the Soviet Union could accumulate its strength, multiply the production



under various circumstances, the minimum adjustment must be provided.

As the world's "peace strategy" becomes more effectively, the "United States" and "peaceful cooperation" become more developed in order to keep cooperation with the peace movement. During the late 1950's, the peace policy had led to the late 1950's but cooperation with the peace side of the system was not.

#### Peace's Strategic Policy and Political Situation

Less than a year before his death in the United States, the September 15, 1951, issue of *Foreign Affairs* published "The Situation of Peace in World Affairs," which, following in the same issue, presented the basic strategic situation for the United States of the "peaceful cooperation" strategy which was seen as a peace policy. Political cooperation was to be engaged on a psychological foundation of peace and not policy as a goal.

1. Through the peaceful approach of the United States against the Soviet Union, the United States was completely engaged, as in the world as a peace policy.

2. The United States has been the leader of "peaceful cooperation" as the United States would maintain its strategy, mainly the economic

of atomic weapons, and advance from an inferior position to a superior one.

3. Dampen the morale of the democratic countries, slow down their rearmament, and weaken their war potential.
4. Carry out, behind the call for peace, political infiltration throughout the free world, and by using neutralists and selfish peoples who want peace at any price sabotage the democratic world from within and place it entirely on the defensive.
5. Divide the democracies by the peace offensive and, above all, isolate the United States from its allies.

Despite his posthumous public degradation, Stalin's strategic legacy remains as valid, subject to Khrushchev's variation on Clausewitz's statement that "war is the continuation of policy by other means." If peace, in dialectic terms, is therefore a struggle, it differs from war not by its objectives, but by the means used. Peace, then, is the absence of military hostilities and nothing more. It is within this frame of reference that current Russian interpretation of peaceful coexistence is fixed. It is precisely this formulation which lends psychological operations their great utility in pursuing the Stalinist strategy.

at these points, and between them at intervals

position in a regular way.

1. Among the points of the horizontal line,

from the first horizontal, and from the

second horizontal.

2. From the point of the horizontal line,

horizontal line, and from the point of the

horizontal line, and from the point of the

horizontal line, and from the point of the

horizontal line, and from the point of the

horizontal line.

3. From the point of the horizontal line,

horizontal line, and from the point of the

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4. From the point of the horizontal line,

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### The Soviet Disarmament Campaign

The really exquisite degree of policy integration, however, becomes strikingly apparent when the Soviet disarmament campaign is examined for the psychological implications and ramifications of this Kremlin policy.

Soviet national security objectives direct major effort toward the neutralization and removal of American power from Eurasia and eventual elimination of any form of military threat from the Western Hemisphere. These national security goals can be combined in proposals for disarmament, the guiding principle of which is: for the USSR, invulnerability; for the United States, paralysis.<sup>11</sup>

The individual goals of this Soviet policy include the following:<sup>12</sup>

1. The paralysis of American will to use strategic nuclear weapons and, if possible, the elimination of all American and other Western nuclear weapons, both strategic and tactical.
2. The weakening or disintegration of the American alliance system, especially NATO.

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<sup>11</sup>J. M. Mackintosh, Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 238.

<sup>12</sup>John W. Spanier and Joseph L. Nogee, The Politics of Disarmament (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), pp. 36-44.

# The Soviet Economic Transition

The early emphasis upon the role of the state in the economy, however, has been steadily replaced by the role of the market. The Soviet Union is now a free market economy, and the role of the state has been reduced to that of a regulator.

The Soviet Union's economic system is based upon the principle of the free market. The state has no role in the production of goods or services, and the only role of the state is to regulate the market. The Soviet Union's economic system is based upon the principle of the free market, and the state has no role in the production of goods or services.

The Soviet Union's economic system is based upon the principle of the free market, and the state has no role in the production of goods or services. The Soviet Union's economic system is based upon the principle of the free market, and the state has no role in the production of goods or services.

The Soviet Union's economic system is based upon the principle of the free market, and the state has no role in the production of goods or services. The Soviet Union's economic system is based upon the principle of the free market, and the state has no role in the production of goods or services.

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The Soviet Union's economic system is based upon the principle of the free market, and the state has no role in the production of goods or services. The Soviet Union's economic system is based upon the principle of the free market, and the state has no role in the production of goods or services.

3. The identification of Soviet policies with the aspirations and aims of the neutral nations recently liberated from Western Colonialism. Psychological warfare has served as a principal vehicle for the pursuit of those goals. It has been, from the beginning, a campaign designed to place the USSR in a favorable position, to appeal to the different segments of world public opinion--the Communist bloc, the Western World, and the uncommitted or neutral nations.

The tactical approach has been to attempt to create a worldwide revolution against nuclear weapons and to prompt peoples and governments all over the world to exert pressure on the American Government to forestall a possible resort to these arms in crisis. The end sought is to force the leadership elite to become unsure of their own capabilities, intentions, rights, and, above all, of their chances of success. This is to be accomplished by the neutralization of allies and by paralyzing principal sources of support, thereby causing the national leaders to vacillate.

By maneuvering American spokesmen into admitting that nuclear weapons are indeed terrible, the USSR has been able to place the United States in the paradoxical position whereby, on the one hand, her military power depends almost exclusively on nuclear weapons, while, on the other, her own representatives have stigmatized the



34. The introduction of social policies was the

beginning and also of the social system

which, through the process of socialization

has been transformed into a political

system for the purpose of social order. It was

from the beginning, a complex system

of power and law in a complex system, in

order to be able to respond to needs

of the community. The system is, the system

is, and the system is, and the system is,

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very strategy on which the United States and her allies rely for their security.<sup>13</sup>

Thus the focus of global concern is disassociated from crises inspired or exploited by the communists and fixed upon the purported immorality of the employment of nuclear weapons, the danger of a nuclear holocaust, and American "atomic aggression."

Classic Bolshevik doctrine holds that communists cannot fight an unjust war, even if they initiate it, since wars fought by communists are, by definition, progressive and revolutionary, the qualifications for "just" war. Khrushchev carefully maintained the distinction between just and unjust wars, thereby retaining war as a permissible instrument of revolutionary change so long as it serves the interests of communism and so long as conditions are suitable for waging it. The Soviet disarmament campaign has represented a major attempt to keep the path to world revolution open to all means of struggle, including whatever use of military force may be necessary, to reach the Soviet goal of global supremacy.

Associated psychological threads weave through all of these programs with the common psychological goals of total paralysis of Western will and debilitation of Western military, economic, and political power. Call it peaceful

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<sup>13</sup>Ibid., pp. 38-39.

very rapidly in what the United States and the  
 United Kingdom have done.

There the trend of public opinion is indicated from  
 various sources as indicated by the communists and their  
 upon the political instability of the movement of western  
 movement, the impact of a western movement, and finally  
 towards the movement.

Chinese political thought is not communist and  
 not like an eastern one, even in the initial 19, since  
 were fought by communists and by the Chinese, communists and  
 revolutionaries, the revolutionaries are "free" men. Communism  
 naturally selected the communist movement (and not others)  
 made, thereby becoming not as a possible movement of  
 revolutionary things as long as it serves the interests of  
 communists and as long as conditions are suitable for making  
 it. The Soviet Government committee has suggested a major  
 attempt to keep the world as a world revolution - not as all  
 kinds of revolution, including western and of military force  
 may be necessary, to reach the final goal of world

revolution.

Political psychological factors were through all of  
 these periods with the common psychological basis of total  
 dominance of western will and domination of western will-  
 ness, economic and political power. This is consistent



coexistence, disarmament, world peace--the ultimate inter-related and integrated goals are identical.

#### IV. A COMPARISON OF SOVIET AND UNITED STATES EFFORTS

A comparison of the organizations existing within the Soviet Union and the United States designed for the conduct of the psychological operations of psychological warfare is a discouraging exercise. It is difficult to compare such dissimilar operations. However, certain relative factors do emerge which demarcate areas of American weakness; these are as follows:

- I. A. The Soviet Union is completely organized for the waging of total, full-scale, psychological warfare during peace time and has been so for over thirty years.
- B. The United States has barely started its organizational development and has no policy guidance body specifically designated with the responsibility of insuring the development of an integrated, psychological program.
- II. A. Soviet psychological operations are uniform and centrally directed in accordance with the integrated plans of the communist party. The control of these activities is absolute,

coexisting, although, with some—this is the case in the  
 raised and lowered levels and identical.

It is, of course, a question of degree and  
 degree of change.

A comparison of the two systems, which is the  
 basis of the two systems, is the basis of the two systems,  
 of the psychological processes of psychological systems is a  
 disorganized system. It is difficult to compare with the  
 similar systems, however, certain relative systems are  
 among them, however, as of human systems, that is  
 as follows:

1. The human system is completely, however, for  
 the system of social, political, psychological,  
 and various other systems, and that is the  
 in the same system.
2. The human system has been studied in  
 organizational systems, and that is the  
 system, but systematically organized and  
 the responsibility of the system is the  
 one of an integrated, psychological system,  
 and that is the psychological system, and that is  
 and control system, as a system, and  
 the integrated system of the human system,  
 the system of these activities is the system.

is at a very high point in the Party, and is the responsibility of a separate department within the Executive Staff of the Party Secretariat.

B. American psychological warfare is only partially uniform. It tends heavily towards information activities conducted by the USIA. There is no central guidance or control; instead, there is a somewhat informal coordination with little compulsion, other than an individual's devotion to duty, to insure that policies, plans, and public announcements are compatible.

III. A. The Soviet Union has waged psychological warfare for forty-six years and has developed advanced organizational and operational techniques. The strategy is a total program, integrating military force, diplomacy, economic activity, and psychological operations into a detailed interlocking plan of action.

B. The United States waged psychological war for the first time in World War I. It carried out extensive operations in World War II and the Korean War. After each of the first



is at a very high point in the early 20s  
 in the responsibility of a regular department  
 and within the Executive Staff of the early  
 30s.

II. American psychological science is only now  
 really entering its second century. The  
 first half of the century was dominated by the  
 study of the individual and the individual's  
 behavior. There is no doubt that the study of  
 the individual is still a dominant interest  
 in psychology. But there is a growing interest  
 in the study of the individual in his  
 relation to his environment. This is a new  
 interest that is growing rapidly, and it is  
 one that is of great importance to the  
 study of the individual.

III. A. The study of the individual and his  
 behavior is the study of the individual and  
 his behavior. This is the study of the  
 individual and his behavior. This is the  
 study of the individual and his behavior.  
 This is the study of the individual and  
 his behavior. This is the study of the  
 individual and his behavior. This is the  
 study of the individual and his behavior.

B. The study of the individual and his  
 behavior is the study of the individual and  
 his behavior. This is the study of the  
 individual and his behavior. This is the  
 study of the individual and his behavior.  
 This is the study of the individual and  
 his behavior. This is the study of the  
 individual and his behavior. This is the  
 study of the individual and his behavior.

two conflicts, the organizations were hastily disbanded and no scientific, scholarly examination of the lessons to be learned was conducted. Consequently, no effective organization has been developed. The USIA under the guidance of Edward R. Murrow, evolved into a first-class information operation, but lacks the proper psychological matrix to be truly effective as a tool for psychological operations. There is no total United States program: foreign policy is still carried out largely through individual, as opposed to the collective, efforts pursued along the parochial lines of action of the various components of foreign policy.

- IV. A. The communist apparatus for psychological war is aggressive and is on the constant offensive--thus giving the USSR a psychological superiority.
- B. United States psychological operations, having no clearly-defined place in the conduct of national strategy and not stridently on the offensive, are forced or, in the eyes of

two countries, the psychological state  
has been assessed and no scientific  
methodology has been used in the attempt to be  
thoroughly scientific. Consequently, no  
objective explanation has been given.

The first major assumption of theory is  
theory which is a theory of human behavior  
that operates, but lacks the proper psycho-  
logical basis to be truly scientific as a  
tool for psychological operations. There  
is no social United States human behavior  
theory is still needed and largely through  
individuals, as opposed to the collective.

which is based on the psychological lines  
of action of the various components of  
human society.

IV. A. The economic system for psychological and  
is operative and is in the human system  
type—this giving the human psychological  
activity.

B. United States psychological operations, having  
no clearly-defined place in the economy of  
national economy and not operating on the  
activity, the human system, as the type of



the World, appear to be forced continually into a defensive position.

V. A. The Soviet program fights for the "liberation" of the suppressed and underprivileged. The program is repeated with an uncompromising insistence.

B. The United States has tended to be out of touch with the miseries and aspirations of the masses in the foreign countries, particularly those of the Middle East and Southeast Asia. As a result, the "pitch" has been too high and complicated--appealing to the spirit instead of the flesh. These tendencies began to diminish under Murrow's directorship of the USIA. Commercial means of mass communications retain the Madison Avenue-Hollywood approach. United States psychological efforts are certainly not insistent.

VI. A. Communist propaganda is spread by the largest propaganda organization in the world. Diplomats, trained underground organs, and the Communist Party sell the ideas of the propaganda war.

B. The United States has no single propaganda/



psychological warfare organization and no "psychological troops" to give unanimity to the utterances of the program, such as it may be.

VII. The people of the United States are generally ignorant or ill informed of the interrelationship between communism and the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. They are equally out of touch with their own heritage and national foreign policy. This has bred an apathy and aimlessness that, through the elected leaders, tends to blur the policy formulation process. In turn, a less than incisive and decisive foreign policy has become the hallmark of United States international relations.

However, before one becomes too despondent over these less than fatal frailties of the American nation, it should be remembered that:

. . . the United States remains the largest extant revolutionary experiment in the world--the first immense human community which survives without profound dogma or profound hatred and which attempts to make short-range, practical, and warm hearted (though ideologically superficial) concurrence the foundation for a political and industrial civilization. If the United States . . . [can survive the cold war] it may be that the rest of mankind will be persuaded that our kind of practicality is not only humanly preferable, but scientifically more defensible than the philosophies of competing civilizations.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>14</sup>Linebarger, op. cit., p. 296.





## CHAPTER VI

### A PROPOSAL

#### I. INTRODUCTION

Many distinguished minds have been directed at the solution to the difficulties encountered in organizing for the conduct of psychological operations. Simultaneously, there has been a curious reluctance to undertake the tasks necessary to the attainment of the objectives of the organizations created. It is the conclusion of this paper that the access route to the development of total strategies, which are, after all, well thought out, integrated plans of action to achieve the goals of American foreign policy, lies through organization and the assumption of the responsibilities of leadership.

Familiarity with a weapon or tool comes only with the employment and use of the instrument. It does not come from philosophic, detached observations. This is not to imply lack of regard for the role of scholarly research; but operational experience derives fundamentally from operating. Scholarship and research can provide theory and tentative doctrine. Its worth is no greater than the practical use to which this theory and doctrine are, or can, be put. The clarity with which the theory and doctrine can be stated and refined requires an operational input. Operational

## Chapter VI

### A. INTRODUCTION

#### 1. INTRODUCTION

Many distinguished minds have been directed at the solution of the difficulties encountered in realizing the concept of psychological operations. Consequently, there has been a certain reluctance to discuss the matter in the statement of the objectives of the current national system. It is the conviction of this report that the success of the development of total strategy, which are, after all, well thought out, integrated plans of action to achieve the goals of American foreign policy, lies through organization and the acceptance of the responsibility of leadership.

Working with a system of total power only with the employment and use of the instrument. It does not come from philosophy, external observation. This is not to imply lack of regard for the role of military leadership, but operational expertise derives fundamentally from decision. Scholarship and research can provide theory and method. The world is no greater than the physical and the whole this theory and method have to put. The clarity with which the theory and decision can be stated and related requires an operational input, operational



requirements should dictate the doctrinal requirements, not vice versa.

It has been developed that in the United States there is neither a clearly-articulated nor a widely-accepted concept of the nature of the psychological instrument of foreign policy. This follows from the Jackson Committee's valid observation that the psychological aspect of policy is not separable from policy and that the psychological implication in every act does not have life apart from the act. The American pragmatic approach yearns for a clear-cut doctrine, a check-off list of "do's" and "don't's." Consequently there is a frustration that derives from attempting to define a function the nature of which is dependent upon the operational requirements of unforeseen contingencies. In vernacular terms, it leaves one with the problem of trying to explain to a person, blind from birth, how purple might taste; in other words, "you simply can't get there from here." One can write around this vicious circle of cause and effect, discoursing upon the innumerable variations on the basic theme, indefinitely. This much is clear, however; so long as the United States awaits the birth of a clear-cut articulation of the role of the psychological instrument before it attempts to utilize the instrument, the understanding needed to articulate the role will never be born. The governmental machinery is "hung on dead center"

regulations should include the following requirements; not

also also.

It has been suggested that in the United States there

is neither a clearly-defined nor a widely-accepted con-

cept of the nature of the psychological instrument of for-

sign policy. This follows from the Jackson Commission's

valid observation that the psychological aspect of policy is

not separable from policy and that the psychological insti-

tution in every act does not have the same effect from the act.

The American psychological approach seems to be a clear-cut doc-

trine, a check-out list of "do's" and "don't's." Com-

munity there is a conviction that behavior is determined

by a function of nature of which it depends upon

the operational requirements of individual circumstances.

In psychological terms, it seems one with the problem of

trying to explain to a person, blind from birth, how people

might behave in other words, "you simply can't get there

from here." One can only expect that people will be

caused and effect, depending upon the immediate variations

on the basic mass, indefinitely. This view is clear, non-

over, so long as the world itself is the first of a

direct-one relationship to the role of the psychological in-

strument nature is attempts to utilize the instrument, the

understanding needed to articulate the form will never be

known. The government's activity is "up on the wall."

and will remain this way until an operational start is made.

Action and only action will break the circle and dispel the

fuzzy notion . . . [that psychological operations are limited to] a contest between two gladiators with the "minds of men" at stake . . . [accomplished through a process of] providing information or of cracking the Iron Curtain with a battering ram of truth.<sup>1</sup>

To organize the tools of foreign policy so as to provide an integrated strategy requires machinery for the resolution of conflicting department viewpoints and positions. Policy, once formulated, requires methods of evaluation to insure that it is being carried out. In effect, this demands a policing of the departments of government in order to assure the executive leadership that progress toward the policy objective is being made in the way the leadership wants it made. There can be no place for unresolved positions on important national issues simply because the resolution will tread on the toes of one department or another.

## II. AMERICAN ORGANIZATIONAL EFFORTS

Since 1941, several distinct organizational approaches to the solution of the problem have been employed. Under Roosevelt, the solution was to proliferate agencies and to

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<sup>1</sup>Robert T. Holt and Robert W. van de Velde, Strategic Psychological Operations and American Foreign Policy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960), pp. 234-237, passim.



and will remain this way until an opportunity arises to make  
action and only action will break the circle and direct the

future action. A. A. (These psychological questions are  
limited to a constant between two individuals with the  
aim of not being a . . . accomplished through a  
process of providing information or of creating the  
from certain with a governing set of rules.)

In organizing the basis of foreign policy as we have  
seen an important scholarly tradition existing for the reason  
that of conflicting important viewpoints and positions.  
policy, even formulated, involves methods of evaluating the  
issue that it is being worked out. In effect, this has  
made a policy of the importance of government in order  
to secure the economic leadership that provides toward the  
policy objective is being made in the way the leadership  
works is made. There can be no place for nationalist policy  
since an important national interest simply because the  
realization will mean on the loss of our dependence on  
foreign.

## II. AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Since 1941, several distinct organizational systems  
for the solution of the problem have been employed. Under  
American, the solution has to provide a specific and to

<sup>1</sup>Edward T. Hall and Joseph A. von Neumann, *Psychological  
Experiments in Learning and Teaching Foreign Policy*  
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1944), pp. 134-  
137, passim.

layer successive committees, offices, and bureaus, one upon the other. The administrative maze that resulted was breathtaking. The almost total elimination of the psychological program following World War II had its bright side, for, at least, it wiped from the governmental complex a truly monstrous, almost grotesque arrangement.

Shortly after World War II, the second conception began to appear in the early State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC). The pattern developed through a variety of larval stages and eventually appeared within the Department of State structure as the Interdepartmental Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee.

The path of development then passed through the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) which was created by Executive Order in 1951. The PSB was to be responsible for the

formulation and promulgation, as guidance to the departments and agencies responsible for psychological operations, of over-all national psychological objectives, policies and programs, and for the coordination and evaluation of the national psychological effort.<sup>2</sup>

It was established outside the National Security Council structure but reported to the NSC on its activities and its

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<sup>2</sup>United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, "National Policy Machinery in the Soviet Union," Organizing for National Security, Volume 2 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 439.





evaluation of national psychological operations including implementation of approved objectives, policies, and programs by the departments and agencies concerned. The PSB failed, primarily, because it was founded upon the basic misconception that psychological operations existed apart from official policies and actions and could be dealt with independently by experts in this field.

The last and most refined stage was reached in the establishment, by another Executive Order, of the Operations Coordinating Board. The OCB was, at first, outside the structure of the National Security Council and was not incorporated within the NSC structure for another four years. Following his election, President Kennedy eliminated the Board, thereby, at least temporarily, ending this direction of organizational development.

All of the bodies that were developed in this second approach to the problem suffered from a common, fatal flaw. They attempted to coordinate, to conciliate, to synchronize a total program out of the individual programs of the member activities. None of these bodies could direct or impose a solution. All of them were heeded only, if, as, and when it suited the member activities to act in effective concert. The decision to act in concert was retained on the agency or departmental level. No organization can function properly if presumptuous juniors are permitted to decide whether or

evaluation of various psychological operations including  
 implementation of approved objectives, policies, and pro-  
 cedures by the departments and agencies concerned. The  
 results, however, are not limited upon the basis  
 of acceptance of the psychological operations conducted  
 from official policies and actions and could be made with  
 independently by experts in this field.

The last and most serious error was reached in the  
 establishment of a central executive body, or the operations  
 coordinating body. The G-2 was, at first, outside the  
 structure of the National Security Council and was not  
 connected with the NSC process for another four years.  
 Following his election, President Kennedy eliminated the  
 NSC, thereby, at least temporarily, ending this situation  
 of organizational dysfunction.

All of the bodies that were developed in this period  
 applied to the process suffered from a common fatal flaw.  
 They attempted to coordinate, to centralize, to synthesize  
 a total picture out of the individual outputs of the member  
 agencies. None of these bodies could direct or manage a  
 program. All of them were created only to do what it  
 never was intended to do in effective command.  
 The solution is not to conduct war through the agency  
 departmental level. The organization can function properly  
 if responsibility for the war is placed in the hands of

not they will carry out the letter and spirit of the policies of the chief executive. This observation remains as valid today as it was when Napoleon expounded it. A chief executive who permits the establishment of such an organization and subsequently does not correct any proclivities to parochialism is culpably responsible for the inevitable failure of the organization.

The third approach is really no approach at all. It was manifest by the Kennedy Administration's tendency to form policy out of small intimate meetings. This is the ad hoc method which may work satisfactorily in periods of comparative calm. The Cuban crisis produced food for some disturbing thought as to the degree of adaptability of the Kennedy approach to a multiple, high intensity, high risk crisis situation. The intellectual resources of the Government were totally committed during the October 1962 crisis; it is difficult to perceive how a similar or several similar crises could have been handled simultaneously. An effective organization for the employment of the tools of foreign policy must be able to serve in peace, "cold" war, or "hot" war without any major structural adjustments. The government must go on; it cannot pause in mid stride, drop everything else it is doing, and deal with the crisis of the moment. To operate and organize for such a method of problem solving is to invite grave danger.



and they will keep out the labor and profits of the public-  
 edge of the chief executive. This management remains in  
 will keep as it has been before. It is chief  
 executive and people are established as such an organization  
 plan and organizationally have not changed and possibly in  
 personnel is mainly responsible for the business  
 failure of the organization.  
 The third approach is really no approach at all. It  
 was rejected by the Kennedy Administration's committee in  
 form policy out of their business methods. This is the only  
 one method which was most certainly in violation of  
 competitive rule. The Commission's previous work for some  
 planning brought us to the point of stability in the  
 Kennedy approach to a business, which is really, with risk  
 taking decisions. The institutional character of the business  
 must have totally changed during the period 1963-1965 (1963-1965)  
 in its efforts to survive has a character of survival which  
 could have been denied simultaneously. In effective  
 organization for the management of the state of foreign  
 policy must be able to serve in peace, which was, in 1963,  
 we without any major structural adjustments. The government  
 was not to be in a constant state of war, they were  
 thing else is to be done, and that is the state of the  
 economy. The system and organization for such a world of peace  
 has nothing to do with the state of the world.

### III. THE POTENTIAL OF THE OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD

The first and third patterns are considered to be very poor and to offer little security if pursued. But the second approach still offers much promise provided it is corrected so as to function viably. The Operations Coordinating Board could have performed as it was intended to perform had it:

1. Been able to direct the members to develop long-range and integrated plans under the policy guidance of the National Security Council.
2. Been able to direct the members to carry out the plans and policy as formulated.
3. Not been allowed to develop away from its original concept. Its official inclusion within the National Security Council Structure in 1957 was bound to result in its performing less of its designed function and more as a NSC staff arm. This is precisely what occurred.
4. Been endowed with sufficient status to deal, at least, on an equal level with the operating agencies and departments. Access to the President, the Cabinet, and the National Security Council must not only be possible, but it must be easy as well. Under the existing conditions

# III. THE QUESTION OF THE REVISIONS

## CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS

The first and most important question is whether the very fact that the Government is now in power, and the fact that it is now in power, is a sufficient basis for the revision of the Constitution. The Government is now in power, and the fact that it is now in power, is a sufficient basis for the revision of the Constitution. The Government is now in power, and the fact that it is now in power, is a sufficient basis for the revision of the Constitution.

1. It is not possible to say that the Government is now in power, and the fact that it is now in power, is a sufficient basis for the revision of the Constitution. The Government is now in power, and the fact that it is now in power, is a sufficient basis for the revision of the Constitution. The Government is now in power, and the fact that it is now in power, is a sufficient basis for the revision of the Constitution.

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of overlap and multiplicity of responsibility and authority, an agency attempting to develop long-range, integrated plans simply will not be able to conduct effective operations if it is on a lower level of importance than the Department of State or the Defense Department.

#### IV. CORRECTIVE MEASURES

##### Status of the Agency Head

Were such a body, as heretofore outlined, to exist, the position of its head within the government hierarchy would be of vital importance. He should attend all meetings of the Cabinet and all National Security Council meetings. He should be at no lower organizational level than that of a Cabinet member. These requirements stem from the following consideration:

First, he must be sufficiently high in rank to speak on equal terms with the department heads of the government. If his organization is to be effective, he must participate, as an equal, in the highest staff levels of policy formulation where his views on the susceptibility of emerging policy to integration into a coordinated planning system could be voiced positively and authoritatively. Since he would be directly concerned with the psychological implications of integrated plans formulated for the achievement of

of making the Ministry of Responsibility  
and Ministry, as Agency attempting to making  
impunity, integrated since they will not be  
able to conduct effective operations if it is  
at a lower level of importance than the Agency  
and of course on the National level.

#### IV. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

##### Terms of the Agency Staff

There must be a body, as mentioned earlier, to make  
the position of the head within the government hierarchy  
would be of vital importance. The second person in the hierarchy  
of the Agency and all National Security Council members.  
He should be at a lower organizational level than that of a  
National member. These provisions stem from the following

##### Considerations

First, he must be sufficiently high in rank to speak  
on equal terms with the department heads of the government.  
It is important to be able to do this, he must be able to  
as an equal, in the highest state of mind to make decisions  
from which his views on the responsibility of making  
policy to be implemented with a minimum planning system  
could be taken positively and substantively. This is  
would be directly connected with the psychological factors  
which is important since discussed for the development of

policy goals, he should inject directly into the policy formulation process a feeling for the important psychological implications which would be expressed much later in those psychological operations developed as part of an integrated national planning process in support of policy. Had such a high level of advice been available, it is possible that decisions which led to such sources of long-term political discomfort as the recognition of Israel, the refusal to fund the Aswan Dam, and the Sky-Bolt might have been viewed in a different manner. Therefore, his position would be untenable if he must participate as a guest or a junior member in any of the policy process.

A second consideration is that his contribution must be made expeditiously so that it may have its impact before policy is formulated. To consult with, or to be consulted by, a Cabinet member or a member of a Cabinet member's staff, out of the context of the actual discussion and after the fact is unsatisfactory. Policy formulation as well as planning for policy execution must be integrated. In many cases, there will be no time or opportunity for altering decisions or changing the course of policy action taken by the President and his principal advisers after they have determined what the decisions and courses should be.

There is one government official whose position within the executive hierarchy vests him with the stature



policy goals, we should submit directly into the policy  
 formulation process a finding that the important psychological  
 and institutional issues would be represented with later in  
 those psychological questions developed in part of an inter-  
 related national planning process in context of policy. And  
 such a high level of review seems available, it is possible  
 that decisions which led to such reviews of long-term  
 political decisions as the reorganization of Israel, the  
 pattern of the Israel day, and the two-state might have  
 been viewed in a different manner. Moreover, his position  
 would be remarkable if he were perceived as a guest or a  
 junior member in any of the policy process.

— A second consideration is that his contribution must  
 be made explicitly so that it may have its impact before  
 policy is formulated. To commit with, or to be committed  
 by a United Nations or a member of a United Nations which  
 set at the outset of the actual discussion and after the  
 fact is unnecessary. Policy formulation as well as giving  
 input for policy execution must be integrated, in many cases,  
 there will be no time or opportunity for strategic decisions  
 or changing the nature of policy action taken by the Israeli  
 government and political system after they have determined  
 what the decisions and actions should be.

— There is one government official whose position  
 within the executive hierarchy seems to be the strategic

necessary for such a post: the Vice President of the United States. His post already exists; he is ranked only by the President himself; and he possesses a direct route of communication to the President which is unsurpassed. His direct participation in this foreign policy process would also serve the Country in the most advantageous manner with respect to preparing the Vice President for the full responsibility of the Presidency should he be called upon to succeed to this post.

#### Agency Location and Authority

An agency such as has been implied might well be established within the Executive Offices of the President and titled the "President's Planning Board." It would have its function stated in the Executive Order establishing its existence as follows:<sup>3</sup>

The National Security Council having recommended a national security policy and the President having approved it, the Planning Board shall: (1) whenever the President shall hereafter so direct, establish, develop, and formulate with the participation of the

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<sup>3</sup>The statement of function for the OCB serves as an excellent basis for this proposed "President's Planning Board." The original, from section 2 of the Executive Order establishing the OCB, appears on page 455 of U.S. Congress, Senate, Organizing for National Security, op. cit. The OCB, even to its last days exhibited so many possibilities, had it not been "still-born," so to speak, and had it been allowed to develop and not permitted to fall prey to staff absorption within the NSC that it offers a natural basis for an organizational solution.





agencies concerned (a) detailed operational planning responsibilities respecting such policy, (b) the integration of the interdepartmental aspects of the detailed operational plans developed by the agencies to carry out such policy, (c) a timely and integrated schedule for execution of such plans, and (d) national plans in such a manner as to exploit the full psychological aspects and implications of the nation's national security policy. (2) initiate new proposals in response to opportunity and changes in the situation. The Board shall from time to time make reports to the National Security Council with respect to the implementation of this order.

The Board thus would start life invested with the Presidential mandate to act, to formulate coordinated policy, and to direct the constituent agencies to carry out the plans developed. It would face the agencies with the necessity to consider individually and collectively the psychological implications throughout the total program.

#### Membership and Organization

The membership and organization of the President's Planning Board would include the following:

##### The Director

The Director of the President's Planning Board would be the Vice President of the United States.

The Director would participate in all National Security Council and Cabinet meetings and preside at all meetings of the Planning Board.

##### The Planning Board

The Planning Board would be composed of the following officials:

agencies concerned (a) detailed operational planning responsibilities respecting such policy, (b) the integration of the interrelated aspects of the detailed operational plans developed by the agencies to carry out such policy, (c) a timely and integrated schedule for execution of such plans, and (d) national plans in such a manner as to provide the full system-logical aspects and implications of the nation's national security policy. (2) In addition, the program is designed to provide for cooperation in the future. The Board shall from time to time make reports to the National Security Council with respect to the implementation of this policy.

The Board shall report to the President with the

President's message to Congress, to formulate coordinated policy,

and to direct the Government agencies in carrying out the

plans developed. It would have the agencies and the means-

with to consider individually and collectively the program-

logical implications throughout the total program.

#### Recommendations for Organization

The membership and organization of the President's

Planning Board would include the following:

#### The President

The Director of the President's Planning Board

would be the Vice President of the United States.

The Director would participate in all National

Security Council and Cabinet meetings and provide at

all meetings at the Planning Board.

#### The Planning Board

The Planning Board would be composed of the

following officials:

1. The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.
2. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
3. The Director of the USIA.
4. The Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
5. The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
6. The Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

#### The Planning Board Working Groups<sup>4</sup>

These groups would be composed of responsible operating officials from the agencies concerned with policy implementation. The chairman of each group would be representative of the Planning Board staff, and his deputy would be the group member from the agency which had chief responsibility. Each group would include a member from the Bureau of the Budget. The functions of these working groups would be two fold: (1) to provide a standing mechanism at the working level for the development of integrated actions to implement national security policies and

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<sup>4</sup>Patterned after the OCB working groups. In this case, however, Chairmanship devolves upon a Staff member of the Planning Board, providing a tighter control than existed under the OCB system.



1. The basic concept of the political

system.

2. The history of the system.

3. The structure of the system.

4. The function of the system.

5. The development of the system.

6. The present state of the system.

7. The future of the system.

8. The role of the system.

9. The importance of the system.

10. The conclusion of the system.

These groups would be composed of representatives

operating officials from the agencies concerned with

policy implementation. The members of each group

would be representatives of the planning board itself.

and the board would be the group member from the

agency which had direct responsibility. Each group

would submit a report from the board of the subject.

The function of these working groups would be to

study (1) to provide a working document at the

working level for the development of integrated

action in planning, research, and policy making.

<sup>2</sup>It should be noted that the working groups, in this case, however, are not necessarily advisory upon a final matter of policy, but rather, providing a liaison between the various agencies involved in the planning process.

(2) to prepare operations plans and progress reports for consideration by the Planning Board.

The Planning Board Assistants<sup>5</sup>

A Board Assistant would be designated from each agency represented on the Planning Board. The membership would include a representative from the Bureau of the Budget. Duties would be to provide staff support for each Board Member; to assist him in interdepartmental as well as intradepartmental planning and negotiation on subjects dealt with by the Board; and to aid the respective agency's Working Group members in meeting the requirements laid down by the Planning Board. In order to meet his responsibilities, an official designated for duty as a Board Assistant would have to hold sufficient rank within his organization to give him direct access to the principal operating officials of his agency.

As a group, the Planning Board Assistants would meet weekly, under the Chairmanship of the Special Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Planning, to review papers prepared by the working groups in order to insure that the documents were

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<sup>5</sup> Patterned directly after the OCB Assistants or "Board Assistants" as they were commonly called.

For consideration by the Library Board

A third statement would be developed from each  
 agency consisting of the Planning Council, the  
 Council would develop a representative from the  
 Council of the Council. Council would be to provide  
 staff support for each Council to assist in its  
 independent as well as interdependent  
 and the organization of subjects will be by the  
 Council and on the respective agency's working  
 group members in meeting the Council's task  
 by the Council itself. It seems to me the Council  
 should be an official advisory body to the  
 Council and should have the right to advise the  
 Council on its organization to give the Council more  
 the Council's official statement of its agency.  
 As a result, the Council would develop a  
 staff which would be the Council's staff and would  
 assist in the Plan Council's work and develop  
 training for other people involved in the working  
 Council in order to make sure the Council's work



ready for Board action. It is at this point that most careful attention would be directed to the adequacy of a paper, the accurate reflection of any differences of view among the agencies, and the development of a proposed course of action for further consideration by the Board.

The Planning Board Staff<sup>6</sup>

The Planning Board staff would be composed of the following elements:

1. The Office of the Planning Board Staff  
Director and the Deputy Director. The Special Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Planning would be the Director.
2. The Secretariat, which would be the source of executive secretaries for the working groups and would generally assist and provide substantive staff support for the process by which member agencies reached decisions and developed actions to carry out national security policies.
3. The Supervisory Staff which would be the source for all chairmen of the planning

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<sup>6</sup>Patterned after the OCB Staff.

easy for Board action. It is at this point that  
 and careful attention would be directed to the  
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 of the Board.

### The Board of Directors

The Board of Directors would be composed of  
 the following members:

1. The Office of the President of the Board.
2. The Secretary and the Treasurer.
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Board Working Groups. The Deputy Director of the Planning Board Staff would assume direct responsibility for the operational guidance of this Staff element.

4. The Special Studies Staff which would provide the Special Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Planning and the Supervisory Staff with current background information on foreign political, military, economic, social, and ideological developments affecting the psychological aspects of implementation of national security policies.

#### The Executive Office of the Director

The Executive Office of the Director would include the Vice President's personal Planning Board Staff which would be headed by the Special Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Planning. It would also include an Office of Inspector General which would be competent to review and evaluate any and all aspects of the operations of Planning Board Agencies.

#### The Special Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Planning

The Special Assistant to the Vice President for





National Security Planning would be the Vice President's principal staff officer for national security affairs. He would be a person without departmental ties who, through a direct and close staff relationship with the Vice President, would be fully cognizant of the desires and the requirements of the Vice President. The Special Assistant would sit with the State Department Policy Planning Council. He would also sit with the Cold War Advisory Panel of the Department of Defense. He would act as the Executive and principal Staff Officer for the Planning Board, would be the director of the Planning Board Staff, and would chair the Planning Board Assistants.

In a further attempt to improve the quality of input to the Planning Board and the policy formulation process, the Director of the USIA would be designated a member of the Policy Planning Council of the Department of State. He would attend, as a guest, all Cabinet meetings and all National Security Council meetings. He would continue to be represented on the Cold War Advisory Panel of the Department of Defense.

#### Operational Evaluation

At this point, the concept of operational evaluation is worth a brief examination. Frankly, it is borrowed from





the idea of the General Accounting Office which acts as a form of independent follow-up and fiscal conscience for the departments and agencies of the Government. The resistance to enforced policy integration will extend downward in all the agencies. It is a peculiar bureaucratic phenomenon that the more junior the official, the more vested becomes the interest and operational patterns. In agencies as large as are those concerned with the formulation and execution of National Security Policy, the dragging of myriads of "little" feet can paralyze the production of total plans. The road to the little man's heart is through his efficiency report, and it would be the role of the Inspector General's staff to shed light on the degree of effective staff work within the agencies.

In the same manner that the Vice President would serve in a way no other official could as the eyes and ears of the President, so would the Inspector General serve the Vice President. The Inspector General would report directly to the Vice President on the results of a continuous series of surprise working inspections administered by his staff to the various headquarters and field offices of Board agencies. These reports would be the basis for improvements in a weak post or activity. The personnel assigned to this office should serve extended tours, on loan from the agencies comprising the Board. They must have demonstrated unquestioned

The idea of the General Accounting Office which acts as a  
 form of independent follow-up and fiscal conscience for the  
 departments and agencies of the Government. The position  
 for national policy integration will extend somewhat in all  
 the agencies. It is a position of general supervision that  
 the more precise the official, the more useful becomes the  
 interest and operational interest. It operates as largely as  
 one does concerned with the formulation and execution of  
 national security policy, the bringing of agencies of "little"  
 head can purchase the production of fiscal policy. The need  
 in the little man's head is through the efficiency of  
 and it would be the role of the Department of Defense's head to  
 shed light on the degree of efficiency which exists within the  
 agencies.

On the other hand, that the Vice President would  
 serve in a way as other officials would in the eyes and ears  
 of the President, so would the independent national service  
 Vice President. The President himself would report directly  
 to the Vice President on the results of a continuous series  
 of various working committees administered by his staff in  
 the various departments and kind of work at hand agencies.  
 These reports would be the basis for improvement in a way  
 just as activity. The personal emphasis on this office  
 should serve as a check on how the agencies are  
 running the Government. They must have demonstrated responsibility

integrity, objective judgment, and marked ability in a variety of headquarters and field posts of the parent agency before consideration for assignment to the Planning Board Staff.

## V. CONCLUSION

It is not intended to delve further into this organization. In the research and studies incident to the development and writing of this paper, a conspicuous lacuna in the American efforts to evolve an organization for the conduct of psychological warfare has been the marked failure to profit from past mistakes. There has been a reluctance to modify and to utilize anything of the past. New structures have been erected and discarded to be replaced by entirely different arrangements. Some of the proposals have been truly mammoth in concept and design, extending to the advocacy of an additional department of the Federal Government. While the American quest has been definitely along the organizational line, its philosophy seems to be that the answer can only lie in something predominantly new and untried.

There seems little doubt that the path is, indeed, an organizational route. However, organization can be expected to produce only a partial answer. President Truman kept a small sign on his White House Desk; it read: "The Buck



integrity, objective judgment, and worked nobly in a variety of departments and field posts of the parent Agency before consideration for assignment to the Training Board.

## V. CONCLUSION

It is not intended to derive further facts regarding the research and studies limited to the development and writing of this paper, a comprehensive picture in the American efforts to provide an organization for the conduct of psychological warfare has been the subject matter of this paper. There has been a realization of the need for such a policy, and the writing of this paper. The research has been conducted and discarded to be replaced by entirely different experiments. Some of the proposals have been fully worked in research and design, available to the Army of an additional department of the Federal Government. While the American Government has been steadily along the organizational line, the policy has been to be the most known has only its in something gradually and not in a final.

There seems little doubt that the only way to develop organizational control, however, organization can be expected to provide only a partial answer. Training cannot be a final aim in the whole world; it is a means to an end.

Stops Here." The acceptance of the inescapable responsibility of leadership can never be avoided through some piece of organizational legerdemain. The unending series of organizational failures are silhouetted in the light of this reality.

It is submitted that the time is long past when we should look over our shoulder; survey where we have been; and divest ourselves of the American preoccupation with the organizational extravaganza.

The proposed solution makes but three claims to any originality. It attempts to employ an old, familiar framework which, if properly restructured, could function effectively. It focuses attention upon the responsibility of leadership and annunciates an unequivocal, positive guidance which demands, rather than requests, a specific performance from the governmental agencies. At all levels, direction and control are retained tightly, under the interlocking supervision of the Planning Board's permanent staff members. Finally, it is comparatively simple and attempts to profit from the more obvious lessons of the past. In the last analysis, however, the following words of Theodore Roosevelt articulate the riddle of national purpose which must be solved, at all levels of American government and society, if this Nation is to continue along its path of greatness:





If we stand idly by . . . if we shirk from hard contests where men must win at hazard of their lives and at risk of all they hold dear, then the bolder and stronger people will pass us by and will win for themselves the domination of the world.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup>Cited in United States Navy, Leadership Manual (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 1.

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






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